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ABSTRACT
Does culture matter in decision-making? Existing literature largely assumes that the
cognitive processes that inform decision-making are universally applicable, while only
very few studies indicate that cultural norms and values shape cognitive processes. Using
a survey based quasi-experiment, I examine cross-country differences in cultural traits
and decision-making processes among undergraduate students in the U.S. and Ghana. A
comparison between the groups shows the constraining impact of culture at three levels:
individual, societal, and situated. At an individual level, those who are more collectivist
are more dependent in their decision-making. At a societal level, students from a
collectivist society (Ghana) are more likely to protect the interests of their inner social
identity groups, and students from an individualist society (U.S.) are more likely to make
group decisions based on perceived merit. At a situated level, a feeling of familiarity with
the setting of the conflict situation tends to produce more cooperative decisions. The
quasi-experimental survey is carried over into a third sample of Ghanaian peace
professionals from a peacekeeping training center. While Ghanaian students demonstrate
a more ethnocentric response and a reluctance to go outside of their social in-group for
help, the more experienced Ghanaian peacekeepers consider problem solutions that
would involve out-group members. This reflects a unique and less ethnocentric approach
in the experienced peacekeeping community that overcomes cultural constraints and
produces more effective conflict resolution practices.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In August of 2012, Erick Barrondo became Guatemala’s first ever Olympic medal
winner. After finishing second in the men’s twenty kilometer walk race, Barrondo said,
“It’s well known that Guatemala has problems with guns and knives. I hope that this
medal inspires the kids at home to put down guns and knives and pick up a pair of
trainers instead” (Maidment, 2012). Even today, Guatemala feels the effects of its thirtysix year civil war that ended in 1996 as individuals throughout the country make
decisions regularly on whether to cooperate or fight and whether to pursue peaceful
activities or use violence. The country’s history of armed conflict and polarized politics
created a complex social environment prompting the presence of a United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping operation, MINUGUA, for ten years ending in 2004. In its final report on
the mission, the UN noted that “the most difficult challenge for MINUGUA was to
operate in the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multilingual environment of Guatemala”
(United Nations General Assembly, 2005, p. 2). This raises the question of how
significant the impact of culture is on the decisions made not only by the deployed
peacekeeping troops but by the individuals living in the society.
Consider another UN peacekeeping mission that was challenged by issues of
culture, namely the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). UNOSOM II
was sent to Somalia to provide humanitarian relief in a protected environment in the mid
1

1990s following the Somali Civil War and has been widely criticized for its security
predicaments and clashes with the local population. Throughout the phases of the UN
mission in Somalia, cultural issues were evident. Local civilian support was essential to
the peacekeeping operation, yet the Somali culture was largely misunderstood by the
international forces stationed there. The importance of the clan system, the nomadic
conception of time, the oral traditions, and the intolerance of outside intervention in
group problems were all characteristics of the Somali culture that were ill-considered
(Duffey, 2000). Director of UN Operations in Kismayo, Mark Walsh, expressed this lack
of cultural understanding when he said, “If I could make a statement of bad experience in
Somalia, the most dominant thing is how culturally unaware I was about everything”
(Duffey, 2000, p. 157).
A lack of understanding of these cultural factors on the decisions in Somalia made
the stormy outcomes of the operation unexpected, whereas a clearer conception of the
connection between culture and decision-making may have allowed for better mission
planning and success. For example, the idea of collective responsibility is embedded in
the Somali culture and requires clan members to support each other and their leader. The
UNSOSOM II personnel, not understanding this collective identity, attempted to
neutralize the power of the clan leader by singling him out for responsibility and offering
US$25,000 for his capture (Duffey, 2000). This move actually strengthened the clan
leader’s position as the rest of the clan rallied to support him in the face of “hostile”
forces outside of the clan. In fact, the collective identity of the Somali culture was
misunderstood by UN peacekeeping personnel from the beginning of the operation.
Those with local knowledge had encouraged the UN not to send any troops, or at most a
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few hundred troops, because without negotiated terms for the operation, the local
population would not accept outside intervention and the fighting would likely get worse.
Unfortunately, the UN did not understand the cultural barrier to out-group interference,
and in a noble attempt to bring peace to the region they continued to send troops to
Somalia until 30,000 troops had amassed (Duffey, 2000). As a result, the troops were not
welcomed by the Somali people as they expected they would be.
A Cross-Cultural Research Approach
Decision-making as an activity is considered to be a universal practice in human
behavior, as people of all cultures have problems and opportunities that require making
choices from among alternatives. Some presume that the cognitive processing behind
decision-making is also universal which has led negotiators and mediators from Europe
and North America to apply Western traditions of reasoning in non-Western cultures
(Duffey, 2000). The Western focus on rational choice and maximizing the benefit for
oneself does not necessarily apply elsewhere in the world. Peacekeeping troops in
Somalia assumed that individuals would want to maximize their own benefit by seeking
the reward money, but the decision process for many locals involved the cultural value of
collective identity that would remove such reward money as an option for consideration.
On the other hand, the MINUGUA operation in Guatemala achieved more success with
its more culturally sensitive approach. MINUGUA only deployed about 425
peacekeeping personnel to Guatemala, and they made use of national indigenous staff
and translators locally. The mission was still not welcomed by many in the Guatemalan
government and some in the resistance movement. Peacekeepers had to deal with
harassment, shootings, and kidnappings directed at MINUGA personnel. However, their
3

smaller presence and linkage with the local community allowed them to overcome many
of those barriers and assist in the peace process (Jonas, 2000).
Culture is an aspect of groups learned by watching others in the group who
embody the group norms. Individuals internalize aspects of the group norms and behave
in ways that model the group overall. The group norms may promote behavior focused on
the group’s interest or may actually promote more singular behavior focused on the
individual’s interest (Rubinstein, 2003). In the end it is the individual who makes the
decision on how to behave in a given situation. How then does culture affect the
individual-level decision-making process? What factors of culture in Guatemala
contribute to a young person’s choice to arm himself or herself, and what factors of the
Somali culture contribute to the choice of a local chief to cooperate or resist with
international peacekeeping troops? Culture creates a foundation that people use to build
their world views and structure their actions and alternatives. Culture affects one’s
interpretation of events, one’s emotional reactions, and one’s ideas for problem-solving.
The key is to understand how these cultural constraints ultimately impact the cognitive
decision-making process and how those impacts may vary across different cultures.
In this study, I explore the question: how do cultural norms and values affect
decision-making in conflict situations? This research question is explored with a
comparative case study that examines cross-country and within-country differences in
cultural traits and decision-making processes. The two countries selected for comparison,
the U.S. and Ghana, were chosen based on significant differences across cultural
dimensions with the largest difference in the individualist and collectivist natures of the
two societies, as this difference seems to repeatedly affect the outcome of peacekeeping
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efforts as the examples above illustrate. As an individualist society, people in the U.S. are
prone to self-interested behavior with a focus on responsibility and achievement. As a
collectivist society, the people of Ghana are prone to group-interested behavior with a
focus on loyalty and harmony. Hofstede’s (1980) study of cultural traits in 40 countries
showed that the U.S. had the highest score on the individualism scale, and Ghana had the
second lowest score making it the second most collectivist culture. These differences are
expected to make cultural impacts more readily apparent in cross-country analysis.
Guatemala had the lowest individualism score and hence the most collectivist culture in
Hofstede’s analysis, but was eliminated as a choice for this study because it is less active
in peacekeeping than Ghana which has been consistently in the top ten contributors of
troops to peacekeeping missions (The Ghanaian Times, 2012; Afele, 2000). The linkage
between cultural differences and peacekeeping operations is a key aspect of this study.
Peacekeepers can come from all types of societies ranging from highly individualist to
highly collectivist, and they are dropped into cultures that can also vary greatly on a
cultural scale, yet it is the peacekeepers job to be an instrument of peaceful resolution to
conflict. Exploring the impact of culture on the decisions made by peacekeepers is an
essential element of the conflict aspect of my research question.
Comparing National Approaches to Peacekeeping
Comparing the national approaches taken by the U.S. and Ghana in global
peacekeeping reveals some differences that can be attributed to the individualist and
collectivist nature of the societies respectively. The U.S. approach to peacekeeping has
evolved in the time period since the Cold War. After the Cold War ended, the U.S.
initially showed interest in multilateral participation in global peacekeeping efforts in
5

conjunction with the UN. However, enthusiasm from the U.S. decreased after the failure
of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993 for which the U.S. had sent 25,000
soldiers (Vuong, 2003). After the Somalia debacle, President Clinton revised U.S. policy
regarding peacekeeping and called for a systematic reduction in U.S. peacekeeping
involvement and particularly in U.S. troop participation. After the attacks of September
11, 2001, President Bush further reduced U.S. participation in peace operations and
focused instead on nation-building. The Obama administration has shown intermittent
enthusiasm for global peacekeeping but has been accused of “selective engagement”
based on U.S. interests (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). Since the turn of the
century, the U.S. policy on peacekeeping has consistently been one of self-interested
multilateralism in which a multilateral framework is used to further the interests of the
U.S. rather than the interests of the global collective (Vuong, 2003). The U.S. is
recognized for its financial support of UN peacekeeping where it contributes 27% of the
budget, the largest contribution by far of any country (UN Peacekeeping, 2012a).
However, the lack of participation from a troop perspective also shows in the numbers.
The U.S. is currently contributing only 128 members to the 94,000 strong UN
peacekeeping forces (UN Peacekeeping, 2012b).
In comparison with the U.S., Ghana is a large contributor of peacekeeping troops
and personnel, providing 2,814 members of the current UN peacekeeping force, and
consistently being in the top ten countries providing troops (UN Peacekeeping, 2012b).
Since the end of the Cold War, African leaders have shown a growing determination to
fix the security predicament across the continent and have become increasingly involved
in international peacekeeping efforts. Western countries have come to depend on African
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countries to supply much of personnel needed to staff peacekeeping missions. However,
not all African states participate equally. Some of the more developed states are not prone
to participate in peacekeeping missions including South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana,
while a number of less developed states are dependably involved including Ghana,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda (Victor, 2010). Ghanaian troops have
participated in peacekeeping missions outside of the African continent as well including
those in Europe and Asia. A former minister of defense in Ghana noted that Ghana,
despite its small size and difficult economic conditions, "is committed to the noble idea
of [contributing] positively towards lasting peaceful co-existence and security in the
world" (Afele, 2000).
The peacekeeping approaches employed by the U.S. and Ghana align with the
individualist and collectivist nature of each society on several points. The U.S. takes a
more self-interested approach in making decisions of whether to participate in
peacekeeping operations. The U.S. does contribute a very large portion of the UN
peacekeeping funds reflecting its value of responsibility in the realm of global security
but chooses to participate in this more distant manner rather than contributing personnel
directly. Ghana on the other hand chooses to participate as part of a group that works
together in the field in the pursuit of peace. Clearly both nations value global peace, but
each approaches participation in a different manner. Foreign policy direction is one
indicator of culturally-based decision making at the national level. However, this study
will go far below the national level and look at decisions made at the individual level and
consider how those individual decisions are influenced by culture and society. I expect to
find that individuals who exhibit more collectivist traits or have lived extensively in a
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collectivist society will make decisions based on group interests and group loyalties.
Alternately, those who have individualist traits or have lived extensively in an
individualist society will make decisions based on self-interest, merit, and achievement.
Organization of the Study
This study is organized into a series of chapters that present background and
results on culture and decision-making in general, followed by chapters on the specific
context of peacekeeping. Chapter 2 introduces the idea of culture, attempting to define
this at times elusive concept and discussing ways to observe and measure it. The culture
of Ghana is reviewed and discussed in comparison to the U.S. and in relation to the
existing measures of culture in preparation for the overall comparative study between the
two countries to come in later chapters. In chapter 3, I review the various theories on how
human beings go about the process of making decisions including theories of rationality,
emotion, and cognition. These theories form the foundation of the approach used in this
study to observe the decision-making process, to classify those observations, and to
develop a model that incorporates the results. Chapter 4 sets the theoretical framework
for this research paper using social identity theory. The concepts of in-groups and outgroups are discussed as the key constructs to be used in the development of hypotheses
and interpretation of results. Concepts from previous chapters on culture and decision
theory are brought together with the ideas of social identity to form a model of culturally
constrained decision-making.
Chapter 5 reviews the methodology of this research with a description of the overriding research question and specific hypotheses, the operationalization of concepts,
sampling methods, and a discussion of how data is collected via a quasi-experimental
8

survey design. I also discuss some of the major challenges of cross-cultural research. In
chapter 6, I analyze the results of the data collected from university student participants
both quantitatively and qualitatively. I discuss the findings that show respondents with
higher levels of collectivism tend to be more dependent and less likely to betray the
interests of members of more central in-groups in favor of less central in-groups.
Furthermore, the results indicate that in conflict settings that seem familiar, individuals
are more likely to compromise in order to achieve peace.
In chapter 7, I bring the context of peacekeeping into the study of culture and
decision-making, reviewing current literature on the training and expectations of
peacekeepers sent into the field to interact with local populations of different cultures.
From the current theories in this area, I formulate hypotheses that anticipate experienced
peacekeepers will focus on problem-solving and break through cultural constraints as
needed in situations of conflicting in-group/out-group interests. In chapter 8, I analyze the
results of the data collected from the population at a Ghanaian peacekeeping training
center showing that Ghanaian peace professionals have a greater focus on problemsolving then Ghanaian university students, and that the more field experience
peacekeepers have, the more likely they are to go outside of the social in-group to seek
problem solutions. In chapter 9, I bring together the theory and research findings in
comparison with the defined model for culturally constrained decision-making. I discuss
how this model can be applied and how it can be refined through further research.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZING CULTURE
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the
right to a nationality,” but what determines nationality? Is it culture? From a legal point
of view, nationality is about reflecting an individual’s genuine link with a country based
on objective factors such as place of birth, descent, and residency (Batchelor, 1998). On
the other hand, culture, even though it is often associated with a country, is a more
difficult construct to define and measure (Armstrong, 1996). One common definition of
culture is based on the anthropological conception of a learned system of meanings
rooted in symbols and language that allow people to adapt to their environment and
interpret their experiences (Rubenstein, 2003). Hofstede (1980) defined culture as “the
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human
group from another” (p. 25). In this study, variations across these human groups are
expected to be revealed in how group members make decisions, particularly in the
heightened volatility of conflict situations.
In this chapter, I will explore the meaning of culture and discuss ways to define
and measure the concept. Then I will provide an overview of elements of the culture of
Ghana, which was chosen as a cultural group to be compared with the U.S. in this
research. Ghana was selected as a target cultural group because it is so different from the
U.S. in several aspects of culture, particularly on the individualism-collectivism
10

spectrum. Americans tend to be more individualist in their traits showing a focus on selfinterest and uniqueness, while Ghanaians are more collectivist with an emphasis on
group-interest and harmony. Finally, I will give a more detailed comparison of the
cultures of Ghana and the U.S. pointing out key similarities and differences that form the
basis for this cross-cultural research.
Value Studies
In attempts to understand and categorize national cultures, a number of scholars
have narrowed their focus to the study of values. Values are principles that give order and
guidance to people in their thoughts and actions as they face common human problems
and issues (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). By observing the principles that different
social groups use in their thoughts and actions, researchers have been able to infer the
shared values that various social groups have. Societies can then be categorized and
compared based on their common shared values. Thomas (2008) reviewed the five major
frameworks that have emerged out of these value studies, each allowing for the
categorization and comparison of national cultures: the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
framework, Hofstede’s model, the Schwartz Value Survey, Trompennars’s value
dimensions, and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness
(GLOBE) study. Each of these value studies will be discussed further, and Table 2.1
provides an overall summary comparison of the studies.

11

Table 2.1
Comparison of Cultural Value Studies
Study
Kluckhohn and

Year
1961

Strodtbeck

Sample
100 people across 5

Cultural Dimensions
6 value orientations

cultural groups in the
Southwest U.S.

Hofstede

1980

117,000 employees of

4 dimensions

IBM across 40 countries
Schwartz

1990s

22,000 people across 40

10 value types

countries
Trompenaars

1993

15,000 managers in 28

7 value dimensions

countries
GLOBE study

2004

17,000 managers in 951

9 dimensions

organizations across 62
societies

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s framework. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961)
theorized that there are a limited number of human problems that a society has to face,
and that the preferred solutions to these problems reflect the society’s values. They
developed six value orientations, or dimensions, around the common human problems.
First the relationship to nature addressed the question - is the relationship between
humanity and its natural environment one of mastery, submission, or harmony? Second,
belief about human nature addressed the question - is human nature good, evil, or a
mixture? Third, the dimension on relationships between people asks - should we relate to
each other hierarchically, as equals (collateral), or by individual merit (individualist)?
Fourth, the behavior motivation dimension asks - should we live for the moment (being),
strive for goals (achieving), or reflect (thinking)? Fifth, space orientation addresses the
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question - should we consider our physical space private, public, or a mixture? Finally,
time orientation addresses the question - should we focus on the past, the present, or the
future?
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck tested their theory by interviewing twenty people from
each of five different cultural groups in the Southwest U.S., including the Navaho,
Mexican-Americans, Texan homesteaders, Mormon villagers, and Zuni pueblo dwellers.
They developed value profiles on each group showing ways in which they were similar
and different along four of the six dimensions. Two of the dimensions (space and nature)
were not explored. Despite the demonstrated validity of four of the six dimensions, this
framework has not been used in very many management studies perhaps due to the nature
of the survey instrument used which was not designed with the workplace in mind
(Thomas, 2008).
Hofstede’s study. Hofstede (1980) conducted an attitude survey of work values
on 117,000 employees of a U.S. based multinational corporation, IBM, in the years 1967
to 1973. He surveyed employees in 72 countries and then reduced that to 40 countries
based on those that had at least 50 responses. Based on country level factor analysis of
the survey responses, Hofstede was able to extract four value dimensions that classified
the 40 countries represented in the study.
First, the individualism dimension measures the extent to which one’s selfidentity is tied to the individual versus the group. Individualists expect to take care of
themselves and their immediate family, whereas those who are not individualists
(collectivists) expect their in-group to take care of them in exchange for group loyalty.
The individualism dimension is often reflected in the way people live in society: in
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families, in extended families, or as a community. In individualistic societies, the self is
promoted and people are taught to be self-reliant, competitive, and innovative. In
collectivist societies, collaboration and cooperation are the ultimate tools of survival, and
people are taught to follow closely the norms of the group that include obedience and
harmony.
Second, the power distance dimension measures how much society accepts the
fact the power is distributed unequally between members of the society. In cultures with
small power distance scores, there is an expectation that inequality should be minimized
and that even the least powerful member should have a voice with social decision being
reached democratically. In cultures with large power distance scores, inequality among
members of society is expected and desired. Family members tend to fall into a strict
hierarchy, usually with the father ruling at the top. At school and at work, teachers,
supervisors, and elders are treated with respect and deference. Large power distance
cultures see power based on one’s position within the hierarchy, whereas small power
distance cultures see power as something to be earned based on hard work and
achievement.
Third, the uncertainty avoidance dimension indicates how uncomfortable a
society is with uncertainty and ambiguity. In societies of low uncertainty avoidance,
ambiguity is considered to be a normal part of daily life, and there is no inherent need to
try to control the future. People enjoy open-ended discussions and do not feel compelled
to follow a particular timetable with their activities. In societies of high uncertainty
avoidance, uncertainty is a threatening thing that must be fought, and there is a general
belief that what is different is dangerous. Members of such a society try to avoid
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uncertainty and seek to bring order and structure to their home and work lives. Time
constraints are important as are precision and punctuality.
Fourth, the masculinity-femininity dimension is an indication of the dominant
values of society. A society that values “masculine” norms will pursue achievement,
reward, and material success. People are generally considered to be competitive. On the
other hand, a society that values “feminine” norms is more cooperative than competitive.
The traditionally female orientation toward nurturing and interpersonal harmony is
emphasized. People will take a more modest approach, will care for the weak, and will
pursue quality of life.
Although Hofstede’s model has been used extensively, it is not without criticism
(Shi & Wang, 2011). Some scholars find fault with his model because he developed it
through world-wide sampling within only one multi-national corporation, IBM. Also
critics point to limitations of the model because it does not capture changes to a culture
over time, and it does not address within-country cultural differences (Kirkman, 2006).
Nevertheless, Hofstede’s framework has been used in thousands of empirical studies over
the past thirty years (Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010). These studies have used Hofstede’s
framework in various ways with culture as the main effect or as a moderator and at
various levels of analysis including individual, group, and country levels.
Schwartz’s value survey. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) is based on a series
of studies conducted by Schwartz and his colleagues in the 1990s. They theorized 56
values to reflect the way that a person satisfies his or her basic relationships toward
nature, toward the group, and toward the preservation of society as a whole. Respondents
from 20 countries were asked how relevant each principle was to their lives revealing ten
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clusters of distinct values types that were hypothesized to be universal across cultures. In
a subsequent study, the presence of the ten value types was examined in a broader
population by using 88 samples of schoolteachers, university students, and other adult
groups from 40 countries lending strong support to the cross-cultural structure of values
(Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). The ten value types can be used to describe the motivational
priorities and uniqueness of any particular culture as well as compare qualities across
cultures. The Schwartz framework does not indicate which value is the most important in
each culture, but it does assert that all values are important in every culture and the
definitions of the values are consistent across cultures.
Schwartz’s ten value types were power (social status and prestige), achievement
(personal success through competence), hedonism (pleasure for oneself), stimulation
(excitement and challenge in one’s life), self-direction (independent thought and
creativity), universalism (understanding and protection for the welfare of all),
benevolence (caring for people with whom one has frequent contact), tradition
(acceptance of customs and beliefs of culture or religion), conformity (restraint on actions
that may violate social norms), and security (safety, stability, and harmony of
relationships). These ten value types can be seen largely as an elaboration of Hofstede’s
four cultural dimensions (Thomas, 2008). For example, tradition, security, and
conformity all align with the collectivist side of Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism
dimension, while achievement, self-direction, and hedonism align with the notion of an
individualist. Also, Hofstede’s dimension of power distance is reflected in the Schwartz
opposing values of power and universalism. Finally, the masculinity-femininity
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dimension as defined by Hofstede can be seen in the opposing Schwartz values of
achievement and benevolence.
Trompenaars’s dimensions. Trompenaars (1993) conducted a study of cultural
values as they pertain to the business world. It was not his goal to determine how people
understood those of other nationalities as he felt this was an impossible task, but rather to
aid business people in multi-national and international corporations in their job to
conduct business across cultures. He administered a value questionnaire to more than
15,000 managers across 28 countries to test seven value dimensions. The first five
dimensions are about relationships between people and include universalismparticularism (belief in a universal definition in good versus a circumstantial
determination of good), individualism-collectivism (the extent to which people selfidentity as an individual or member of a group), neutral-affective (maintaining control
over emotions versus expressing emotions freely), specific-diffuse (the separation of
public and private parts of life), and achievement-ascription (whether status and power
are determined by position or achievement). The last two dimensions concern orientation
toward time and space: human-time relationship (past versus future orientation) and
human-nature relationship (do people influence their own lives or is the environment a
more powerful influence).
Several of Trompenaars’s dimensions relate strongly to Hofstede’s dimensions.
The individualism-collectivism dimension is virtually identical between the two models.
Trompenaars’s achievement-ascription dimension is very similar to Hofstede’s measure
of power distance as each defines the source of power, although Hofstede’s dimension
goes further and includes the distinction of how much power distance is socially
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accepted. The universalism-particularism dimension has some relation to Hofstede’s
uncertainty avoidance with its measure of preference for well-defined rules. The last two
dimensions about time and about the environment are similar to Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck’s (1961) categories regarding attitudes toward time and relationship to nature.
The GLOBE study. The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness (GLOBE) program conducted a large study on cross-cultural value
dimensions involving 170 researchers (House et al., 2004). The GLOBE project collected
data from 17,000 middle managers in 951 organizations across 62 countries in an attempt
to replicate and expand on Hofstede’s work and test various hypotheses on leadership
topics. The study resulted in the definition of nine dimensions of cultural variation. The
first four dimensions are direct extensions of Hofstede’s work including institutional
collectivism (how much societal institutions reward collective action), in-group
collectivism (loyalty and cohesiveness in groups), power distance (how much groups
members expect power to be distributed equally), and uncertainty avoidance (reliance on
social norms to reduce unpredictability of the future). Hofstede’s masculinity-femininity
dimension was expanded into four dimensions – gender egalitarianism (how equal are
the genders considered in society), assertiveness (aggression in human relationships,
typically considered a masculine trait), performance orientation (how the group rewards
performance and achievement, also linked to the masculinity construct), and human
orientation (how the group rewards fairness and kindness to others, typically considered
a feminine trait). The final dimension of future orientation (focus on the future for
planning and delayed gratification) aligns well with the time orientation dimension of
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961).
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One of the main differences between the GLOBE study and Hofstede’s study is
that the GLOBE study measured the dimensions in terms of both actual practices (how
things are) and values (how things should be) (Thomas, 2008). Hofstede believed that
values are what differentiate societies, and practices are more appropriate when looking
at the organization level (Shi & Wang, 2011). The two studies can be considered
complementary providing results at multiple levels of analysis - individual,
organizational, and societal.
Similarity of value studies. Each of these five studies categorized culture in
terms of value measurements, deriving a set of four to nine dimensions depending on the
framework. Despite the facts that the studies employed varying methodologies, used
different sample populations, and took place at different times over the course of four
decades, there is a large amount of similarity in their results. The consistency of the
findings lends validity to the overall construct of value dimensions as a measure of
cultural distinction. The dimensions that are most frequently and consistently occurring
among the different value studies are the dimensions of individualism-collectivism and
power distance. The only dimension to appear in all five values studies is the
individualism-collectivism dimension which will be examined in more detail in the next
section.
Individualism-Collectivism
Of the various cultural dimensions emerging from the value studies, the most
frequently used in the study of social behaviors has been individualism-collectivism as
evidenced by the large amount of research that has made use of the individualismcollectivism dimension to predict behavioral patterns (Thomas, 2008; Taras, Kirkman, &
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Steel, 2010; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). For example, in their metaanalysis of studies on individualism-collectivism, Osyerman et al. (2002) gathered all
English-language literature published from 1980 to 1999 that assessed the individualismcollectivism construct either directly or indirectly ending up with 253 studies to review.
They concluded that the individualism-collectivism construct does impact basic
psychological processing, and cultural differences in the dimension “provide a powerful
explanatory tool for understanding the variability in the behavior of individuals in
different parts of the world” (Oyserman et al., 2002, p. 44). However, in order to take
advantage of this powerful construct, individualism and collectivism must be clearly
defined. This section will delve further into the definition of this dimension.
The term individualism first appeared during the French revolution in the late
1700s in order to describe the negative effects that individual rights had on the health of
the overall commonwealth (Oyserman et al., 2002). Today, the term individualism is used
to define the degree to which members of society define their self-images as individuals
or part of a larger group. On the other hand, those who define themselves from the social
and collective aspects of the self-concept are described with the term collectivism.
Individualism and collectivism are sometimes seen as opposite ends of a single
continuum, but it is more accurate to describe them as worldviews that make different
aspects of the self-concept salient. They are clearly contrasting worldviews but better
described as orthogonal rather than opposite. The core elements of individualism are
independence and uniqueness, whereas the core elements of collectivism are duty to ingroup and maintaining harmony.
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Triandis (1993) writes about the prototypical social relationships that describe
each of these two constructs. For collectivism, the prototypical relationship is the family.
The family cares for its members and cooperates together often acting as a single unit
with common goals. Each member of the family has a well-defined role and status
determined by position within the group. Family members have strong emotional ties to
one another and are linked typically for life. For individualism, the prototypical
relationship is the marketplace where an individual makes a payment and gets a good or
service in return. The relationships are emotionally distant and although members of the
market interact frequently, each member maintains their own distinct identity. The
marketplace encourages competition, and status is usually determined by individual
achievement and success and not by membership in a particular group.
The individualism-collectivism construct is useful as a mechanism for
systematically describing ways in which cultures differ. The construct is helpful for
understanding how culture influences not only what people think but how they think. The
individualism-collectivism construct has helped to create a growing awareness that the
influences of culture should be considered when psychologists study how the mind
works. Osyerman et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis of individualism-collectivism research
concludes that Americans do differ in individualism-collectivism from other nationalities.
More specifically, European Americans valued personal independence more and felt a
duty to the in-group less than others. European Americans did not differ distinctly from
African Americans or Latinos. As a result of their analysis, Oyserman et al. (2002)
concluded that modern American psychological research is most appropriate to the
Western individualist worldview only and may not be a good fit to a universal model of
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human behavior. The study of individualism-collectivism on human behavior is therefore
an essential tool for cross-cultural research.
There are three main approaches which can be used when studying individualismcollectivism effects. First, Hofstede’s (1980) country-level scores can be used as proxies
for individualism-collectivism by applying the country score to each individual based on
their nationality rather than assessing this dimension directly. The limitation to this
approach is that it assumes country-level scores are stable over time and circumstance,
and that they are relevant at the individual-level. There is a lack of empirical support for
these assumptions which makes this approach open to criticism. Second, the researcher
can measure individualism-collectivism at the individual level with Likert-type ratings of
values and attitudes being the most prevalent measurement technique used. This approach
avoids the vulnerabilities of the first approach but has its own limitations. The approach
relies on self-reporting by participants and requires close attention to equivalence in the
meaning of value descriptions across cultures. Third, priming studies may be used in
which individualism-collectivism values are made salient through some experimental
manipulation before assessing their effect on the dependent variable. This approach
allows researchers to study culture as a dynamic construct and can avoid some of the
pitfalls of measurement if subjects are observed directly. However, the approach is not
prone to large-scale use making data sparse and comparative results less robust. In sum,
each approach has its limitations and none dominates the field (Oyserman et al., 2002).
Whichever method is chosen, researchers must be careful not to be too hasty in declaring
cross-national differences to be due to culture, and therefore to individualismcollectivism theory.
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The Culture of Ghana
Ghana is a coastal country in West Africa with a population of 25 million and an
area about the size of Oregon. Oral tradition suggests that the people of modern-day
Ghana migrated to the location from various locations across West Africa. In the early
fifteenth century, Portuguese explorers set foot on the land that is now Ghana and named
the place Mina (meaning mine) because of the relative abundance of gold found in the
area. The name Gold Coast was later adopted by the English colonial rulers as a
replacement for the Portuguese name. Various European powers battled to gain access to
the resources in that area fighting amongst themselves and against the local people,
primarily the Ashanti empire. By the late 1800s, Britain had defeated the opposition and
made the Gold Coast into a British colony. The Gold Coast remained a British colony
until it gained independence in 1957 and was renamed Ghana in honor of the most
ancient of West African empires.
Pan-Africanist Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was instrumental in efforts to bring about
Ghana’s independence. Dr. Nkrumah was an activist for many years pursuing the issue of
self-government and was elected to the office of prime minister of the Gold Coast while
he was in prison for political activism and while the Gold Coast was under colonial rule.
Under Dr. Nkrumah’s leadership, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan colony to gain
independence leading the way for other African nations. Dr. Nkrumah remained president
until 1966 when the country fell under military rule. A series of coups kept Ghana under
military rule for the greater part of the late 1960s through the 1970s until Jerry Rawlings
took power for the second time in 1981. Rawlings banned political parties for over a
decade restoring a multi-party system in 1992 and winning two presidential elections
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subsequently. Ghana has remained a democracy since that time with two elected
presidents succeeding Rawlings, John Kufuor and John Atta Mills. In 2012 Mills died
suddenly and a peaceful transition was made as the vice president, John Mahama, took
over. Such a smooth transition would not be possible in all countries of Africa. Today,
Ghana is considered to be one of the most democratic and stable countries in Africa with
a score of eight on a scale with ten representing a fully institutionalized democracy
(Center for Systemic Peace, 2012).
The government of Ghana was originally founded as a parliamentary system
based on that of the British, but today it is considered to be a constitutional democracy
(CIA, 2012). Ghana’s 1992 constitution divides power among the executive (president,
vice, and cabinet), legislature (parliament), and an independent judiciary. Members of
parliament and the president are elected by universal suffrage. The constitution also
provides for a Council of State (primary responsibility is to advise the president), protects
the institutions of chieftaincy, and as part of the latter allows for the use of customary
law, traditional councils, and the organization of chiefs into the National House of Chiefs
(Salm & Falola, 2002). Ghana also maintains a strong presence in world politics as a
member of international organizations such as the African Union and the United Nations
(UN). Ghana is well-known and respected for its peacekeepers and is ranked among the
top ten contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping missions (The Ghanaian Times, 2012;
Afele, 2000). There has been minimal civil strife in Ghana in recent years, although in
1994 the country did have an outbreak of ethnic violence in the northern region over land
disputes causing 1000 deaths and 150,000 displaced people (BBC, 2012).
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The economy is largely based in the agriculture sector with more than half of
Ghanaians working in the farming and fishing industries (Salm & Falola, 2002). Ghana is
the second largest cocoa producer in the world and the second largest gold miner in
Africa. It has one of the fastest growing economies, and the recent discovery of off-shore
oil in 2007 has raised expectations for economic growth even further (BBC, 2012).
Different models have been used to categorize the ethnic composition of the
people of Ghana leading to the identification of over one hundred ethnic groups with
distinct languages and cultural differences. There is general agreement, however, that
there are four dominant ethnic groups that make up over eighty percent of Ghana’s
population. These are the Akan, Mole-Dagbane, Ewe, and Ga-Adangbe. The Akan are
the largest ethnic population making up about forty-eight percent of Ghana, and they are
located widely across Ghana, mostly in the middle and southern portions of the country.
The Mole-Dagbane are the most populous group in the northernmost regions, and the
Ewe are generally found in the southeast regions of the country, east of the Volta River.
The Ga-Adangbe are believed to have originally come from areas of Nigeria, and they,
along with other coastal dwellers such as the Fante (Akans), historically had much
contact with the Europeans and settled in urban areas. Although Ghana has over sixty
language groups in the country, English is the official language for government, business,
and most media. Most Ghanaians are bi-lingual speaking both English and their native
language, and many speak three or four languages.
Overall, the Ghanaian nationality is a blend of rich historical tradition and the
external influences of British colonization, Christianity, Islam, and Western ideas. The
northern regions have the most history with Islamic influence, and the southern and
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central regions have had more contact with Europeans and are more likely to be Christian
and more formally educated (Salm & Falola, 2002). Christianity is the most prominent
religion at about seventy percent, although traditional religions often coexist with both
Christian and Islamic religions. Globalization has made an impact on Ghana, but it has
not driven out the traditional elements found throughout art, music, religion, language,
and even government. In general, globalization has been blended or integrated into local
culture in Ghana.
Ghanaians have a strong sense of community and maintain a closely knit kinship
system. Many Ghanaians leave the village or town where they were born to pursue
educational or career interests, but they almost always maintain ties to the village or town
of their birth (Salm & Falola, 2002). These community ties are often strengthened with
annual festivals held in local communities that draw people back for visits. In Ghana, the
sense of kinship extends into the workplace where people give help and support to
extended family members and expect the same support in return (Debrah, 2002). This
family support system may not always be appreciated by Westerners trying to conduct
business in Ghana, but it is part of the overall collectivist nature of the country.
Ghanaians are generally accepting of external influences in business as well as foreign
aid but nevertheless prefer to drive the country’s growth and development themselves
from within the country (Salm & Falola, 2002).
Comparing Cultures: Ghana Versus the U.S.
Although Ghana and the U.S. are both former British colonies, their overall
historical traditions are very different. The British colonization of Africa started over two
centuries later than colonization in the U.S. began and met with very different results. In
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Africa, the British interacted more with the local people, sometimes appointing them into
positions of leadership or co-opting existing leadership structures in order to implement a
system of “indirect rule” through the use of chiefs. There was also significant use of
forced labor. The African response varied, from submitting to the British, allying with
them, or confronting them either peacefully or violently (Boahen, 1987). Within a
century of the start of colonization, every African country was able to secure
independence from the European imperial powers. On the other hand, the U.S. was
colonized by the British in a way that nearly eliminated the native tribes of the region,
replacing any indigenous culture with the English language and traditions and leading to
a declaration of independence by the colonists themselves.
Even though the colonial histories between the U.S. and Ghana vary significantly,
the British left a legacy in both countries that provides a foundation of similarity across
several areas. Both countries model in some way the British traditions of democracy,
language, and religion. Christianity is the predominant religion in both countries, at
eighty percent in the U.S. and seventy percent in Ghana. The common use of English
facilitates cooperation and business interaction between the two countries as well, and the
institutions of democracy allow for a common understanding on issues of politics and
human rights.
From an empirical point of view, the cultures of Ghana and the U.S. show some
significant cultural differences as evidenced by their scores on the cultural dimensions
defined and measured by Hofstede (1980). Figure 2.1 below shows scores for the four
original Hofstede dimensions for the U.S. and Ghana (Itim International, 2012). The
largest difference occurs in the second dimension of individualism-collectivism, where
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the U.S. has the highest score of all countries in Hofstede’s database at 91, and Ghana has
one of the lowest scores at 15. This implies that Americans live in a highly individualist
society where they have a tendency toward self-reliance, mobility, forwardness, and a
belief in reward based on merit. Alternately, Ghanaians live in a highly collectivist
society with a high value placed on loyalty and commitment to one’s group members,
whether that be immediate family, extended family, or other extended relationships. This
dramatic difference in the individualist-collectivist nature of the two cultures is expected
to manifest itself in decision-making factors throughout this study based on the previous
discussion of individualism-collectivism being a strong predictor of social behavior.

Figure 2.1. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for the U.S. and Ghana
The power distance index also has a significant difference between the two
countries, although not as dramatic. The power distance score in Ghana is twice that of
the U.S. indicating that Ghanaians expect hierarchy in organizations to reflect inherent
inequalities in society. This is less true in the U.S. where people expect equal rights for
all with hierarchy being only a necessary structure to support efficiency in organizations.
The masculinity dimension shows very little difference with both countries near the
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midpoint, although the U.S. falls slightly more on the masculine side indicating a value of
striving to win and “winner takes all” attitude. Ghana falls slightly on the feminine side
where people strive for consensus and compromise. Finally, the uncertainty avoidance
scores are again similar and hovering near the midpoint. Americans are slightly more
uncertainty-accepting, which allows for new ideas and freedom of speech. Ghanaians
have a preference to avoid uncertainty, resulting in relatively more rigid codes of beliefs
and norms. The key conclusion from this comparison of Hofstede scores is that the
societies in the U.S. and Ghana are significantly different in the major predictive
dimension of individualism-collectivism, and this study will pursue evidence of this
difference in the decision-making process.
This chapter has shown how value orientations can provide insight into the
behavioral patterns of different cultures from across the world and how the
individualism-collectivism dimension in particular acts as a powerful tool in measuring
and comparing results across cultures. Comparison of the cultures in the U.S. and Ghana
has revealed distinctions in the priority of self and group, in the expectation of equality in
relationships, in competitiveness, and in the value of rigid rules and norms. Of course,
these distinctions are largely theoretical at this point, based on surveys done over three
decades ago in a purely business environment. The rest of this study seeks to apply the
concepts of culture to an updated comparison of the U.S. and Ghana with a view to
understanding similarities and differences in the decision-making processes in each
culture. Before taking the concepts of culture discussed here and building them into a
framework for a comparative study, I will first discuss theories of decision-making to
better position the role of culture in the overall framework.
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CHAPTER 3
DECISION-MAKING: LOGICAL OR INTUITIVE?
How do people go about making a decision? In particular, how do people make
decisions when faced with a situation of conflict? Kaempf et al. (1996) investigated
decision-making during actual command-and control activities by the anti-air warfare
(AAW) team on the U.S. Navy AEGIS cruiser. The main task of the AAW team was to
detect airborne vehicles and respond to those vehicles according to their identity and
intent. Team members had access to sensors for tracking vehicles and weapons which
they could use to engage the airborne vehicles if necessary. Even in this highly
procedural and time sensitive environment, members of the AAW team differed in the
decision strategies they used. However, the vast majority (95%) made decisions based on
a recognition strategy where they found familiarity of the situation to previous experience
or would create their own story to link together pieces of information into a coherent tale
before making a decision. Very few would weigh the pros and cons of different options in
what is considered to be a rational or logical approach. What determines which strategy is
invoked by someone in a particular situation? In my study, the goal is to better
understand the decision-making process which informs efforts to manage conflict. In this
chapter, I will briefly review four categories of decision theories: theories of rationality,
theories of emotion, theories of cognition, and theories that blend the others. Then I

30

discuss the approach that would be most appropriate for revealing the decision-making
process individuals use in the midst of conflict situations.
Theories of Rationality
Rational choice theory was the dominant paradigm in decision making from
World War II until the late twentieth century. Rational choice theory makes three broad
assumptions: actors know what they want, actors are able to order their wants, and actors
will choose the best means to reach their desired ends (Riker, 1995). In the same realm of
rationality, there is the expected utility theory that dates back to 1738 when Daniel
Bernoulli attempted to explain why gamblers would pay only a small dollar amount for a
game of infinite mathematical expectation (Schoemaker, 1982). In the expected utility
theory, it is recognized that different people attribute different value to risk, so each seeks
to maximize their own “expected utility” rather than maximizing an overall “expected
value” that is mathematically calculated. In other words, people make a rational choice
by analyzing the costs, benefits, and risks and seeking to optimize their outcome based on
their own preference for risk aversion.
One flaw in any rational approach is the assumption that people have perfect
information and the perfect ability to calculate all the costs and benefits before making a
decision (Franke, 2011). In order to accommodate the more imperfect real world, the
satisficing theory was introduced to include shortcuts in the optimization process (Simon,
1955). In the satisficing theory, individuals set a threshold and accept the first choice that
crosses their threshold, leaving the rest of the alternatives without analysis.
Some scholars believe that rationality provides the only scientific approach to
social theory (Riker, 1995). Theories of rationality do simplify or generalize the problem
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at hand, and generalization is seen to be of great value because it allows for prediction.
However, there is a growing set of scholars who are strong critics of the rational choice
approach. The main argument against rational choice theories is that those theories are
inconsistent with observed human behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Gowda, 1999;
Berejikian, 2002; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). It has been argued that a focus on rationality
takes away from explanatory actions and the construction of models based on empirical
evidence of how individuals make decisions (Berejikian, 2002). For example, automobile
owners in the U.S. states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were given the option to
choose an insurance policy that had cheaper premiums but limitations on recovery of
damages or one that had more expensive premiums but fewer limitations. There was a
large difference in the cost and it was equally simple to choose either option. Yet
overwhelmingly car owners in each state chose to stay with the default option, even
though the cheaper policy was the default in New Jersey and the expensive policy was
the default in Pennsylvania (Knetsch, 1995). In other words, an analysis of costs, gains,
and risks did not appear to be in effect in this economic decision, and other factors
outside of the traditional rational choice model must be considered. In this case, there
appears to be a “status quo bias”, a robust tendency in which consumers choose to stick
with what they have out of a stronger fear of errors of commission than errors of
omission (Johnson et al., 1993).
A number of behavioral studies have shown that some of the conventional
assumptions used in economic analysis and policy setting can be systematically incorrect,
such as the assumption that people act rationally to maximize their gains. In another
example, a study showed that workers felt that cutting their wages was unfair, yet if their
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annual bonuses were to be cut by the same amount, the workers felt it was fair and
acceptable (Knetsch, 1995). The rational choice idea of people maximizing utility during
decision-making does not always hold in examples such as these. Individuals can deviate
from rational choice in ways that are significant and systematic, not easily dismissed as a
random event or irrational behavior.
Theories of Emotion
Let us turn to a different category of decision theory that is based on human
emotion. Although much of the theory opposing rational choice goes in the direction of
cognitive theory (described in the next section), there are a few emotion-based points that
are worth mentioning. The concept of affect in decision-making is one that arises when
emotions such as fear are particularly strong. Affect enables a person to make decisions
quickly in the face of danger but can also cloud judgment (Franke, 2011). In threatening
situations, emotional reactions tend to dominate our decision process drowning out our
rational reasoning. This can lead to incorrect or non-optimal decision choices.
Gordon and Arian (2001) studied the relationship between feelings of threat and
the policy making decision process from data on the Arab-Israeli conflict. They found
that when people felt threatened, their policy-making decision process was dominated by
emotion, not logic or rational considerations. Their findings showed that the stronger the
level of threat, the more belligerent the policy choice; the lower the level of threat, the
more pacific the policy choice. For example, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Jewish
Israelis who felt the Arabs were out to conquer Israel and kill Jews were less willing to
agree to the formation of a Palestinian state. The Jewish Israelis who felt the Arabs just
wanted to get back some territories lost in the Six Days War were more willing to agree
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to the formation of a Palestinian state. Although these results may seem to make policy
choices clear, leaders often believe differently of their opposition and act under the notion
that threats will lead to submission. Even though logic has a role in decision-making,
much of the process in a threatening situation is driven by emotion.
Theories of Cognition
Observation has shown that people often make choices that are not rational, and
many social scientists have pursued an explanation for this unpredictable behavior via a
cognitive approach. The cognitive approach focuses on human processing of information
including how individuals gather information and then use it to evaluate situations or
make judgments (Miler, 2009). The cognitive approach led to the development of a
model of human behavior broadly referred to as “behavioral decision theory” which
shows that people use shortcuts and preferences when processing information and deviate
predictably from rational choice or expected utility theories (Gowda, 1999).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) researched why people seem to exhibit
inconsistent behavior when making decisions in risky situations and published their
ground-breaking research on prospect theory in 1979. In prospect theory, the objects of
choice are prospects with values assigned in terms of gains and losses rather than final
outcomes. People react differently depending on how the situation is presented in terms
of those gains and losses. If a situation is presented in terms of losses, then people
become risk seeking. If a situation is presented in terms of potential gains, then people
become risk averse. Here is one example of prospect theory in action. Imagine someone
has to choose between two options. The first option has an 85% chance of losing $1,000
along with a 15% chance of losing nothing. The second option has a 100% chance of
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losing $800. Optimizing the choice according to probability theory, the person should
choose the sure loss of $800, but most people do not. With the potential for loss, people
suddenly become risk seekers and choose to gamble.
There are a number of common real-world examples of human behavior that are
anomalies for expected utility theory, but are readily explained with prospect theory. For
example, consider the racetrack betting pattern in which betters tend to shift their bets
toward long shots and away from favorites at the end of the racing day (Camerer, 1998).
There is nothing inherent about the time of day that affects the probability of horses
winning the race. However, most gamblers find themselves behind after a day of betting,
and they hope to cover their losses with a higher payout of a long shot bet. This behavior
is not rational in the sense of maximizing winnings based purely on probability, but the
shift in preference toward risk is easily explained by loss aversion aspects of prospect
theory. Another example of prospect theory in action is consumer behavior in state
lotteries. Lotto is a special kind of lottery in which the jackpot is rolled over to the next
week if no winner has emerged, so the jackpot continues to grow over time often to very
large numbers in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Lotto becomes more popular as the
jackpot grows in size, despite the correspondingly low probability of winning (Camerer,
1998). This behavior is not rational or logical in the mathematical sense but is explained
by the high visibility of a large jackpot and the insensitivity to very low probabilities as
described in prospect theory.
Underpinning the work on prospect theory are the concepts of heuristics and
biases. Heuristics are essentially cognitive shortcuts which reduce complex tasks to
simpler operations of judgment. Judgmental heuristics, however, can introduce error and
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lead to suboptimal outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kanwisher, 1989; Gowda,
1999; Miler, 2009). These errors are usually referred to as biases which can vary
depending on the heuristic being used. The concept can be demonstrated with one of the
best known experiments done by Kahneman and Tversky referred to as “the Linda
problem” (Kahneman, 2011). In this experiment, participants were told about a fictional
woman named Linda who is outspoken about issues of discrimination and social justice,
and then they were asked which was more probable: (a) Linda is a bank teller, or (b)
Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. Participants overwhelmingly
chose option (b) indicating that Linda was more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a
bank teller. Clearly, this does not follow the laws of probability, because “feminist bank
teller” is a subset of “bank teller” and therefore will have a lower probability. Even
among students with extensive training in probability, 85 percent chose option (b) as
more probable. In these cases a heuristic was applied in which participants sought a
coherent narrative to the story rather than a logical response that considers the laws of
probability, and an error, or bias, was the result.
Three commonly discussed heuristics are: availability, representativeness, and
adjustment and anchoring. The availability heuristic is based on information that is most
accessible to a person or occurrences that can be most easily brought to mind. In the
representativeness heuristic, others are grouped into types with assumed similarity of
characteristics as in stereotypes. Using the adjustment and anchoring heuristic means
starting from an initial value that is known and making adjustments from there based on
the current situation to yield a final answer (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). There are
many other heuristics that have been identified in political science and psychological
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literature with more than fifty distinct heuristics named (McGraw, 2000). The danger of
this seemingly endless proliferation of heuristics is that keeping track of them all and
discovering how individuals coordinate these multiple judgment strategies becomes
overwhelmingly complex. A more productive approach would be to focus on the
cognitive processes behind the decisions rather than on the individual heuristics
themselves. There are varied examples in the literature of how social scientists have
applied aspects of cognitive theory to specific situations. The application of the cognitive
approach to domestic politics and voting practices is the most prevalent (McGraw, 2000;
Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Other applications include understanding how heuristics are
used by political elites (Miler, 2009) and security policy makers (Kanwisher, 1989). The
application of heuristics to decision making in situations of conflict management is not
prevalent and worthy of further research.
Blended Theories
One can imagine various ways to combine theories of rationality, emotion, and
cognition, but there is one particular blended approach that has received the most
attention in the literature - poliheuristic theory. Poliheuristic theory offers an alternative
to the traditional rational actor model by integrating aspects of both the cognitive and
rationalistic approaches to decision-making. Poliheuristic choice theory is conceptualized
as a two-stage decision process. The first stage is a cognitive process which screens the
possible alternatives and narrows the choices by eliminating options based on one or
more heuristics. In the second stage, the remaining alternatives are then evaluated in a
rational way in order to minimize risk and maximize benefit (Mintz, 2004; Stern, 2004).
Figure 3.1 shows a diagram of the poliheuristic process. There are five key features of
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poliheuristic theory that distinguish it from other theories such as rational choice theory
or prospect theory. Poliheuristic theory is dimension-based, non-compensatory, nonholistic, satisficing, and order sensitive (Stern, 2004; Goertz, 2004; Mintz, 2004).

Many
options

Stage 1:
Heuristic Shortcuts

Fewer
options

(screen choices)

Stage 2:
Rational Choice

Final choice

(make a choice)

Figure 3.1. Diagram of the poliheuristic model
First, poliheuristic theory is dimension-based with the attributes of a problem
driving the search rather than alternatives. Dimensions or attributes are groups of criteria
that are similar in nature. The criteria within each dimension is evaluated in a sequential
manner and then combined to get an overall value. Availability of information can drive
the order of evaluation of criteria directing attention initially to dimensions that have
information easily accessible for evaluation. For example, in the realm of foreign policymaking, a decision-maker who is concerned with the political consequences of his or her
decision will consider criteria such as public opinion polls, the leader’s popularity, and
domestic issues grouped into one dimension (Mintz, 1993).
Second, the non-compensatory nature of poliheuristic theory comes from the fact
that low values on one dimension cannot be substituted for high values on other
dimensions. A minimum standard must be fulfilled for each salient dimension of an
alternative, otherwise that alternative is discarded. Considering the foreign policy maker
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described in the previous paragraph, if the minimum criteria are not met in the “political
consequences” dimension, then a high score on another dimension such as military
strategy cannot counteract it (Mintz & Geva, 1997). Decisions on matters of war and
peace often demonstrate this principle, because political leaders in today’s democratic
societies have to worry about their political popularity at home while in the midst of
making decisions related to military situations overseas. Mintz (1993) performed a
detailed review of President Bush’s 1991 decision to invade Iraq. Mintz was able to show
that Mr. Bush considered both the dimension of domestic politics and the dimension of
military strategy in making his decision. Given the three alternatives by his advisors of
using force, exercising containment, or withdrawing, Mr. Bush eliminated the
containment and withdrawal options based on the dimension of domestic politics. His
performance ratings in public opinion polls were on the decline, and a use of force
overseas was viewed as a way to boost popularity. Also, the American public was
impatient with prolonged military deployments, so he felt there was not time to execute a
containment strategy. The withdrawal option was also rejected from a military strategic
point of view. For the containment option, regardless of how high the score may have
been from the military strategic dimension, the lack of support on the domestic front was
enough to eliminate it.
Third, poliheuristic theory has the characteristic of being non-holistic where
decisions derive not from a full comparison of all alternatives, but undesirable
alternatives may be rejected based on only a few criteria. Due to the non-compensatory
nature of the theory, the decision maker does not have to evaluate other dimensions if one
dimension has already been evaluated and not met the minimum level. In the example

39

above when Mr. Bush made the decision to invade Iraq, he did not have to evaluate the
military strategic value of the containment alternative, because he had already eliminated
it as an option based on the domestic political consequences. Expected utility theory
requires a holistic approach with all dimensions being evaluated in order to properly
maximize gains or minimize losses. On the other hand, the poliheuristic theory simplifies
the decision process by rejecting undesirable alternatives based on one or only a few
criteria.
Fourth, poliheuristic theory is satisficing as opposed to maximizing, because the
search ends when an acceptable alternative passes the test on all key dimensions. This
theory allows for the possibility that an “acceptable” decision is made as opposed to an
“optimal” decision, because it is possible for some dimensions or alternatives to remain
unevaluated. The strategy is to evaluate alternatives along selected dimensions comparing
values to a predetermined minimum instead of comparing each alternative on each
dimension. This kind of strategy becomes essential in the real world of decision making
which is often uncertain, complex, and time-constrained (Mintz & Geva, 1997). In the
case of the 1991 invasion of Iraq, once it was determined that the use of force met the
domestic political dimension and was sufficient in the military strategic dimension, the
choice was made. There was no need to further evaluate the containment option from a
military perspective or seek other alternatives altogether.
Finally, poliheuristic theory is order sensitive, because variations in the order that
alternatives are presented may have profound effects on choices made. It is also possible
that the order in which dimensions are evaluated can have an impact on the ultimate
choice that is made. When Mr. Bush began his decision-making process on Iraq, the three
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alternatives were identified. But were there other alternatives that could have been
presented earlier? As Mintz (1993) asks, would President Bush’s choice to invade Iraq
been different if he had met the Pope or Mother Teresa prior to his decision-making
process, rather than having met with Margaret Thatcher who was believed to have
encouraged Bush to be tough with Sadam Hussein?
In sum, the poliheuristic model offers an alternative to expected utility theory by
incorporating heuristics in addition to rational comparisons and reasoning. The process is
dimensions-based, non-compensatory, non-holistic, satisficing, and order sensitive.
Whereas expected utility theory is focused on the decision outcome, poliheuristic theory
is concerned with the decision process as well as the outcome. Poliheuristic theory has
made important contributions to understanding the decision making process in the realm
of foreign policy makers, but is also applicable to many types of decisions made by
individuals, by groups, in sequence, and in strategic settings (Mintz, 2004).
In my study, the poliheuristic model will be applied to individuals from different
cultures to try to understand and compare how they make decisions within the context of
conflict situations. The process-focused nature of the model allows me to examine the
impact of culture not only on the decision outcomes but also on the decision process. The
dimension-based nature of the model provides a method for distinguishing the factors that
people consider when making their decision. I expect to find that culture influences
which dimensions people choose to apply, and that in some cases a culturally-based
dimension will be applied in a non-compensatory and non-holistic way. For example,
those from a collectivist culture exhibit a strong duty to their in-group, and that group
focus will likely emerge as a dimension considered in the first stage of the decision-
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making process. The “duty to group” dimension may be so strong that any alternative
considered to be a betrayal of the group will be summarily eliminated without evaluating
other dimensions in a fashion similar to how President Bush eliminated options that
would hurt his political position domestically.
Have previous studies revealed the impact of a measured difference in culture on
decision-making? Chen and Li (2005) explored cultural differences of decision-making
between individualist and collectivist societies by looking at Chinese (collectivist) versus
Australian (individualistic) cultures. They found that the Chinese were less cooperative
with foreigners than with Chinese, whereas Australians were equally cooperative with
members of both groups. However, such research studies into the cultural impacts on
decision making are rare and there are many unresolved and unanswered questions in this
area. Do individualist and collectivist cultures differ in the dimensions they apply to
decisions made in the face of conflict? Do such differences enhance or aggravate
peacekeeping efforts that are initiated in conflict prone zones? Can peacekeeping
personnel be trained to manage cultural differences and achieve peace more efficiently?
There is a need for further research to gain an improved understanding of how cultural
differences manifest themselves in the decision making process. The broad difference in
the individualism-collectivism dimension between the U.S. and Ghana will make for a
good cross-country comparative study on culture and its impact on decision-making, and
the poliheuristic model will provide a good framework for uncovering factors involved in
the decision process.
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CHAPTER 4
A FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL IDENTITY
Identifying with other people is part of the process of defining our selfconception, because it is through interactions with others that we come to understand our
own characteristics and behaviors (Tajfel, 1981). The part of an individual’s self-concept
that is derived from his or her membership in groups is considered to be that person’s
“social identity”. A person’s social identity influences his or her decision-making through
a three-step process: (1) define oneself as a member of a social group, (2) learn the norms
of the group, and (3) when in a context where group membership becomes salient, use the
group’s attributes for decision-making (Turner et al., 1987). The effect of group
membership on individual decision-making is the topic of this chapter. First, I will
discuss the extent to which in-groups and out-groups shape an individual’s sense of self.
Then I describe two experiments and one real-world event that elaborate on the nature of
intergroup conflict and individual choice. Finally, elements of culture and social identity
are brought together in a socially contextualized model of cultural influence on
behaviors. This model demonstrates how culture constrains the decision-making process
at three distinct levels of analysis – individual, societal, and situated – and forms the
framework for the hypotheses and analysis of this study in subsequent chapters.
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In-groups and Out-groups
The concepts of an in-group and an out-group were originally defined over a
century ago as a group that maintains a relationship of peace and order within itself (the
in-group) and one of hostility and war towards those outside of itself (the out-group)
(Sumner, 1906). In other words, an in-group consists of a group of people who all use the
term “we” with the same significance, whereas an out-group consists of those who are
perceived as “alien” (Allport, 1954; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Through the process of
interaction and loyalty, the in-group forms norms, standards, and habits that influence the
individual behavior of each of its members. Members of the in-group develop attitudes
that are consistent with the group, and therefore, the group feels familiar to them. The ingroup is then preferred over the out-group, because “the familiar provides the
indispensable basis of our existence” (Allport, 1954, p. 29). The out-group contains
elements that are less familiar, less preferred, and at times may be considered the enemy.
Even though an out-group is by definition dissimilar to the in-group and hence is
considered a threat in some way (Triandis, 1990), it is not necessarily true that the ingroup feels hostility toward the out-group, and the in-group may at times appreciate the
out-group members for their differences (Brewer, 1999; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Stuart
Hall (1991) defined identity as a relationship between oneself and the other. In other
words, in order to have a sense of self, one has to know who one is not. Identity is the
narrative of the self, and this narrative requires finding differences between the self and
the other. Racism is the outcome when someone tries to symbolically eliminate or
marginalize the other in their own self-identity narrative (Hall, 1991). Social dominance
theory, a variant of social identity theory, states that society is inherently a group-based
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hierarchy formed to ensure survival of humanity and oppression occurs to maintain that
hierarchy (Sidanius, 1993). In this case, the in-group is perceived as dominant over some
out-group which, consequently, serves as a negative reference point. Most of the time the
in-group tends to form biases against the out-group that can be used to preserve or
enhance the existence of the in-group, resulting in a set of “in-group virtues” and “outgroup vices” (Schaefer, 2004). These biases often appear in the form of partisanship or
ethnocentrism which place the in-group in a place of superior standing, setting the
standard by which other groups should be measured.
What happens when we belong to multiple in-groups which overlap? Figure 4.1
shows an example set of in-groups which would apply to most individuals. The
concentric circles show multiple in-groups with the size of the group increasing as the
circle grows larger. In general, as the size of the in-group grows larger, the potency of the
sense of membership decreases, implying that world-loyalty is difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve (Allport, 1954). However, there is no reason why the outermost circle in a
grouping has to be the weakest. For example, an outer identity circle of race sometimes
overrides inner circles of membership, such as multi-racial social or work groups. Often
concentric loyalties need not clash at all with devotion to a larger circle being consistent
with devotion to an inner circle. For example, it is easy to imagine someone who has
strong patriotic devotion to their country living peacefully with their neighbors. Clashes
more often occur among group memberships at the same level. Someone who is deeply
loyal to two nations may be considered a traitor or may be internally torn over his or her
decisions and actions, particularly if those two nations are at odds.
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Figure 4.1. Multiple in-groups with increasing membership size
As an individual’s attitudes form, how much can be attributed to the sway held by
the person’s in-groups and how much can be attributed to the individual’s own
characteristics and personality traits? One can take either a collective approach or an
individual approach on the formation of attitudes, but these approaches do not necessarily
have to be in opposition. One can hold to the individualistic theory while still recognizing
the influence of the collective on the individual. People only reflect the attitudes of their
in-groups if they have some personal trait or need that aligns with the group. Let us look
further into the concept of ethnocentrism and the individual approach of judgment
formation and decision-making by considering some specific case studies in the next few
sections.
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Ethnocentrism: The Robbers Cave Experiment
In-group ethnocentrism and intergroup conflict can sometimes be invoked due to
real issues over real assets, such as scarce resources. This principle is demonstrated by
the classic Robbers Cave Experiment (Sherif et al., 1988). This experiment, conducted in
1954, involved sending two groups of eleven boys each to a three-week summer camp in
Robbers Cave, Oklahoma. During the first week the boys spent time in their own groups
getting to know each other, forming friendships, and pursuing typical camp activities
such as hiking and treasure hunting. At this stage, each group was unaware of the
existence of the other group. In addition to forming their own group norms and daily
routines, the groups gave themselves names, the Rattlers and the Eagles. During the
second week, the groups were told about each other and informed that there would be a
competition between the two teams. The winning team would receive a nice trophy, and
each boy on the winning team would get a medal and a fancy pocket knife. Once the boys
knew about the other team, they began to think negatively about them. As the
competition proceeded and one group ultimately won the tournament, the negativity
escalated into overly aggressive behavior between the groups, and the experiment had to
be ended early.
The psychologists conducting the experiment were able to observe the rapid
formation of in-group structures and cultures as they naturally developed in each of the
two groups. Each group developed a culture which created boundaries around the group,
and it was these boundaries that allowed for intergroup conflict when an issue of scarce
resources was presented (Fine, 2004). Also, the effect of in-group virtues and out-group
vices was observed soon after the announcement of the existence of the other team and
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the upcoming competition. Each group of boys considered members of their own team to
be “brave” and “friendly”, whereas they quickly adopted stereotypes of boys on the other
team as “crybabies” and “no-good cheats” (Sidanius, 1993).
The Rattlers and the Eagles were also given challenges that could only be solved
by working cooperatively, such as a broken truck that could not be pushed without the
help of all the boys or a problem with the camp’s water supply that required efforts from
both groups to resolve. These cooperative tasks were shown to reduce in-group bias due
to the fact that both groups had a common objective. This could indicate the existence of
a shared “super-identity” further out in the concentric circle model. Invoking such a
shared identity might be able to serve as a conflict resolution measure, pushing people
beyond the limits of their ethnocentrism and encouraging them to cooperate with outgroups in their problem-solving efforts.
Overall, the Robbers Cave Experiment demonstrated through qualitative and
quantitative data that group formation and subsequent competition led to the expected
outcome of group ethnocentrism as seen in: (1) each group’s preferences for its own
members as friends, (2) stereotyping, and (3) over-rating of in-group products and underrating of out-group products (Sidanius, 1993). In this experiment, ethnocentrism can be
largely attributed to the zero-sum nature of the competition over real assets (trophies and
pocket knives) spurred on by the formation of intergroup competition. However, the
effect of scarce resources is not a necessary condition for ethnocentric group behavior to
occur, as we shall see in the next section.
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Discrimination: The Minimal Groups Experiment
Social identity theory goes beyond the idea that ethnocentrism derives solely from
resource competition and suggests that ethnocentrism can arise simply due to the
cognition of in-groups and out-groups, without the need for competition, and without the
need for in-group interaction and norm forming. The negative attitudes that in-groups
tend to form about out-groups are often referred to as prejudice, an attitude of favor or
disfavor that is based on an over-generalized belief (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Some
people may form an attitude of prejudice but keep it to themselves. When the attitude
turns into outward action or behavior, it becomes discrimination. The conditions required
to develop a prejudice that turns into discrimination are minimal and have been
demonstrated by the minimal groups experiment originally developed by Henri Tajfel in
the 1970s (Tajfel, 1978).
In the minimal groups experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of
two groups through some made-up task, such as estimating the number of dots on a
screen. Participants are told they fit within a certain made-up group, but they do not
actually meet other members of their group. The in-group is a purely cognitive creation
existing only in the minds of the participants. Participants are then given the task of
rewarding points to anonymous members of the in-group and out-group but are not
allowed to give any points to themselves. Points must be rewarded using one of three
strategies: maximizing in-group favoritism, maximizing out-group favoritism, or
maximizing fairness between groups. Results of this experiment show that in-group
favoritism is most often employed, suggesting that people are predisposed to discriminate
against others in the context of intergroup behavior. These experiments were conducted
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holding everything but an artificial and meaningless in-group identity constant, pointing
to a fundamental need to discriminate that is free of situational context. Some researchers
have suggested that people identify with groups and express strong in-group favoritism in
order to reduce uncertainty (Abrams & Hogg, 1999). The minimal groups experiment sets
up a novel situation and a task that is highly uncertain prompting individuals to gravitate
to the artificial group definitions to give them a sense of certainty about themselves and
how they should perform the task. This form of social categorization produces social
identity and a natural in-group bias (Abrams & Hogg, 1999).
This in-group bias has been found to hold true in minimal group tests run across a
number of countries including Wales, Holland, Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, Hong
Kong, and New Zealand, prompting the suggestion that the findings are universally
applicable (Sidanius, 1993). However, the aforementioned list includes Western-style
cultures almost exclusively, except for Hong Kong which is one of the more Westernized
cities in Asia. In order to make a claim of universal applicability, further research needs
to be conducted in countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.
Internalization: Trouble With Cows
The above experiments reveal some of the effects of social groups such as
ethnocentrism, competitive behavior, and discrimination, but the question still remains as
to how the group effects are internalized by a person going through his or her own
individual decision-making process. Beth Roy (1994) explored this internalization
process in her qualitative study of a riot in Bangladesh. As Roy put it, “in a remote
village somewhere in South Asia, someone’s cow ate someone else’s crop. Within two
days, tens of thousands of men were ranged against each other, armed, hostile, righteous”
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(p. 1). As it turned out, the cow belonged to a Muslim, and the crop belonged to a Hindu,
and this seemed to be the origin of the problem.
Through a series of interviews, Roy uncovered first person accounts of the story
that led to rioting. The cow and plants were seen as symbols, representative of a daily
experience that remained unexpressed. Many of the villagers said that they were
frightened and apprehensive and that although the society seemed peaceful on the
surface, there was danger just beneath. They formed opinions about the other group that
were often not true, such as the others beating their children or being unwilling to hire
them. These false stereotypes did, however, have some basis in valid grievances. Changes
had been occurring at the national level in Bangladesh, but no structures had been put in
place to allow for improvement at the local level. Political parties were not well-formed
and in some cases suppressed by the state. Local people who felt the need for change had
very few options for enacting it.
Roy concluded that the villagers made a choice to riot, and they were not caught
up in strong currents of emotion. She saw the decision-making process of the villagers as
rooted in an awareness of history acquired through personal experience. People had
translated historic change into personal facts through a process of “internalization” which
allowed for the integration of self and society. Internalization meant learning ideas and
then forgetting them as ideas and thinking they are emotions and truths. In this way,
feeling, thinking, and social structure came together into a reasoned process.
A Model of Cultural Constraint in a Social Context
So far this chapter has shown how individual membership in societal groups can
influence behavior through the processes of ethnocentrism, discrimination, and
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internalization. The question still remains as to how the effects of culture integrate with
the effects of social identity in forming decisions and behaviors. Level of analysis is a
key consideration at this point, as culture can be viewed at the individual level, group
level, or societal level. Osyerman, Kemmelmeier, and Coon (2002) developed an
integrated model of the different approaches to studying the effect of culture on behavior.
Their model integrates four main approaches: individual, distal, proximal, and situated. I
will discuss each of these approaches and show how they can be integrated with the
poliheuristic decision-making model (from Chapter 3) to form a framework for this
study.
The individual-level approach to culture portrays culture as a set of internalized
values, norms, and beliefs (Oyserman et al., 2002). These cultural norms may be derived
from social or group level interaction, but the norms then become part of the individual
level cognitive processing. The process of internalization as seen in the case of the riot
over cows is a good example of the individual level approach. The internalization of
values becomes apparent in behaviors when people avoid acting in ways that challenge
an identity or value that has become part of their self-conception (Franke, 1999). The
identity images that we carry with us at the individual level, such as race, gender,
religion, occupation, or other characteristics, are structured into a hierarchy of salience so
that when contradictions arise between identity images, the identity with the higher level
of commitment tends to be invoked as part of the decision making process (Stryker,
1968).
Distal and proximal approaches to culture are both at the societal level. Distal
approaches consider the historical and philosophical traditions of culture including
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language and religion. These elements are assumed to be relatively stable and influence
the nature of other institutions within society (Oyserman et al., 2002). Proximal
approaches consider the more dynamic aspects of society that can change over the
lifetime of any individual. These aspects include systems of parenting, education, law,
and economics (Oyserman et al., 2002). The key point with both societal level
approaches is that the culture exists within society prior to the existence of the individual
who then lives among the cultural elements of their surroundings.
The situated approach focuses on the context of specific social situations that may
be encountered on a daily basis and highlights how those situations may differ in the
individualist and collectivist features. Changes in situational context can cause shifts in
individual cognitive processes, motivations, and ultimately decisions (Oyserman et al.,
2002). For example, Kitayama (2002) described a study of Japanese and American
participants’ responses to various culturally relevant social situations. The Japanese
participants found more situations to decrease their self-esteem, but all the situations that
increased American self-esteem also increased Japanese self-esteem. In a similar study,
Japanese participants were found to be self-critical when considering situations that had
been created by other Japanese participants rather than by American participants, and
Americans were self-enhancing when considering situations created by American
participants rather than Japanese participants (Kitayama, 2002). In these cases, the
features of the situation itself influenced how participants viewed themselves.
Common to all of these approaches is the notion that culture requires subjective
interpretation prior to decision-making and behavioral consequences. The construal of the
problem at hand requires cognitive processing involving influences at individual, societal,
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and situational levels. In this study, culture is modeled using the three approaches of
individual, societal, and situated levels. These influences combine in the first-stage of the
poliheuristic model where cognitive processing occurs. The first stage of the model
represents the influence of cultural constraints on the filtering of priorities and
alternatives prior to the second stage of logical or rational selection of action. Together
these two stages form a socially contextualized model of the effects of culture on the
decision making process as shown in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2. Socially contextualized model of culture and decision-making
In sum, our membership in various groups, our “social identity”, has a strong
influence on how we behave, form judgments, and make decisions. We tend to have an
overly positive view of people in our in-groups and an overly negative view of people in
our out-groups, largely because it is a natural human trait to prefer that which is familiar.
The in-group preference is so strong that it can lead to ethnocentrism, discrimination, and
intergroup conflict. A key feature for my study on individual decision-making is the
internalization process in which the influence of groups is captured in the cognitive
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processing of a person who makes their own choices in behavior and action. By
combining views of culture at the individual, societal, and situational level, the socially
contextualized model derived here can be used to explore questions of cultural impacts
on decision-making and how they vary across cultures.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Concepts and Variables
The main research question of this study asks how cultural norms and values
impact decision-making, positioning “decision-making” as the dependent variable. The
concept of decision-making is divided into three aspects for further study: (1) how are
decisions made - the decision-making style, (2) what are the actual decisions - the
decision-making outcome, and (3) what justification factors are considered in the process
– the decision-making priorities. I operationalize the concept of decision-making
priorities through qualitative analysis and coding of participant descriptions of their
justifications for their decisions. I operationalize the concept of a decision-making
outcome in the actual choices an individual makes between a given set of decision
alternatives based on a specific conflict scenario.
In order to operationalize the decision-making style, I considered three existing
scales that had been previously developed and validated. First, I considered the
Information-Processing Questionnaire (IPQ) developed to measure a self-reported
information processing style along a continuum between rational processing at one end
and heuristic processing at the other end (Smerecnik et al., 2012). Although the IPQ is a
valuable tool for understanding risk perception as people process written information on a
particular topic rationally or heuristically, it has some limitations for my particular
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application, because it does not focus on coming to an actual decision. Second, I
considered the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire (DMQ), an instrument used to
measure patterns for coping with decisional conflict (Mann et al., 1997). A key advantage
of the Melbourne DMQ is that it has been used successfully in cross-cultural research
between individualistic societies in the West and collectivist societies in Asia (Mann et
al., 1998). However, rather than focusing on the rational and heuristic factors, the
instrument focuses on coping mechanisms that are distinguished as vigilance, hypervigilance, buck-passing, and procrastination. Finally, I considered the General DecisionMaking Scale (GDMS), which identifies a self-reported decision-making style falling
into one of five categories: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, or spontaneous (Scott
& Bruce, 1995; Spicer & Adler-Smith, 2005). The GDMS offers the best distinction
between types of cognitive processing in decision-making allowing for multiple
dimensions to be present at once, so it was chosen as the instrument for operationalizing
the decision-making process.
The GDMS consists of 25 items scored on a five-point Likert-type scale
identifying the five styles of decision-making. First, the rational style represents a logical
and structured approach to decision making. As described in Chapter 3 on decision
theory, rational choice is characterized by an analysis of the costs, benefits, and risks of a
situation and an attempt to optimize the outcome. The rational decision maker makes a
deliberate and logical choice. Second, an intuitive style relies upon hunches, feelings and
impressions. Heuristics often come into play as the intuitive decision maker tends to
make decisions quickly without the careful consideration of the rational decision maker.
Third, a dependent style relies upon the direction and support of others. The dependent
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decision-maker seeks the advice of others and is heavily influenced by the in-group. As
described in Chapter 4, the influence of in-groups can be seen in the choices a person
makes in behavior and action, and the dependent style is reflective of this influence.
Fourth, an avoidant style tends to postpone or avoid making decisions. The avoidant
decision-maker is less confident in his or her decision-making ability and/or prone to
procrastination. Fifth, a spontaneous decision-maker is impulsive and prone to make spur
of the moment decisions although not necessarily relying on hunches or feelings as the
intuitive decision-maker does. These five decision-making styles are not considered to be
mutually exclusive. Individuals do not rely on only one decision-making style, but they
will use a combination of styles when making important decisions. Therefore, the GDMS
instrument allows for the presence of each of the five styles to be detected separately.
The independent variable in this study, “cultural norms and values”, is divided
into three measurable aspects per the socially contextualized framework of culture
defined in chapter 4: (1) the cultural traits of the individual decision maker, (2) the
society that the individual lives in, and (3) the culturally situated context of the conflict
setting. For the first aspect of culture, the traits of the individual relative to the cognitive
process of decision-making are represented in the construct of the individualismcollectivism dimension measured at the individual level using self-reported responses to a
questionnaire developed for the Auckland Individualism Collectivism Scale (AICS)
(Shulruf, Hattie, & Dixon, 2007). The AICS consists of 26 items, of which 11 relate to
collectivism and 15 relate to individualism. Responses were measured on a Likert-type
scale and given response options of strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or
don’t know.
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The AICS defines individualists as those who exhibit traits of uniqueness,
responsibility, and competitiveness. One of the most salient features of individualism is
the valuing of personal independence which leads to an emphasis on personal
achievement, self-knowledge, privacy, and a desire to be unique. Individualism is also
related to personal responsibility and self-reliance with a direct communication style that
uses “I” more than “we”. The competitive nature of individualists is normally
demonstrated in their tendency to strive for personal goals over the goals of society.
North Americans are often considered the models of individualism as they demonstrate
many of these traits across the population.
The AICS defines collectivists as those who seek advice and harmony.
Collectivists have a sense of duty to the group and seek interdependence with group
members. Collectivists have a sense of belonging to the group and are likely to
internalize group goals as their own goals and give them a higher priority. The
communication style of collectivists tends to be indirect and emphasizes harmony during
group discussions and an awareness of saving face within the group. Hierarchy is
important in collectivism, because it allows groups members to know their rank within
the group as they seek to maintain their status. Individualists, on the other hand, use the
knowledge of their rank to try to move higher than others in a competitive way.
The AICS measures the individualism-collectivism dimension at the individual
level without any presumption of nationality or the overall individualist-collectivist
nature of a respondent’s country of origin. It is important to capture this individual-level
measurement of culture, for it is very possible for a person living in an overall collectivist
culture to be highly individualistic. Nationalistic traits may be internalized into individual
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values and norms but may also be confounded by a large number of other, unknown
individual differences. Consider Liu Xiaobo, the Chinese professor and human rights
activist who won the Nobel Prize in 2010 while imprisoned in China for inciting
subversion to state power. Born and raised in China, Xiaobo lived in a collectivist
culture, yet his international experiences and perhaps other unknown factors sent him
down a more individualistic path where he chose to stand out and promote individual
human rights. As shown in Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4, the individual level imparts particular
influence and constraint on the decision-making process distinct from the societal-level.
The second aspect of culture, societal, is operationalized simply by the country
location of the participant, either the U.S. or Ghana. As discussed in chapter 2, the
cultural dimensions of these two countries vary across Hofstede’s measures with the most
marked difference seen in the individualism-collectivism score. Hofstede’s scores are
measured at the country level, implying there is a distribution of responses around a mean
value. However, even if a person living in a country does not align well with Hofstede’s
score for that country, as in the example of Liu Xiaobo above, I anticipate a societal
impact on that person that, on average, would follow a particular cultural style
represented in Hofstede’s scores. In other words, a highly individualist person may live in
a highly collectivist country, and although his or her individualism impacts his or her
judgments and decision-making, that person may also be influenced by societalbelongingness, or nationality, in their decision-making. For example, amidst his proWestern, individualist activism, Liu Xiaobo describes part of his motivation as “fulfilling
my social responsibility as a Chinese citizen” (Mackey, 2010, p. 1). Rather than debate
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which is more influential, the individual-level or the societal-level, I choose to include
both levels in the framework and operationalize each one separately.
The third aspect, the situational context of the conflict, is operationalized in two
different ways. First, the context is represented by the setting of a particular conflict
scenario which is varied between two descriptions that differ distinctly in the
individualist/collectivist nature of the groups involved. The conflict scenario is a short
fictional vignette about a mining operation under protest. Participants are asked to take on
a specific role within the vignette and make decisions that would potentially affect
themselves and the various groups to which they belong. A more detailed discussion of
the vignette is provided in the section below on the “Quasi-Experimental Design”. The
two versions of the vignette are identical except for a variation in the description of the
overall community and reference to friends and family. In order to observe whether the
cultural context of the setting in the vignette had any influence on the participant’s view
of the situation, the participants are asked if the setting felt familiar, providing a selfreported measure as the second way of operationalizing the situational context. The
familiarity trigger is expected to align with feelings of preference and influence the
decision-making outcomes, as reflected in the hypotheses discussed in the next section.
Hypotheses
I hypothesize that each of the three aspects of culture would impact decision
making, either in style, outcome, or priorities. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the key
variables in this study, how they are operationalized, and what hypotheses make use of
those variables.
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Table 5.1
Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Type

Concept

Operationalization

Hypotheses

Dependent

Decision-making style

GDMS questionnaire

H1, H2

Dependent

Decision-making priorities

Coding of qualitative data

H3

Dependent

Decision-making outcome

Binary choices (yes/no) for

H4

given decisions
Independent

Individualism-collectivism

AICS questionnaire

H1, H2

Location

Sample location (US or

H3

(societal level)

Ghana)

Familiarity of setting

1. Vignette version

(situated level)

2. Self-reported familiarity

(individual level)
Independent

Independent

H4

First, the individualist-collectivist nature of individuals as reflected in their
culturally-based self-perceptions is expected to affect their decision-making style. The
desire for harmony and the inclination to seek advice from others are likely to result in a
more dependent decision-making style for collectivists, while the desire for uniqueness
and the competitive drive are likely to reflect a more rational decision-making style for
individualists. I test the following hypotheses:
H1: People with more collectivist traits are more dependent in their decisionmaking.
H2: People with more individualist traits are more rational in their decisionmaking.
With regard to the second cultural aspect, society, I hypothesize that people living
in a more collectivist society (Ghana over the U.S.) would be more likely to prioritize the
needs and interests of their more central in-groups, namely those identity groups that are
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more salient at the inner layers. On the other hand, those living in a more individualist
society (U.S. over Ghana) would be more likely to prioritize self-focused factors relating
to responsibility, competitiveness, and achievement.
H3: People from a more individualist society will prioritize self-focused factors
in their decisions, and those from a more collectivist society will prioritize groupfocused factors in their decisions.
For the third cultural aspect at the situated level, I anticipate an effect of the
cultural setting of the scenario such that when decision makers are presented with a
scenario in a cultural setting that feels similar to their own social surroundings, their
decisions will more often lean toward cooperation rather than continued protests. This
type of effect can be considered to be a heuristic of “representativeness” where the
opposition is judged to be more trustworthy, because they are more familiar.
H4: When the setting of the story feels more familiar, decision makers more often
choose to cooperate and achieve peace, than resist and continue protesting.
Note that there are numerous additional hypotheses that can be formed to test the
relationship between each of the dependent and independent variables. Table 5.2 depicts
a summary of how a complete test of variables would be formed. The hypotheses shown
diagonally are the ones that have substantive expectations behind them based on the
theoretical discussion presented, and these are the hypotheses that will be explored in
detail in this study. The other cells in the grid are not expected to reveal substantive
relationships, however each of those cases was tested fully and results are presented in
Appendix E. Results did not indicate any additional significant and substantive
relationships.
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Table 5.2
Full Set of Testable Hypotheses
Culture at

Culture at

Culture at

Individual Level

Societal Level

Situated Level

How do decision

How does

styles vary

scenario

between the U.S.

familiarity affect

and Ghana?

decision style?

Decision-Making
Style

H1, H2

Decision-Making
Priorities

How do

How does

individualism &

scenario

collectivism affect
priorities used

Decision-Making
Outcome

H3

familiarity affect
priorities used

during decision-

during decision-

making?

making?

How do

How do choices

individualism &
collectivism affect
choices made?

vary between the

H4

U.S. and Ghana?

Quasi-Experimental Design
At the heart of this research design is a vignette or short story which participants
read as part of a hypothetical decision-making process. The vignette contains a fictional,
though realistic, conflict scenario depicting a mining operation under protest. The story is
written without any specific indicators of location so that it could occur anywhere, and
only one proper noun is used, the name of the president of the mining company. In the
instrument to be used in Ghana, a common Ghanaian name is chosen for that character,
whereas in the U.S. a common American name is chosen. The story is written in English,
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the official language of both the U.S. and Ghana, so the text is identical in both countries,
word for word, with only the one name changed. The vignette itself is designed to make
salient different layers of social identity as shown in Figure 5.1. The participant is asked
to take on the role of the leader of the protest group or “self” in Figure 5.1. The protest
group consists of fifty miners who are making peaceful protests against the company for
better pay and working conditions for all 1000 miners, the next layer out. The outermost
layer represents the mining company itself including the president, the management team,
and the more elite and well-paid engineers.

Figure 5.1. Layers of group identity in the vignette
The participants are asked to make decisions that would potentially affect
themselves and the various groups to which they belong. The first decision involves
revealing the names of two fellow protesters who have secretly been sabotaging the mine.
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Revealing their names could get the two people into trouble. However, not revealing their
names would put all the miners in physical danger and would put the financial viability of
the company at risk. There are many factors for participants to consider because the
dilemma has no straightforward or obvious answer requiring them to weigh the interests
of the various identity groups during the decision-making process.
The second decision involves responding to an offer from the company
management which meets part, but not all, of the protesting groups stated objectives. The
leader (self) and the protest group would receive increased benefits, but the rest of the
miners would not. This decision involves not only conflicting interests between the
different in-groups but also holds the potential for achieving overall peace between the
groups and possibly preventing further escalation of physical danger.
The conflict scenario is varied randomly between two descriptions that differ in
the individualist/collectivist nature of the groups involved. Both versions of the vignette
follow the layered group model shown in Figure 5.1, but the versions differ in the
description of the setting of the story as individualist versus collectivist via references to
friends, family, and overall community feel. The description is enhanced with a
photograph that shows either a single miner, in the case of the individualist setting, or a
group of three miners sitting together, in the case of the collectivist setting. The
photographs are necessarily different in the U.S. and Ghana to represent the racial/ethnic
appearance of the local people, but the expressions and body language in the versions are
virtually identical. Appendix A provides all 4 versions of the vignette: (1) individualist
setting used in the U.S., (2) collectivist setting used in the U.S., (3) individualist setting
used in Ghana, and (4) collectivist setting used in Ghana.
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Prior to being presented with the vignette, participants are asked to complete the
AICS instrument to determine their individualism-collectivism traits and the GDMS
instrument to determine the general decision making style. After reading the vignette,
participants are presented with the two decisions to make, each presented as a binary
choice: (1) reveal the names of the saboteurs or not, and (2) accept the management deal
or not. After making each decision, participants are prompted to answer the open-ended
questions “why did you make that decision?” These two open-ended questions are meant
to provide more detailed qualitative data for exploring the justifications and rationale
behind the decision-making process. The flow of the experiment is shown in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2. Quasi-experimental design
Pre-Test of Scales
A pre-test was performed of the survey instrument with KSU students across three
departments: Political Science, Economics, and Psychology. In the pre-test survey, there
were 51 questions for the pre-validated scales for individualism-collectivism (AICS) and
decision-making styles (GDMS). The survey had been started by 150 students in total,
but only completed by 115 students – a 77% completion rate. I received written feedback
on the survey from 18 students, and although most students enjoyed the vignette aspect of
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the survey, 50% of them were negative about the repetitive nature of the questions from
the AICS and GDMS scales.
I wanted to improve the survey experience and increase the completion rate
without causing a drastic reduction in reliability. I performed an analysis of Cronbach’s
alpha measures on the original survey scores and on scores from a reduced number of
items from the original survey responses. Results show that the number of items could be
reduced across the individualism-collectivism categories and the decision making style
categories and still maintain α of .62 or higher in all cases. The resulting reduced survey
contains a total of 31 questions for the AICS and GDMS scales, versus the original 51
questions, with the most repetitive of questions removed. This new survey was expected
to be more positively received by participants. In fact, the completion rate of the final
survey using the final samples was 93%, a significant improvement. Reliability analysis
on the final samples shows α values similar to those from the reduced question sets in the
pre-test. See Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 for details of the reliability analysis.
Table 5.3
Cronbach’s Alpha for Individualism-Collectivism Scores
Pre-Test

Pre-Test

Final Data

Original Survey

Reduced Survey

Reduced Survey

(26 items)

(14 items)

(14 items)

Individualism

α = 0.80

α = 0.69

α = 0.62

Collectivism

α = 0.70

α = 0.67

α = 0.70

131

131

469

N
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Table 5.4
Cronbach’s Alpha for Decision-Making Style Scores
Pre-Test

Pre-Test

Final Data

Original Survey

Reduced Survey

Reduced Survey

(25 items)

(17 items)

(17 items)

Rational

α = 0.77

α = 0.70

α = 0.76

Intuitive

α = 0.82

α = 0.69

α = 0.68

Dependent

α = 0.75

α = 0.68

α = 0.70

Avoidant

α = 0.92

α = 0.89

α = 0.87

Spontaneous

α = 0.83

α = 0.64

α = 0.72

122

122

469

N

Based on the reliability analysis of the pre-test, the AICS was reduced from 26
items to 14 items, 7 items each for individualism and collectivism. The GDMS was
reduced from 25 items to 17 items, 4 items each for the rational and dependent styles and
3 items each for the other styles. See Appendix B for the reduced version of the AICS,
and Appendix C for the reduced version of the GDMS.
Sampling and Data Collection
Data was collected from 589 voluntary participants across three sample
populations: 265 undergraduate students at a university in the U.S., 204 undergraduate
students at a university in Ghana, and 120 peace professionals at a peacekeeping training
center in Ghana. I will discuss the selection of each sample population as well as
demographics of the samples and their representativeness of the populations.
Kennesaw State University (KSU), located in Kennesaw, Georgia, was chosen as
the U.S. university based on its longevity, size, diversity of programs, and convenient
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access. KSU was originally established in 1963 as a junior college and became a fouryear institution in 1976. KSU is located about thirty miles northwest of Atlanta on a 328acre campus with approximately 22,000 undergraduate students currently enrolled. KSU
is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, and it offers
undergraduate degrees in education, health, business, the humanities, the arts, science and
math. There were 265 KSU respondents who voluntarily participated in this research
through an on-line survey system implemented in introductory psychology classes. The
demographics of the survey respondents compared with the overall demographics of
undergraduates at the university are shown in Table 5.5. Based on information provided
by KSU, the comparison shows that the survey sample provides a good representation of
the KSU undergraduate student population in terms of age, race, and country of origin
(KSU Factbook, 2012). Student respondents come from a good mix of majors with a
slight skew toward health majors and away from business majors. The gender of the
sample was skewed significantly toward females, more so than the overall KSU
undergraduate average which is already higher in females. The skew in gender and major
is most likely due to the sampling method which made use of introductory psychology
classes containing more students from the health and human services area which has
more than twice as many women enrolled as men (KSU Factbook, 2012).
The University of Cape Coast (UCC) located in Cape Coast, Ghana, was chosen
as the Ghanaian university based on its longevity, size, and diversity of programs which
parallel KSU in many respects. UCC was established in 1962 as a college and attained
full university status in 1971. UCC is located about ninety miles southwest of Accra, the
capital of Ghana, on a 30-acre campus with approximately 15,000 regular undergraduate
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Table 5.5
Representativeness of KSU Undergraduate Sample
Measurement

KSU Survey Respondents

KSU Factbook 2011

Male

19%

42%

Female

81%

58%

22

24

95%

91%

White/Caucasian

63%

66%

Black/African American

22%

16%

Hispanic

4%

6%

Asian/Pacific Islander

4%

4%

Other

7%

8%

Social Sciences

20%

25%

Health & Human Service

36%

12%

Science & Mathematics

11%

11%

Business

6%

30%

Education

3%

18%

Arts

0%

2%

Other

15%

2%

U.S.

90%

94%

Other

10%

6%

Gender

Age
Average age
Under 35 years old
Race/Ethnicity

Major

Country of Origin

students. UCC is accredited by the National Accreditation Board of Ghana, and it offers
undergraduate degrees in education, business, social sciences, the arts, science,
agriculture, and medical sciences. There were 204 voluntary participants from UCC who
responded to paper surveys which I later entered manually into the on-line system. UCC
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participants came from three specific classes: 84 participants from an introductory level
history class; 67 participants from a junior level sociology class; and 53 students from a
senior level business class. The demographics of the survey respondents are compared
with the overall demographics of the university in Table 5.6. Of particular note is the
skew toward female participants. The university overall has about one-third female
students, but more than half the student participants in this research were female. This is
most likely due to the skew towards arts majors and social sciences majors and the lack
of representation of the science and math majors as shown in the distribution of areas of
study in Table 5.6.
The resulting samples from KSU and UCC are compared on key descriptive
statistics, such as gender, age, religion, ethnicity, major, and country of origin. The
various statistics show that in general, the two samples provide similar demographic
distributions suitable for comparison, including similar age, similar percent native born,
similarly dominant religion, and a similar distribution of ethnicities with one dominant
ethnicity and one secondary ethnicity. The majors vary based on the class types polled,
but both samples have a good distribution with no one major representing more than
36%. The largest demographic difference is in the gender split, where KSU has a larger
participation of females. This is to be expected due to the differences in female
enrollment between the universities. KSU’s 2011 enrollment includes 58% females,
whereas UCC’s 2012 enrollment includes only 34% females. See Table 5.7 for further
details on the comparison of demographics between the two university samples.
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Table 5.6
Representativeness of UCC Undergraduate Sample
Measurement

UCC Survey Respondents

UCC Data 2012

Male

47%

66%

Female

53%

34%

23

Not available

97%

Not available

Akan

62%

Not available

Ewe

13%

Not available

Mole-Dagbane

3%

Not available

Ga

8%

Not available

Other

14%

Not available

Social Sciences

31%

16%

Health & Human Service

1%

2%

Science & Mathematics

0%

24%

Business

26%

14%

Education

7%

32%

Arts

34%

9%

Other

2%

3%

U.S.

98%

Not available

Other

2%

Not available

Gender

Age
Average age
Under 35 years old
Ethnicity

Major

Country of Origin

73

Table 5.7
Comparison of Respondent Demographics from KSU and UCC
Measurement
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Average age
Under 35 years old
Religion
Christian
Muslim
Buddhist
Traditional
Jewish
Hindu
No religion
Other
Race/Ethnicity (U.S.)
White/Caucasian
Black/African American
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Other
Race/Ethnicity (Ghana)
Akan
Ewe
Ga
Mole-Dagbane
Other
Major
Social Sciences
Health & Human Service
Science & Mathematics
Business
Education
Arts
Other
Country of Origin
U.S.
Ghana
Other

U.S. (KSU)

Ghana (UCC)

19%
81%

47%
53%

22
95%

23
97%

77%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
16%
5%

93%
5%
1%
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%

63%
22%
4%
4%
6%
62%
13%
8%
3%
14%
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20%
36%
11%
6%
3%
0%
15%

31%
1%
0%
26%
7%
34%
1%

90%
1%
9%

0%
98%
2%

The third sample consists of 120 participants from the Kofi Annan International
Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) located in Accra, Ghana. KAIPTC was chosen
as one of only two peacekeeping training centers located in Ghana that are members of
the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers. The other center is the
Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA) at the University of Ghana. LECIA only
provides training for civilian personnel, whereas KAIPTC provides training for civilian,
military, and police personnel. Due to its broader range of trainees and potential future
comparison with similar training centers in the U.S., KAIPTC was chosen as the
peacekeeping sample population for this study.
KAIPTC, founded in 2003, provides mission-oriented operational peace support
training to African forces and conducts research into the various aspects of peace
operations. KAIPTC’s stated mission is “to develop and deliver internationally
recognized and professional training courses and related programs to equip personnel
with selected skills and competencies required to meet Africa’s present and future
complex peace and security challenges” (KAIPTC, 2013). KAIPTC conducts classes at
their ten acre campus located in Accra, Ghana, and in their first eight years of existence,
the staff at KAIPTC has conducted over 200 classes and trained over 8,000 individuals.
The classes they provide include seminars for senior African leaders, symposiums on key
issues of peace and security, training on conflict prevention and management, and predeployment training for police. Recently, KAIPTC established itself as an accredited
tertiary institution providing post-graduate classes for a master’s degree in conflict,
peace, and security.
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All the participants in the KAIPTC sample were associated with the Center as
staff or students and involved in the study of peace operations in some way. There were
29 participants from the research and training staff at the Center and 91 participants from
students at the various classes held at the Center in September and October of 2012. The
breakdown of students by class type is as follows: 20 students from the Masters in
Conflict Peace and Security program; 28 students from peace and security courses
targeted at African senior and middle level leaders from government and nongovernmental peace support institutions; and 43 students from the course designed for
police officers about to be deployed on peacekeeping missions. Participants at KAIPTC
filled out paper surveys that I entered manually into the system later, except for the
Masters students who were not on-site at the time of my research, so they participated
remotely via the on-line system.
Seventy-one percent of the KAIPTC participants were born in Ghana, and another
twenty-three percent were born in other African countries. Only six percent of the
participants are from outside the continent of Africa. Many of the demographics are
comparable with the Ghanaian student sample from UCC, including a high percentage of
Christians, those of Akan ethnicity, and those from the Eastern and Volta regions. The
UCC sample did have more representation from the Central region, where Cape Coast is
located, and the Ashanti region which is just north of there. As one might anticipate, the
age difference is significant. The UCC student sample has an average age of 23 with 97
percent of the students under the age of 35, whereas the KAIPTC sample has an average
age of 40 with only 34 percent of the participants under the age of 35. Table 5.8 contains
more details on the demographics of the KAIPTC sample in comparison with the UCC
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Table 5.8
Comparison of Respondent Demographics from KAIPTC and UCC
Measurement
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Average age
Under 35 years old
Country of Origin
Ghana
Other Africa
Other
Religion
Christian
Muslim
Buddhist
Traditional
Jewish
Hindu
No religion
Other
Region of Ghana
Eastern
Volta
Greater Accra
Central
Upper East
Ashanti
Northern
Brong-Ahafo
Western
Upper West
None of these
Ethnicity
Akan
Ewe
Ga
Mole-Dagbane
Other

KAIPTC

UCC

67%
33%

47%
53%

40
34%

23
97%

71%
23%
6%

98%
2%
0%

84%
10%
1%
1%
0%
0%
3%
1%

93%
5%
1%
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%

18%
17%
10%
8%
6%
6%
4%
4%
3%
1%
22%

18%
13%
10%
19%
4%
17%
3%
4%
9%
2%
2%

36%
16%
9%
5%
34%

62%
13%
8%
3%
14%
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sample. The biggest caution in comparing responses from these two samples is the age
difference, although it is hard to separate measures of age and experience as they tend to
go hand in hand. Any differences in decision-making may not necessarily be attributed to
involvement with peace operations but might be due to a general level of life experience
due to age.
Coding Process
Participant responses to the open-ended questions were coded to facilitate content
analysis and comparison across samples. There were two open-ended questions asked,
one for each decision to be made asking “why did you make that decision”. I read
through all the responses to both open-ended questions (over 1,000) and created a
codebook of the most frequently occurring themes (about 10 themes per question). Due to
the large number of items to be coded, I assigned separate coders to each open-ended
question cutting the amount of work in half and keeping the context the same for coders.
I recruited four university students (undergraduate and graduate level), two for each of
the open-ended questions. I gave the coders the codebook to use as a guide.
Results from the student coding were evaluated to determine intercoder reliability.
I compared the codes from each pair of students getting an intercoder observed
agreement value of 0.95 for question 1 and 0.96 for question 2. In other words, the
coders were in agreement 95% of the time for question 1 and 96% of the time for
question 2. In order to determine how much better than chance the observed agreement
was, I calculated Cohen’s kappa for each pair of students. Kappa values were 0.72 and
0.79 indicating that the 95% agreement that was observed for question1 is 72% better
than expected by chance and the 96% agreement observed for question 2 is 79% better
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than expected by chance. As a final step, I met with each pair of coders to discuss their
impressions of the codebook, coding process, and where their interpretations may be
different. Based on this discussion, I resolved the remaining discrepancies between
coders (the 4% or 5% of items).
Issues in Cross-Cultural Research
The methods used in this study are designed with the some of the issues unique to
cross-cultural research in mind. Cross-cultural research began over 100 years ago with
research such as Rivers’ 1905 study that compared the effect of visual illusions on
individuals from India and England. Over subsequent decades cross-cultural studies
moved through three distinct methodological phases: (1) cross-cultural comparative
studies typically through quasi-experimental design, (2) the development of dimensions
of cultural variability to aid in interpretation of findings, and (3) the development of rich
theoretical models that link culture to self (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). In general, crosscultural research has met with its own unique challenges due to the differing languages,
norms, and practices that arise between groups that are being compared. Researchers face
the temptation to lower rigors of methodological standards in cross-national surveys in
their attempts to respect cultures or sometimes just out of practicality (Jowell, 1998).
However, the evolution of cross-cultural research has provided for some techniques to
address these challenges. In this section, I will discuss two main pitfalls of cross-cultural
research: cultural attribution fallacy and the principle of equivalence. Then I will discuss
approaches used in my study to mitigate these concerns and the limitations in reliability
and validity that still remain.
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One of the limitations of cross-cultural comparative studies is that there may not
be empirical evidence to justify the interpretation that culture is the source of differences
between the groups (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). This can lead to the cultural attribution
fallacy – the incorrect conclusion that something cultural caused the difference between
two country groups being compared, when really the cause is due to a non-cultural
variable such as socioeconomic status, climate, education, or population density. Of
course, it is also possible that these non-cultural variables were factors in the formation of
culture in that country to begin with. Ideally, the samples being used to compare across
countries would not differ in any of the non-cultural demographic variables of
participants, although it may be impossible to fully achieve this goal. Many cross-cultural
studies make use of university students who often provide a reasonably comparable
sample across countries, even though there can still be demographic differences across
university samples in age, work experience, religion, and personality (Matsumoto & Yoo,
2006). It is important to collect demographic information for non-cultural factors in order
to assess the comparability of samples being used in cross-cultural research, as is done in
this research study.
Heterogeneity in samples presents a major obstacle to cross-national quantitative
surveys which rely on the principle of equivalence for their reliability. Jowell (1998)
breaks down the principle of equivalence in multinational survey research into four main
areas: (1) the probability of selection in a sample should be equal, (2) cooperation rates
must not vary between subgroups, (3) questions should have broadly equivalent meaning
to all respondents, and (4) coding should be consistent across coders. There are cultural
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factors that challenge these four areas including differences in language, idiom, and
preference for certain survey procedures.
One technique used to overcome the issue of culturally-varied interpretation of
survey questions is the use of vignettes. Vignettes are particularly useful in the empirical
study of values, norms, and the ways that human behavior is shaped by cultural constraint
(Finch, 1987). Vignettes are commonly based on the simulation of a real world event that
puts the participant in a situation to comment on how that event makes them feel or what
they might do in that situation (Spalding & Phillips, 2007). In survey research, vignettes
can be followed by a fixed set of questions and responses which may restrict the
participant’s ability to accurately express their beliefs. Vignettes may also be followed by
open-ended questions, which have the limitation of less comparability between
respondents. The common approach is a vignette followed by a fixed-choice response
and an open-ended question (Finch, 1987).
The research design in this study makes use of the vignette approach with both
fixed-choice and open-ended responses in order to obtain comparable answers for
quantitative analysis and more specific answers for qualitative exploration. Some of the
factors needed for the principle of equivalence are well met by this research design,
including the benefit of a common use of English as the official language in both
countries under study. In order to further minimize colloquial interpretations, all survey
questions and vignettes were reviewed by scholars local to the areas under study. In order
to minimize concerns for cross coder variation, I made use of a well-defined codebook,
discussed discrepancies with coders, and calculated intercoder reliability as described
previously. Finally, demographics were collected from all participants and assessed for
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the level of comparability of samples. There are, however, still some limitations to the
validity of study, particularly due to the lack of randomness in the sampling method.
There is also a limitation to the generalizability of using university students as
participants, because they do not typify the public at large. However, the goal of this
experiment is not to generalize to a specific population, but rather the goal is to compare
two countries and test for the impact of culture on decision-making in a laboratory-like
setting in order to verify the existence of such an impact (Mook, 1983).
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CHAPTER 6
COMPARISON OF DECISION-MAKING ACROSS CULTURES
The four hypotheses established in the previous chapter are tested with
quantitative and qualitative analysis on data collected from the university students in the
U.S. and Ghana. The hypotheses investigate the effect of culture on decision-making by
considering each level of cultural influence as shown in the socially contextualized
framework in Figure 4.2 from Chapter 4. First, for the individual level, quantitative
analysis is performed comparing the individualism-collectivism trait measured at the
individual level and the general decision-making styles of rationality and dependence.
Second, for the societal level, a qualitative analysis is performed on the open-ended
questions asked after the vignette. The participant answers are compared between the
U.S. and Ghana samples using content analysis and a coding scheme that tags responses
in terms of justification factors. The comparison is hypothesized to reveal more selffocused justification factors in the U.S. sample and more group-focused justification
factors in the Ghana sample. Third, for the situated level, quantitative analysis is
performed comparing the familiarity of the conflict setting with decision choices made
after reading the vignette. The sections in this chapter will review the findings in further
detail for the hypotheses at each level ending with a discussion and interpretation of these
findings particularly within the context of peacekeeping.
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Individual Level Effects
The individual level of culture is represented in the first two hypotheses. H1 states
that people with more collectivist traits are more dependent in their decision-making
style. H2 states that people with more individualist traits are more rational in their
decision-making style. In order to test these hypotheses, I build indexes for the traits of
individualism and collectivism, as well as the decision-styles that are rational and
dependent. Each of the questions in the reduced AICS and GDMS questionnaires were
converted from a Likert-type scale to a binary value by setting responses of stronglyagree and agree to a 1 and responses of strongly-disagree and disagree to a 0. If the
majority of the items for a given index were a 1, then the overall value was set to a 1.
Otherwise the overall value was set to a 0. For example, if at least 4 of the 7 questions on
the individualism scale were answered with strongly-agree or agree, then the participant
was considered to be individualistic. The consistency between groups of questions was
verified with Cronbach's Alpha as shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter 5. The validity
of recoding Likert results into a binary format has been shown to meet standards that do
not jeopardize the underlying meaning of the original format (Grassi et al., 2007).
Analysis of H1 compares the collectivist trait with the dependent decision-making
style. Results of a bivariate analysis of the GDMS dependent index and the AICS
collectivism index are shown in Table 6.1. Interpreting across the dependent row, we see
that 73% of collectivists use a dependent decision-making style compared to only 26%
for non-collectivists. The likelihood of using a dependent style is much higher for
collectivists – nearly three times higher, in fact. The odds of being dependent as a
collectivist are 293:107 and not being a collectivist are 18:51 giving an odds ratio of 7.75.
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Collectivists have 7.75 times the odds of being dependent thinkers compared to noncollectivists. The chi-square value of 58.6 gives statistical evidence to reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between the two groups at the alpha=0.01 significance level.
Table 6.1
Dependent Decision-Making Style by Collectivism Trait
Decision-Making Style
Not Dependent

Dependent

Total

Not Collectivist

Collectivist

Total

51

107

158

(73.9%)

(26.8%)

18

293

(26.1%)

(73.3%)

69

400

(100%)

(100%)

311

469

X2 = 58.6 ; df = 1; p < .001

Analysis of H2 compares the individualist trait with the rational decision-making
style. Looking at the data values reveals that only two people in the sample of 469 are
non-individualists. With 99% of the sample falling into the individualist category, it is
difficult to get a conclusive comparative result. When there are fewer than five cases in
any cross-tabs cell, chi-square can be distorted and results may be misleading. That raises
the question as to why almost everyone fell into the individualist category in both the
U.S. and Ghanaian university samples. Students tend to come from a higher
socioeconomic status, and higher socioeconomic status is associated with higher levels of
individualism (Oyserman et al. 2002). Also, it is possible that student individualism is
higher because a university education provides more familiarity with Western cultures
(Oyserman et al., 2002). It may be, however, that some participants are more individualist
than others, so the category “highly individualist” is created which is calculated
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differently. Rather than taking the majority of individualist items with a strongly-agree or
agree response, the highly individualist category is for a set of responses of stronglyagree or agree to all seven individualist items. This approach gives a more substantive
split of the data with about half the sample falling into the highly individualist category.
Results of a bivariate analysis of the GDMS rational index and the highly individualist
index are shown in Table 6.2. Interpreting across the rational row, we see that 96% of
high-individualists use a rational decision-making style compared to 92% for non-highindividualists. The odds of being rational as a high-individualist are 245:12 and not being
a high-individualist are 194:18 giving an odds ratio of 1.9. High-individualists have about
twice the odds of being rational thinkers compared to non-individualists. The chi-square
value of 2.8 gives statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference
between the two groups only at the alpha=0.1 significance level. This result points to a
general trend, but significance does not reach the desired .05 level. The individualist trait
is worthy of exploring in future research with non-student samples to determine further
implications.
Table 6.2
Rational Decision-Making Style by Individualism Trait
Decision Style

Not Highly Individualist

Highly Individualist

Total

18

12

30

(8.5%)

(4.7%)

194

245

(91.5%)

(95.3%)

212

257

(100%)

(100%)

Not Rational

Rational

Total
2

X = 2.8 ; df = 1; p = .09
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439

469

Societal Level Effects
The societal level effect of culture is captured in the third hypothesis, H3, which
anticipates that in a more individualist society (U.S.) people will prioritize self-focused
factors in their decision-making, whereas in a collectivist society (Ghana) people will
prioritize group-focused factors in their decision-making. This hypothesis is tested by
examining the responses that participants made to the open-ended questions of “why did
you make that decision” asked after each of the two decisions made about the vignette
and comparing the responses between the U.S. and Ghana samples. I expect to see factors
of self-reliance, self-interest, and achievement more often in the U.S. sample and factors
of group harmony and in-group influence in the Ghanaian sample.
Rationale for the first decision to tell or not. After reading the vignette, the first
decision participants have to make is whether or not to reveal the names of the two
colleagues who were sabotaging the mine. The decision to reveal the names and “tattle”
was made 36% of the time at UCC in Ghana and 44% of the time at KSU in the U.S.
Although the choice to tattle was made less frequently in the Ghana sample, the
difference cannot necessarily be attributed to cultural variables. In order to more fully
understand the process people went through in coming to their decision, I look at the
rationale behind the decision. What factors did people consider during their decision
making process and were any of those factors culturally bound? Participants were asked
an open-ended question of “why” did they make that decision, and I look in those
responses to seek patterns of justification. After reading through all the responses in
open-coding mode, I created a codebook to describe any frequently occurring
justification factors. There are ten frequently occurring factors shown in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3
Frequency Distribution of Justification Factors for Telling or Not
Factor
Miner Safety

Codebook Description
Concern for safety of other miners.

Saboteurs
May Lose
Jobs
Moral
Reasons

U.S.
(N=255)
26%

Concern that saboteurs would lose
19%
their jobs or otherwise get into
trouble.
Because it's the "right" or "fair"
13%
thing to do. Mentions personal
values, ethics, morals, or not lying.
Sabotage
The sabotage was understandable
11%
Was Justified based on the saboteurs’ desperate
position. Or the sabotage was
effective in getting the deal. In
other words, it worked.
President
Considers company President
9%
Responsible
responsible for the situation and/or
responsible to investigate the
sabotage himself. Or doesn't trust
the President.
Not My
Not my place or not my business to
7%
Business
tell.
Solve In
Wants to convince the saboteurs to
8%
Group
stop himself/herself or within the
group of protesting miners.
Betrays
Considers telling a betrayal of the
6%
Group
group.
For Company Has best interest of
6%
Benefit
company/management at heart.
Loyalty to company/management.
Protect Self
Concern for their own position or
5%
family.
Other
Other stated reason.
4%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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Ghana
(N=179)
13%
18%

X2

(p-value)
11.0
(0.001)***
0.1
(0.802)

7%

3.2
(0.075)

5%

4.8
(0.029)**

15%

3.7
(0.054)*

2%

6.0
(0.015)**
0.6
(0.444)

6%

14%
8%

3%
3%

8.2
(0.004)***
0.6
(0.426)
1.0
(0.312)

Using the established codebook, independent coders tagged all the responses as
described in the coding section of Chapter 5. The resulting frequency distribution of
justification factors is shown in Table 6.3. Note that the percentages add up to more than
100% because some participants mentioned more than one factor in their response. The
most frequently occurring factor at 26% in the KSU sample (U.S.) is concern for safety
of all the miners. For the UCC sample (Ghana), the most frequently occurring factor at
18% is concern for the two saboteurs who might lose their jobs and income if their names
are revealed. Other significant differences between the two samples are concerns for
betrayal in the Ghana sample, the idea that the sabotage was justified in the U.S., and the
notion that it’s just “not my business” in the U.S. sample.
Further exploration of the three most significant differences in factors of safety,
betrayal, and ownership (“not my business”) reveal detail that is consistent with different
frames of group identity and priority. First, when participants considered the safety
factor, they almost always made the decision to reveal the names of the miners, more
than 93% of the time. In a few cases, safety concerns were considered along with other
factors, and then the decision was made not to reveal the names, but in general those who
thought of the safety factor made that the highest priority. In some cases, participants
were concerned about their own safety, but largely they cited concern for safety of their
fellow workers as the main priority. In the U.S. sample, participants expressed a
sentiment that compared material benefits and life-or-death, as seen in the following
exemplary quotes:
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“I would tell him because this sabotage could be deadly for some of the
miners. It could end up being a life or death situation. I would rather people be
poor, than dead.”



“I would tell him because the safety of myself and my fellow employees isn't
worth a pay raise.”

In the Ghana sample, the safety rationale was straightforward about not endangering
others’ lives. Some Ghanaians referenced previous industrial experience and several
talked about accidents in the workplace. Here are two representative quotes from Ghana:


“Because they cannot endanger the lives of the miners because of the selfish
interests.”



“Because I had my industrial attachment with one mining company and
safety is one of their priority so Mr. Owusu has the right to know the people in
order to safe other miners life.”

Secondly, the betrayal factor is significantly more frequent in the Ghanaian
sample. Ghanaians who considered this factor usually mentioned betrayal in a simple
statement without elaboration, as if the choice were clear. In fact, every person who cited
the betrayal factor chose not to reveal the names of the saboteurs, even if they considered
other factors as well, such as moral values. For example, one person in Ghana wrote:


“Because it would be a betrayal. Though, what some of the members are
doing is bad, I cannot tell.”

In the U.S. sample, the actual word betrayal occurs only once, versus the fourteen times it
occurs in the Ghanaian sample. However, there are other sentiments of betrayal expressed
in the U.S. sample that are less formal or severe, such as “snitch”, “rat”, “tattle”, or
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“throw under the bus.” In the U.S., the betrayal justification is often elaborated on with
practical reasons such as avoiding fissures in the working group or other awkwardness
among the workers. In a few cases, there is an element of personal responsibility
involved, as in this example quote from the U.S.:


“It was my idea to create the BFAs, therefore I am partly responsible for the
sabotaging. In addition, I would not throw my group members under the bus. I
am their leader, and they count on me.”

The third factor with a significant difference is the notion that revealing the
saboteurs names is just “not my business”. This lack of ownership for any part of the
problem is more prevalent in the U.S. sample where it is mentioned by seventeen
participants, whereas only three people in Ghana mention this factor. Those in the U.S.
that considered it use phrases such as “not my place”, “not my business”, “not my duty”,
or “not my job.” Here is a U.S. quote that sums up the lack of ownership expressed by
participants in this category:


“Because it is not my place to tell other people's mistakes. It is the worker's
duty to take responsibility and own up to wrong behavior. Those two workers
are in control of their own destiny and may decide whether they want to lie, or
come out with the truth. Their own punishment and their own reward will be
in their own hands.”

In sum, the most frequent rationale given by Ghanaians contemplating the
decision to “tattle” is a concern for the welfare of the two saboteurs that were part of their
inner group of protestors. This priority often overrides moral concerns as well as the
safety of the larger group. In comparison with the U.S. sample, Ghanaians more often

91

consider revealing the names of the saboteurs as a form of betrayal, another indicator of
strong group identity with an inner group. Those in the U.S. more often prioritize the
needs of the larger social group, namely all of the miners in the company due to safety
concerns, or just simply remove themselves from identification with all the groups by
indicating that it is “not my business”. Both of these trends are consistent with the
definitions of individualist and collectivist societies and the notion that self-conceptions
around social group identity develop differently in different cultures.
Rationale for second decision to take the deal or not. The second decision
participants have to make is whether or not to accept an offer made by the company that
would provide requested benefits to the fifty members of the protest group in exchange
for an end to protests. The decision to accept the offer and “cooperate” was made 30% of
the time at UCC in Ghana, and 35% of the time at KSU in the U.S. This is a very similar
response pattern, and again, in order to determine if there are any cultural differences in
the process people went through in coming to their decision, I consider the rationale that
participants gave to the open-ended question of “why”. After reading through all the
responses in open-coding mode, I created another codebook with justification factors that
occurred frequently in the responses. There are nine frequently occurring factors with
definitions as shown in Table 6.4.
The 430 responses to this question were coded by independent coders with any of
the nine factors that appeared. The resulting frequency distribution of justification factors
is shown in Table 6.4, with the percentages adding up to more than 100% because some
participants mentioned more than one factor in their response. The most frequently
occurring factor in both samples is the desire to focus on benefits for the entire miner
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population rather than just for the fifty miners who were part of the protest group. This
factor appears in more than half the responses in each sample. The frequency of factors is
reflective of a prioritization process going on between the four main identity groups in
the scenario: self, protest group, miners, company. The first four entries in Table 6.4
show these factors, and given their dominance in the frequency distribution overall, I
explore those factors in more detail.
Table 6.4
Frequency Distribution of Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not
Factor

Codebook Description

Self Benefit

U.S.
(N=255)
14%

Ghana
(N=175)
9%

X2

(p-value)
3.1
(0.081)*

Wants the promotion and/or pay
increase for self or family.
4.7
Protest Group
Wants the promotion and/or pay
16%
9%
(0.030)**
Benefit
increase for member of the BFA.
0.8
Miner Benefit
Wants improved benefits for ALL
56%
51%
(0.384)
miners.
N/R
Company
Wants to sustain the organization
0%
2%
Benefit
and help the company to survive.
0.1
Achieve Peace
Wants to reduce conflict, bring
7%
8%
(0.715)
about peace, or stop the sabotage.
0.1
Follow
Wants to do the "right" thing.
4%
4%
(0.873)
Principles
Mentions ethics or morals.
1.1
View of
Does not trust/like/respect the
3%
5%
(0.294)
President
president/management.
N/R
Keep Protest
Does not want to give up the right
2%
1%
Rights
to protest as specified in the offer.
N/R
Avoid
Wants to avoid the
0%
1%
Confusion
chaos/disorder/confusion that
would be caused by the changes in
the offer.
Other
Other specific reason given.
5%
9%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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The justification factors for the four identity groups (self, protesters, miners,
company) appear in 342 responses, and those responses are examined separately, by
country sample, and by choice to cooperate or resist. The results are shown in Figure 6.1,
revealing a very similar decision profile between the U.S. and Ghana samples. The
majority of the participants focused on the miner group priority, and most of those that
did decided to decline the offer. The rest of the respondents, who largely chose to
cooperate and accept the offer, are spread between the other three identity groups. The
Ghana sample had a few responses concerned with company benefit , but otherwise the
frequency distributions are very similar. This similarity is not surprising, because the
scenario indicates that the main objective of the protest group is to gain better benefits for
all miners, and in fact, the protest group is named “Benefit for All” or BFA for short. The
key question is what caused some people to abandon this given objective and seek the
interests of only the protest group, or perhaps just themselves, and in a small number
cases the company as a whole?

Figure 6.1. Identity group affinity with decision to cooperate or resist shown
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I examine more closely the two larger alternative sub-groupings: protester benefit
and self benefit. First, those that emphasized the need of the protesters as a priority in
their decision-making most often mentioned one of two sub-factors behind that choice, as
shown in Table 6.5: compromise or merit.
Table 6.5
Frequency Distribution of Sub-Factors for Those Prioritizing Protesters
Sub-Factor
Compromise

Description
Thought the offer met at least some

U.S.
(N=40)
45%

Ghana
(N=15)
33%

objectives, or it would help end the

X2

(p-value)
0.6
(0.435)

sabotage.
Merit

Thought that those who fought for the

45%

0%

18%

67%

N/R

benefits (protesters) earned them and
the others did not.
Other

Other stated reason.

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
In some cases, participants felt that the offer given met at least some of the objectives set
out by the BFA protest group, if not all, seeing it as a compromise. Here is a
representative quote from a Ghanaian student:


“Because half a loan is better than none. This means that I take the offer and
the leaders get their promotion or I refuse and the sabotages continue.”

Others thought the protesters that were part of the BFA had earned the benefits, and the
other miners that had not joined the BFA did not deserve to get them anyway.
Interestingly, this distinction between the deserving and the undeserving, or an emphasis
on merit, appears only in the U.S. sample. Forty-five percent of the U.S. students who
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focused on the protesting group mentioned merit as a key factor, as represented in this
quote from a U.S. student:


“I think it would benefit those who decided to stand up for their rights, I mean
I could take the other miners into account, but they didn't do anything so why
should they benefit.”

Secondly, in the groups that prioritized self in the decision-making process, the
same idea of merit occurs but again in only the U.S. sample. Table 6.6 shows the three
most frequently occurring sub-factors for those that emphasized self in their decision
process.
Table 6.6
Frequency Distribution of Sub-Factors for Those Prioritizing Self
Sub-Factor
Merit

Description
I earned it through hard work,

X2

U.S.
(N=36)
22%

Ghana
(N=15)
0%

(p-value)
N/R

53%

73%

1.8

protesting, or just making an
intelligent move.
Want

I want to improve my situation. No
mention of merit, achievement, or

(0.174)

earning it.
Need

I need it to support my family.

19%

27%

0.3
(0.568)

Other

Other stated reason.

11%

13%

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
Most emphasized the desire to improve their position in life, while others focused either
on the need to support family, or in the case of the U.S., merit. Twenty-two percent of the
U.S. sample that focused on self in the decision felt that they had earned the benefits
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offered in the company’s deal because of their hard work, their protest efforts, or even
their intelligence in working the situation. One student in the U.S. wrote:


“I need money and deserve it, others can prove they deserve a raise and they
may receive it. I already earned mine though.”

Another U.S. student wrote:


“I worked hard to protest, and some benefit came out of it. The others will
have to formulate a plan just as I did.”

In sum, the vast majority of participants (65% or more) chose to decline the offer
that was made in an attempt to resist the management’s proposed compromise. This is
true of both cultural groups and is presumed to be based on the influence of the objective
established in the vignette that was further emphasized by labeling the group as the BFA,
or “Benefit For All”. Most participants followed along with this premise, and in both
samples, more than half the participants expressed a prioritization of “all” the miners as
the basis for the decision-making. However, other participants chose to emphasize the
priority of other social identity groups, either self, the protester group, or the company as
a whole. These participants generally choose to accept the company’s offer which would
benefit themselves and the protest group, at the expense of the larger social group – all
the miners. The justification behind this decision to cooperate differed distinctly between
the U.S. and Ghanaian samples. The U.S. participants tended to emphasize merit as a
reason for taking the offer, citing the fact that they and the other protesters had earned the
benefits and the other miners had not.
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Situated Level Effects
The situated level of culture is reflected in the fourth hypotheses, H4, which states
that those in a familiar setting are more likely to cooperate than those in an unfamiliar
setting. This hypothesis is tested with quantitative analysis of the decision to compromise
with the company management and take an offer that meets part, but not all, of the
protesting group’s stated objectives. The independent variable of “familiarity of setting”
is first operationalized with the vignette version which varied between an individualist
and collectivist description of the mining community. Table 6.7 shows a cross-tabulation
of familiarity versus the choice to take the deal. Whether the vignette setting aligned with
the country culture or not, participants chose to decline the deal about two-thirds of the
time and accept the deal one-third of the time. It is possible that the varying descriptions
in the vignette of the community did not provide enough distinction or could have been
interpreted differently by each participant.
Table 6.7
Decision to Take the Deal in Unfamiliar Vignette Setting
Decision

Decline Deal

Unfamiliar Setting
(Collectivist setting in
U.S. or Individualist
setting in Ghana)
158

Familiar Setting
(Individualist setting
in U.S. or Collectivist
setting in Ghana)
137

(68.4%)

(64.9%)

73

74

(31.6%)

(35.1%)

231

211

(100%)

(100%)

Take Deal

Total
2

X = 0.6 ; df = 1; p =0.439
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Total

295

147

442

Because of the subtlety of the vignette differences, H4 was tested again with a
different operationalization of the independent variable, self-reported familiarity. At the
end of the survey, participants were asked if the setting of the vignette was similar to
where they lived, and they answered on a Likert-type scale. The response was changed to
a binary value with those saying strongly-agree or agree having a score of 1, and those
saying strongly-disagree or disagree having a score of 0. Cross-tabulation analysis shows
that the familiarity of the cultural context does have the hypothesized effect. See Table
6.8 for a summary of the results. Interpreting across the “take deal” row, we see that 44%
of those that thought the setting was familiar chose to take the deal compared to only
31% for those who did not feel the setting was familiar. The likelihood of cooperating is
higher in cases of familiarity – about one and a half times as high. The odds of taking the
deal when familiar with the setting are 30:38 and when not familiar with the setting are
113:251 giving an odds ratio of 1.75. Those familiar with the setting have 1.75 times the
odds of taking the deal compared to those not familiar with the setting. The chi-square
value of 4.4 gives statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference
between the two groups at the alpha=0.05 significance level.
Table 6.8
Decision to Take the Deal by Self-Reported Familiarity of Vignette Setting
Decision
Decline Deal
Take Deal
Total

Not Familiar

Familiar

Total

251
(69.0%)
113
(31.0%)
364
(100%)

38
(55.9%)
30
(44.1%)
68
(100%)

289

X2 = 4.4 ; df = 1; p = 0.035
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Discussion of Findings
Analysis of the data collected in the U.S. and Ghana indicates that culture does
indeed have an impact on decision making showing indications of cultural impact across
individual traits, societal traits, and situational context. First, the individual level was
explored with hypotheses on individualism-collectivism. The first hypothesis regarding
personal traits was well-supported by the data, indicating that cultural traits such as
collectivism can have an effect on the general decision making style of individuals. Those
who are more collectivist tend to be more dependent in their decision making. Results for
the second hypothesis regarding individualism were non-conclusive and require further
research with nonstudent samples. The finding on decision-making styles for collectivists
is important for those who work in mediation and conflict resolution. When attempting to
bring parties together to form an agreement, one ought to understand the cultural traits of
the parties involved and tailor one’s approach accordingly. My findings lead me to
conclude that we ought not to expect collectivists to make long lasting decisions without
the involvement of others in their group.
Secondly, the nature of the society one lives in informs the decision making
process. This study shows support for the third hypothesis that those from a collectivist
society (Ghana) are more likely to prioritize interests of members of more central social
identity groups, and those from an individualist society (U.S.) are more likely to prioritize
interests based on responsibility and achievement. The decision to conceal or reveal the
names of saboteurs brought out a strong sense of in-group loyalty or betrayal in the
Ghanaian sample. Ghanaians more often showed concern for the welfare of their closer
in-group members overriding factors of safety for the larger groups, stability of the
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company, or even personal morals. Americans more often showed their value of merit
where an individual gets what they deserve by standing up and taking action on their own
behalf. Each of these findings is consistent with the Hofstede view of the U.S. and Ghana
as individualist and collectivist societies respectively.
These societal level findings have particular relevance to peacekeeping
operations. Preparation and training for peacekeeping missions should be built on an
awareness of the cultural traits of the target society and particularly on the central group
identities for the parties in conflict. My research suggests a tendency for collectivist
societies to want to solve group problems within the most central and salient in-groups
and a general reluctance to go to outer circles to find a solution. This potentially makes
collectivist societies less prone to accepting external intervention. The cognitive
heuristics invoked in collectivist societies differ from individualist societies and could
serve as predictors for things that go well in the interactions of peacekeepers with the
local population, whereas other salient images may undermine peacekeeping efforts. As
an example, Miller and Moskos (1995) studied the experience of U.S. army soldiers sent
on the humanitarian mission to Somalia in the 1990s. The soldiers, many of whom had
recently participated in relief work in Florida following Hurricane Andrew, were
expecting a warm and grateful welcome by the Somali people much as they received
when they were in Florida. Instead they felt abused by the local population who resented
their presence and would throw rocks at them, refuse their aid, and insult them.
Thirdly, my analysis indicates that the cultural setting of a situation can alter
decision-making processes. The fourth hypothesis is supported, showing an effect of the
feeling of familiarity to a conflict setting creating a tendency toward cooperation. This
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may be an indication that it is advisable to deploy peacekeepers from collectivist societies
to conflict settings in collectivist societies because their familiarity will aid their
effectiveness. The importance of aligning cultural traits of peacekeepers with the target
conflict resolution environment is also supported by the study of U.S. soldiers on the
humanitarian mission to Somalia. When U.S. soldiers were confronted with negative and
resentful feelings from the local population, they responded in one of two ways. Some
chose to categorize the locals as hostile and respond accordingly, while others chose to
seek explanations for local behavior and distinguished between the militants and the
needy (Miller & Moskos, 1995). The response chosen was affected by such
characteristics as race, gender, and combat status with most women soldiers and most
black men choosing to avoid the negative stereotypes and hostile approaches.
Why did women soldiers and black men respond differently to the resentful
behavior of the locals? Miller and Moskos (1995) concluded that women and black men
were more able to relate to the locals because of their social location in American society,
invoking anti-discriminatory narratives similar to the civil rights movement in the U.S.
These soldiers were also more likely to volunteer at local orphanages, schools, and
refugee camps while in Somalia further increasing their cultural awareness. Some of
these soldiers suggested that future missions could be improved by providing further
intelligence information prior to the mission that would improve soldiers’ understanding
of the culture of local populations (Miller & Moskos, 1995). The effect of peacekeeper
training and preparation as well as the effect of actual field experience will be explored
more fully in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 7
APPLICATION TO PEACEKEEPING
Findings in this research indicate that culture makes a difference in the decisionmaking process of the individual. People from collectivist societies are more dependent
in the decision-making style and are more likely to consider in-group loyalties as a high
priority. People from individualist societies are more likely to consider merit-based
criteria as a high priority. In both types of societies, familiarity with the setting of the
conflict situation brings with it a tendency toward peaceful solutions. The application of
these results to the peacekeeping community is critical, because peacekeepers may find
themselves in either individualist or collectivist societies and are likely to be in settings
that are not familiar, yet their job is to be an instrument of peaceful solutions. How then
does culture impact the peacekeeper? Or more importantly, how does the peacekeeper
break through the cultural constraints of their mission when necessary? The peacekeeper,
as an individual, enters a conflict situation with his or her own personality traits,
decision-making style, and societal expectations. Peacekeepers may receive training or
other exposure to peace studies prior to their deployment which could enable them to
break through some of their own cultural constraints as needed to bring problem
resolution to situations of conflict.
In this chapter, I review the literature on the cultural element of conflict
resolution, and I discuss a model profile of the peacekeeper. I hypothesize that decision103

making trends around choices made from the vignette will vary between the Ghanaian
peace professionals population and the Ghanaian university student population
representing non-peace professionals. I propose that those with exposure to the study of
peace, training on peacekeeping operations, or experience on peacekeeping missions are
more likely to be problem-solvers in situations of conflict and are more likely to reach
beyond in-groups to seek solutions. Training familiarizes potential peacekeepers with the
context of the situation activating a more appropriate set of criteria in the “situated level”
of culture that constrains decision-making as shown in the first stage of the model
developed in Chapter 4 (see figure 4.2).
Culture and Conflict Resolution
Conflict resolution emerged as a field of study in the 1950s and 1960s when a
group of scholars found value in studying conflict as general phenomena with similar
properties that could be practically addressed by developing specific approaches and
techniques. The field evolved and matured over subsequent decades facing critiques and
challenges along the way. One of the major issues to be addressed in the field has been
one of the cultural generalizability of conflict resolution (Fisher, 1997). It was the
involvement of anthropologists such as Avruch and Black in the 1980s that brought
increased awareness to the culture question challenging some of the assumptions being
made about the universality of human nature. The question of how much impact cultural
variation has on theories of conflict resolution can be answered at three different levels of
response: (1) cultural variation as not a factor, (2) cultural variation as moderately
important, and (3) cultural variation as fundamentally significant (Ramsbsotham,
Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).
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The first category assumes that culture is not a factor in conflict resolution. The
founders and early theorists in the field of conflict resolution took this generic approach
and did not find cultural variation as particularly relevant. For example, Burton and
Sandole (1986) characterized conflict resolution approaches as generic based on universal
behaviors that transcend cultural differences. The root of conflict was seen not through
the power of social institutions and cultural values but rather through the drive to satisfy
basic human needs. Individuals use their identity groups as a means for pursuing their
basic needs, and the role of culture in conflict is therefore minimized. The later
introduction of anthropological ideas to the field challenged these generic assumptions
and focused more on cultural variation.
The second category of response recognizes culture as important but as just one of
many variables to be considered in studying conflict resolution. Many of the responses in
this category come from the literature on cross-cultural negotiations. There is cultural
variation across key aspects of the negotiation process including building relationships,
communicating, setting goals, and reaching agreements (Moore & Woodrow, 2010).
Cohen (1991) considered negotiations to be a special case of communications with all the
inherent traps of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. In international negotiations,
the potential for miscommunication is characteristic of intercultural interaction in
general, for in order to have true communication, the parties must have a common base of
semantic assumptions. People that have no shared experience or common history have no
guarantee that the intended meaning of one is decoded correctly by the other. In this
sense, culture becomes an important variable when people of different cultures come
together to interact.
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Finally, the third category of response positions culture as the fundamental factor
in conflict resolution, whether the interaction is between cultures or within one culture.
Avruch and Black (1991) introduced the notion of ethnoconflict theory which precedes
discussion of interests, needs, and values in the analysis of conflict and focuses on the
implicit knowledge contained within a culture that is often taken for granted and may
rarely be verbalized. They referred to this knowledge as “local common sense”, and it
should provide the foundation for understanding the cultural constraints underlying any
situation of conflict. This importance of cultural relevance to conflict resolution theory
emerged partly as a result of specific case studies (Lederach & Wehr, 1991; Rubenstein,
1992). These case studies demonstrated the ineffectiveness of taking North Americanbased conflict resolution techniques and trying to transfer them to other parts of the world
without accounting for local common sense, or ethnoconflict theory. Lederach (1997)
renounced this non-adaptive transfer technique, and promoted instead an elicitive
approach that drew on the unique cultural aspects of the conflict setting in defining
models of conflict to be used.
In sum, although there are differences of opinion on the relevance of culture to
conflict resolution, the field has evolved to a point where culture is considered a factor in
most situations of conflict resolution. Cultural variation is often applied to instances of
cross-cultural interaction such as international negotiations, mediation in interactive
conflict resolution, and cross-cultural peacekeeping operations. Yet ethnoconflict theory
and the elicitive approach should apply to within-culture situations of conflict as well, as
in-groups and out-groups can form within a single society as we saw in the Robbers Cave
experiments and the Minimal Group experiments discussed in chapter 4. The response to
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in-groups and out-groups may vary by culture, but the formation of such groups through
ethnocentrism can theoretically occur anywhere. Peacekeepers may be deployed to
environments where in-groups and out-groups are already at odds, or they may be
entering a situation where they represent the out-group themselves (Miller & Moskos,
1995).
Culture in Peacekeeping Operations
The peacekeeping process itself is in many ways a large problem-solving effort,
and in this context, culture is extremely important, because it is the mechanism that
people use to determine their options and structure their actions (Rubinstein, Keller, &
Scherger, 2008). Culture can predispose people to act in a certain manner or constrain
them from choosing certain options, all in a way that may be outside of conscious
thought. Culture becomes part of the foundation upon which people organize their
options, create solutions, and take action. In this way, culture guides individual actions
but is not the only determinant of them. Variation in these cultural foundations can make
the decisions of one party appear unpredictable, irrational, or counterproductive to other
parties. In order to successfully coordinate the work between the culturally diverse set of
actors involved in peace operations, sensitivity to cultural issues is important. As
Rubinstein (2003) said, “There is no ‘right’ formula for minimizing these cultural
differences. But an awareness of their existence and analytic tools for understanding them
are essential elements for meeting the challenges they pose” (p. 48).
All parties involved in a peacekeeping operation have cultural contexts that they
bring to the situation. This would include multi-national peacekeeping troops, civil and
military organizations, and the local population. Rubinstein et al. (2008) distinguish
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between the horizontal and vertical interoperability of the various parties involved.
Horizontal interoperability refers to the interaction between the international actors
involved in a peacekeeping mission, such as troops, humanitarian organizations, and UN
agencies. There can be points of tension among these actors during complex missions,
and some of the difficulties can be due to cultural differences among these heterogeneous
groups. The differing points of view of the various organizations can lead to an impasse
despite the efforts of both parties to treat each other with respect. Rubinstein et al. (2008)
describe the common exchange they heard during the field research of peacekeeping
missions. Organizations will state that they respect each other and want to work together
as partners, but when the practical matters are discussed, clashes of opinion occur. Parties
will restate their intent for respect and cooperation, yet continue to clash. Generally, the
parties would fail to come to an agreement or would come to a false consensus. This type
of interaction may be well-intended but only addresses cultural differences at the surface
level, leaving differences unresolved.
Vertical interoperability refers to the interaction between international
peacekeeping staff and the local population, and the same issues of surface level
cooperation can occur. In the case of vertical interoperability with the local population,
surface cultural understanding often comes in the form of “travelers’ advice”. Tips about
how to shake hands, how to eat, and how to avoid showing the bottom of your shoe may
be good for the surface elements of culture and the outward expression of respect, but
these actions are insufficient if they are not linked to a deep culture level (Rubinstein et
al., 2008). As peacekeepers interact with the local population, they are bound to
encounter divisions with and within the society in addition to the cultural divisions that
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exist between international troops and locals. Ethnocentrism in the local community can
be seen when there is a sense of in-group superiority and out-group inferiority. The risk
of violence between combatants during a peacekeeping mission is increased when
cultural differences are emphasized between the in-groups and out-groups (Kimmel,
1998).
Peacekeepers need cultural awareness training to avoid becoming part of the
ethnocentric problems found in cross-cultural conflict situations. It is essential that this
training addresses the deeper cultural differences, identifies local community divisions,
and helps the peacekeeper learn to deal with in-group/out-group formations in the
community as well as techniques for overcoming their own status as an out-group
member. The question is how does one create such a deep cultural awareness training
program, one that goes beyond “traveler’s advice”? Culturally-relevant decision guides
can come in the form of formal control or informal control. Formal control refers to legal
regulations that indicate what is permitted and what is prohibited which may differ for
armed forces, civilian forces, or contractors operating in a peacekeeping environment.
Formal control encompasses international law, home country law (such as the U.S.), and
domestic law of the host country. Legalities can vary distinctly between countries, and
peacekeepers should be aware of such distinctions prior to their deployment (Franke, in
press).
Formal control mechanisms operate in parallel with informal control mechanisms
which refer to the norms and values that the individual has internalized as part of his or
her own self-identity (Franke, in press). Informal control provides a means of selfmonitoring and self-regulation based on social interactions and a shared system of values.
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By creating a system of shared values, social interactions can shape individual behavior
even in the absence of formal rules. Ideally, informal regulation should be consistent with
formal regulation so that each reinforces the other. An example of an informal control
mechanism is the code of conduct developed by International Stability Operations
Association , an umbrella organization representing the industry that supports peace and
stability operations by contract (ISOA, 2011). This code of conduct has been signed by
all of their member companies and provides a description of ethical behavior in conflict
and post-conflict environments (Franke, in press).
Peacekeepers need the same form of informal control based on training on
culturally-relevant codes of conduct that are internalized and shared among peacekeeping
team members. The United Nations has developed a peacekeeper’s code of conduct that
is incorporated into the peacekeeping training courses and is institutionalized for all
peacekeepers deployed on missions. Since 1998, uniformed personnel on UN
peacekeeping missions have been given pocket cards containing the ten rules of the
“Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets” (UN CDU, 2013). Some of the rules are
about acting responsibly and with integrity, while other rules are concerned particularly
with cross-cultural interaction. For example, the second rule states that the peacekeeper
must respect local culture, customs, and traditions, and the third rule states that
inhabitants of the host country must be treated with respect. See Appendix F for a listing
of the ten rules. By incorporating the code of conduct into pre-deployment training and
providing cards to be carried in the field, the UN has attempted to create an informal
control mechanism with a shared expectation of behaviors to be reinforced among
peacekeepers.
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Cultural Profile of the Peacekeeper
Peacekeeping troops are often given tasks that bring them into direct contact with
the local population and other third parties in the area, and the nature of the relationship
formed between the peacekeeping troops and the local population is the decisive element
determining the success or failure of the mission (Duffey, 2000). What characteristics
make for a good peacekeeper? If one maintains, as Duffey does in her 2000 article on
peacekeeping, that a prerequisite for a successful peacekeeping mission is strong
relationships with the local community, then an effective peacekeeper is one who
understands the local population and respects its cultural traditions. Cultural awareness
training has been recommended for all participants of peacekeeping missions and can
cover a variety of cultural topics including surface level symbols and traditions as well as
the deeper level meanings, motives, expectations, dealing with in-groups and out-groups,
and power differences (Duffey, 2000; Rubinstein, 2003; Kimmel, 1998).
Classroom training can give peacekeepers a substantial head start in
understanding the cultural challenges they will face, because learning concepts in a
classroom setting can form a heuristic understanding that is more easily recalled in the
field. However nothing is as effective as field experience especially when dealing with
culture. Culture itself is a learned system that is often dynamic and full of implied
symbols and meaning. “Culture is learned through practice – by doing” (Rubinstein,
2003, p. 31). So the most effective peacekeepers are likely to be those with the most
experience in the field. With practice comes the ability to observe other cultures, pinpoint
areas of meaning, and adapt one’s own behavior as needed.
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The differences in culture and mission expectations encountered by peacekeepers
in the field can lead to contradictions in ideas of self-conception. For example, when
military personnel are sent on peacekeeping missions, they may discover identity tensions
between the soldier in them that has been trained to norms of obeying orders and entering
combat, and the humanitarian in them that has been sent to provide aid and promote
peace (Franke, 1999). In his classic article, Abelson (1959) describes such a situation as a
“belief dilemma” in which cognitive processing encounters a contradiction in belief
structures. In these instances, an object may simultaneously incur both positive and
negative cognitive responses, such as the man on a diet who also likes rich foods.
Abelson describes the cognitive response to such contradictions as falling into one of four
categories – denial, bolstering, differentiation, or transcendence. In denial, one or both of
the contradictory images is denied, as in the man on a diet saying he never liked rich
foods anyway. Bolstering occurs when the person relates one of the contradictory images
to other values to increase that image’s value and reduce the imbalance which can be
represented by the man rationalizing that rich foods make him happier, and happiness is
after all healthy. Differentiation involves splitting one of the images and identifying with
a piece of it, such as the man saying his diet only requires avoiding rich desserts, but rich
entrees are okay. Finally, transcendence involves combining or integrating the opposing
images into one larger image to resolve the dilemma, as in the man deciding that a
healthy diet and the tastiness of rich foods are both valued and can be balanced.
Each of these responses can be adapted to the peacekeeping context to address the
belief dilemma that arises between a person’s peacekeeper and warrior identities. In the
first case of denial, the soldier on a peacekeeping mission who employs a warrior strategy
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has denied their peacekeeper identity. For the second response of bolstering, soldiers may
justify strategies that involve using force with the idea that such actions are in the interest
of a greater good, such as restoring peace or ending civilian suffering. Thirdly, the
differentiation response may involve soldiers relating the peacekeeper role to one that
requires a soldier’s characteristics of obedience and discipline. Finally, the fourth
response of transcendence becomes evident in soldiers that view both fighting and
peacekeeping as equally important strategies in their job and personal interests (Franke,
1999).
From the perspective of culture, peacekeepers’ belief dilemmas involve
potentially conflicting identity images of the self in the home country culture and the self
in the host country culture. The peacekeeper response to such cultural belief dilemmas is
well-represented in the spectrum of intercultural sensitivity shown in Figure 7.1 (Bennett,
1993). Bennett’s model explains how people discriminate and experience cultural
differences along a continuum which parallels Abelson’s four response modes expanding
the denial and transcendence responses into two orientations each. In this model, there is
a spectrum of cultural sensitivity that people move through based on the assumption that
as one’s experience of cultural difference becomes deeper, one’s competence in
intercultural relations increases (Hammer, Bennett, & Wiseman, 2003). The spectrum
moves through six orientations, with the three lower orientations conceptualized as
ethnocentric, and the three upper orientations conceptualized as ethnorelative.

Figure 7.1. Spectrum of intercultural sensitivity
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The first three orientations on the spectrum are denial, defense, and minimization,
each in the ethnocentric section, meaning that one’s own culture is the primary
determinant of reality (Hammer et al., 2003). In denial, one’ own culture is viewed as the
only real one, and other cultures are generally not discriminated. People in cultural denial
are not interested in understanding cultural difference and will react strongly to eliminate
such difference if it is brought to their attention. In the extreme case, those in cultural
denial view those of other cultures as somehow less than human and not deserving of
equal human rights. In the defense stage, people do discriminate the differences between
cultures but defend their own culture as the only viable one in an “us” versus “them”
mode. The other culture is viewed in stereotypes with no real depth of understanding.
People in cultural defense mode feel threatened by the other culture and must position
their culture as the superior one. Both the denial and defense stages align with Abelson’s
original denial mode where one of the contradictory images is eliminated. In
minimization, cultural differences are minimized with the idea that one’s own cultural
worldview is really universal. Cultural differences are obscured in the quest to find
similarities such as the biological nature of the human being, basic needs, or common
motivations. This approach tends to trivialize other cultures and perhaps even obscure the
fact that the individual belongs to a specific culture himself or herself. The feeling of
universality of their own cultural beliefs causes them to often correct others behaviors to
try to align them with their own. The minimization approach is similar to Abelson’s
bolstering response where one’s own culture is raised in importance and scope.
The next three orientations on the spectrum are acceptance, adaptation, and
integration, each in the ethnorelative section, meaning that one’s own culture is
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understood in the context of other cultures (Hammer et al., 2003). In the acceptance
orientation, people see their own culture as just one of many cultural worldviews. They
are able to differentiate the aspects of their own culture and other cultures, and they can
experience other cultures as valid. Acceptance does not mean agreement, and in fact
other cultures may sometimes be viewed negatively, but acceptance does mean that those
from other cultures are accepted as equally human. The acceptance stage aligns with
Abelson’s differentiation response where aspects of the image of other cultures can be
broken down into pieces, some of which will be in agreement with one’s own culture and
some of which will not. In the adaptation stage, people expand their worldview and are
able to shift cultural frames and behave in ways appropriate to another culture. People at
this stage may consider themselves bicultural or multicultural with the ability to take on
the perspective of a different culture depending on the situation. Finally, in the
integration stage, a person’s self-concept includes movement in and out of different
cultural worldviews with self-identity tied to more than one culture. Both the adaptation
and integration stage are part of Abelson’s transcendence response where cultural images
are integrated into one larger identity.
In the Bennett model, the ethnocentric orientations can be described as ways of
avoiding cultural difference, and the ethnorelative orientations are ways of seeking
cultural difference. Those that have moved into the ethnorelative areas of the spectrum
are seen as having more potential to exercise intercultural competence. A peace
professional with an academic background in peace studies or cultural awareness training
and a self-regulating internal control mechanism such as the code of conduct for blue
helmets is more likely to be accepting of other cultural worldviews. The peacekeeper

115

with field experience under this code of conduct is more likely to be able to adapt and
integrate cultural views effectively between in-groups and out-groups. It is this notion of
cultural competence in the trained and experienced peacekeeper that will be developed
into testable hypotheses in the next section.
Hypotheses for Peacekeeper Decision-Making
Based on Bennett’s model of intercultural sensitivity, I expect that the participants
from the sample of peace professionals in this study will be farther along on the
ethnocentric-ethnorelative spectrum than the undergraduate student participants. The
training, course work, and exposure to peace studies will impact peoples’ decisionmaking approaches to overcome cultural constraints. A comparison will be made between
the Ghanaian student (at UCC) and the Ghanaian peace professional (at KAIPTC) to
observe how their approaches differ, and a comparison will also be made within the
peace professionals sample to determine the effect of the amount of field experience on
the decision making process. Although the vignette does not call out different cultures, it
does specify different in-groups and out-groups in the form of the protesters, miners, and
company management. The cross-cultural (or in-group/out-group) problem is whether or
not to reveal the names of the protesters who are sabotaging the mine in an attempt to get
better benefits from the company management. How would the peace professional and
the experienced peacekeeper approach this intergroup conflict? I hypothesize that peace
professionals will be less dependent in their style and take a more problem-solving
approach than students. Also, I expect to find that experienced peacekeepers will be more
likely to cross in-group/out-group boundaries in order to solve the problem. The
hypotheses tested in this context are:
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H5: Peace professionals are less dependent in their decision-making style than
university students.
H6: Peace professionals are more likely to focus on problem solving in their
response to the saboteur problem than university students.
H7: Peacekeepers with more field experience are more likely to go outside of the
in-group for aid in solving the saboteur problem.
The dependent variable for H5 is decision-making style which is operationalized
with the GDMS scale as previously defined. The dependent variable for H6 is “focus on
problem solving” which is operationalized qualitatively through the coding of answers to
the open-ended question which provides rationale for the decision. For both H5 and H6,
the independent variable is peace professional status versus university student status, and
the KAIPTC versus UCC samples are used in those analyses. The dependent variable for
H7 is “going outside of in-group for aid” which is also operationalized through the
coding of open-ended responses. The independent variable for H7 is peacekeeping field
experience which is taken from KAIPTC data sample and the demographic of how many
peacekeeping missions the participant has been on. The next chapter will take a closer
look at the KAIPTC data sample and test these hypotheses regarding peace professionals
and their propensity toward ethnorelative problem-solving.
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CHAPTER 8
DECISION-MAKING OF PEACEKEEPRS
The three hypotheses established in the previous chapter will be tested with
quantitative and qualitative analyses on data collected from the university students in
Ghana and personnel at the Kofi Annan Center in Ghana. The results are expected to
show that the Ghanaian peace professionals are less dependent in their decision-making
style and more focused on problem-solving than the Ghanaian student population. Also,
Ghanaian peacekeepers with more experience on peacekeeping missions are expected to
be more likely to go outside of the defined in-group to solve the problem. This is an
indication that the peacekeeping community, ostensibly by virtue of their training and
experience, are further along on the intercultural sensitivity spectrum and make decisions
in a more ethnorelative way.
Defining the Samples of Peace Professionals
The data sample of peace personnel used in this chapter consists of 120
participants from the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) located in
Accra, Ghana. The personnel include research and training staff at the Center, students
from the Masters in Conflict Peace and Security program, students from peace and
security courses, and students from the course designed for police officers about to be
deployed to peacekeeping missions. All KAIPTC participants are part of the sample of
“peace professionals” that will be compared with the sample from UCC which consists of
118

204 undergraduate students as described in Chapter 5. Figure 8.1 shows how the two
samples will be compared when testing hypotheses H5 and H6 which distinguishes
between those with background in peace studies and those without.

Figure 8.1 Sample populations used for comparison in hypotheses H5 and H6
KAIPTC respondents were then separated into two categories based on their field
experience. Personnel who had no experience on peacekeeping missions were put into the
category of “non-peacekeepers”, and those who had been on one or more peacekeeping
missions were put into the category of experienced “peacekeepers”. Figure 8.2 shows a
summary of the sources of the respondents and how they were mapped to the two
categories. The “non-peacekeepers” represent those with an academic background in
peace studies or participation in peacekeeping courses but no field experience. The
“peacekeepers” represent those with field experience on peacekeeping missions and
therefore with exposure to the blue helmet code of conduct. The “non-peacekeepers” and
“peacekeepers” are compared when testing hypothesis H7.
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Figure 8.2.Samples from KAIPTC used for comparison in hypothesis H7
Decision-Making Style of Peacekeepers
H5 anticipates that peace professionals are less dependent in their decisionmaking style than university students. In order to test this hypothesis, I examine the
attributes of decision-making style as shown in Table 8.1, in addition to the individualistcollectivist attributes for context. It can be seen that the peace professionals are slightly
less collectivist, 1.2 times as much, but significantly less dependent in their decision
making. University students are twice as likely to be dependent in their decision-making,
at the alpha=.01 significance level. There is little difference shown in the rational
decision style or level of individualism. Both samples come from the same collectivist
society, Ghana, pointing to other aspects as the explanation for the difference in style
which likely comes from broader life experience due to age and exposure to other
cultures and cross-cultural issues through the study of peace and peacekeeping.
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Table 8.1
KAIPTC Versus UCC Style Attributes
Attribute

KAIPTC
(N=120)
54%

UCC
(N=204)
64%

Collectivism

73%

87%

Rational Decision Making Style

92%

97%

Dependent Decision Making Style

38%

73%

High Individualism

X2

(p-value)
2.9
(0.09)*
10.2
(0.001)***
4.7
(0.03)**
36.8
(0.001)***

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
Problem-Solving Evidence
H6 anticipates that peace professionals are more likely to focus on problem
solving in their response to the saboteur problem than students. In order to test this
hypothesis, I examine the responses to the first problem posed in the vignette. At first, it
appears that the responses of peace professionals and students are the same, because in
both samples participants chose to reveal the names of the saboteurs to the company’s
management about thirty percent of the time (27% for KAIPTC and 36% for UCC). For
the majority of participants who chose to keep the names of the saboteurs quiet, what was
their motivation? A comparison of the justification factors shown in Table 8.2 reveals a
difference in the frequency of the “solve in group” factor. For KAIPTC participants, this
factor was cited 20% of the time, more than three times as often as for UCC participants.
Undergraduate students from UCC who chose to keep the names quiet did so out of a
desire to protect the saboteurs’ livelihood and generally avoid betrayal. These participants
wrote most often about loyalty to their colleagues, mistrust of the company president, and

121

protecting jobs. In only 3% of the responses is the notion of leadership expressed in an
effort to solve the problem. On the other hand, the responses from the KAIPTC
participants frequently point out the responsibility of leadership for their in-group (the
protesters), and as the leader, how they would attempt to resolve the problem of the
saboteurs by speaking with them directly and not involving outsiders. The notion of
leadership effecting the decision occurs three times more often in the KAIPTC responses
than the UCC responses. Here are some example responses from the peacekeepers that
chose not to reveal the names of the saboteurs, because they wanted to solve the problem
within the group as the leader:


“This is something I personally have to handle at my level as a leader. I do not
have to betray the cause of my following even though I do not agree with their
modus operandi.”



“Because, as a leader, my duties are to protect the members. I will continue to
talk to them but never tell it to Mr. Owusu.”



“As the leader of the BFA, I am ultimately responsible for the actions of my
team. I need to control the actions of members of my team or dissolve their
membership as not representing the ideals and vision of the team.”
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Table 8.2
KAIPTC Frequency Distribution of Justification Factors for Telling or Not
Factor
Miner Safety

Codebook Description
Concern for safety of other miners.

Saboteurs May
Lose Jobs

KAIPTC
(N=99)
12%

UCC
(N=179)
13%

X2

(p-value)
0.03
(0.861)
0.3
(0.562)

Concern that saboteurs would lose
15%
18%
their jobs or otherwise get into
trouble.
Moral Reasons Because it's the "right" or "fair"
5%
7%
0.5
thing to do. Mentions personal
(0.473)
values, ethics, morals, or not lying.
Sabotage Was
The sabotage was understandable
4%
5%
N/R
Justified
based on the saboteurs’ desperate
position. Or the sabotage was
effective in getting the deal. In
other words, it worked.
President
Considers company President
8%
15%
2.5
Responsible
responsible for the situation and/or
(0.116)
responsible to investigate the
sabotage himself. Or doesn't trust
the President.
Not My
Not my place or not my business
0%
2%
N/R
Business
to tell.
Solve In Group Wants to convince the saboteurs to
20%
6%
14.1
stop himself/herself or within the
(0.001)***
group of protesting miners.
Betrays Group Considers telling a betrayal of the
18%
14%
0.9
group.
(0.352)
For Company
Has best interest of
7%
8%
0.1
Benefit
company/management at heart.
(0.821)
Loyalty to company/management.
Protect Self
Concern for their own position or
5%
3%
N/R
family.
Other
Other stated reason.
5%
3%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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Additionally, twenty percent of the “solve in group” responses from KAIPTC
participants add a condition that would cause them to eventually take the issue outside of
the in-group in order to bring resolution. This could be to company management or the
police, as shown in these examples written by KAIPTC participants:


“[I] would warn them to stop the sabotage. After the third time I would tell on
them.”



“I will engage them on the disadvantages of their actions and let them know I
will tell the police if they refuse to stop sabotaging the mines.”



“Not at this moment until these miners understand that sabotage is not the best
option but continue negotiating with them. If they still refuse and go on
sabotaging I will tell them my decision to report them.”

This conditional revealing of the names is indicative of a group of responses inbetween the “tell” and “do not tell” decision, even though this is not offered as an option
on the survey. Summing up the responses including this condition would change the
overall results of the peacekeepers decisions to 68% “do not tell”, 27% “tell”, and 5%
“conditional tell”. The notion of a conditional revealing of the names only appeared once
in all of the UCC student responses, less than one percent of the time. This raises the
question: what factors within the peacekeeper community pushed people into the last two
categories, both of which involve some consideration for involving parties outside of the
in-group? Hypothesis H7 assumes that peacekeeper field experience is the explanatory
factor, and this will be discussed in the next section.
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Involving Parties Outside of the In-Group
In order to test hypothesis H7 that anticipates peacekeepers with more field
experience are more likely to go outside of the in-group for aid in solving the saboteur
problem, I start with a quantitative analysis. The dependent variable of going outside the
in-group is represented by the decision to reveal the names of the saboteurs. The
independent variable, peacekeeping field experience, is represented by the number of
peacekeeping missions the peacekeeper has been on. Results of the bivariate analysis of
the decision to reveal and peacekeeping experience are shown in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3
Decision to Reveal Names of Saboteurs by Peacekeeping Experience
Decision to Reveal

No Peacekeeping

1 or More

Missions

Peacekeeping

Total

Missions
Don’t Reveal Name

Reveal Names

Total

56

18

(84.8%)

(54.5%)

10

15

(15.2%)

(45.5%)

66

33

(100%)

(100%)

74

25

99

X2 = 10.7 ; df = 1; p= .001

Interpreting across the dependent row, we see that 46% of peacekeepers with field
experience chose to reveal saboteur names compared to only 15% for peacekeepers
without field experience. The likelihood of revealing the names of the saboteurs is much
higher for experienced peacekeepers – about three times higher, in fact. The odds of
revealing the names for experienced peacekeepers are 15:18 and for peacekeepers
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without experience are 10:56 giving an odds ratio of 4.7. Peacekeepers with mission
experience have 4.7 times the odds of revealing the names compared to those without
mission experience. The chi-square value of 10.7 gives statistical evidence to reject the
null hypothesis of no difference between the two groups at the alpha=0.01 significance
level.
The peacekeepers who chose to reveal the saboteurs’ names justified their
responses with concerns for the broader community including those outside of the ingroup of miners. They wrote about concern for the safety of all company workers, about
concern for collapse of the company, and the impact of the development of the entire
town if the company were to fail. For example, peacekeepers wrote the following:
 “It will avert any future calamity which may claim lives and cause more
financial loss to the company.”
 “Because the mine is the only source of income for the community and the
more damage to it will affect all.”
 “If I don’t own who is sabotaging the mine, the entire village stand a chance of
losing their job and also stop development in the village.”
The consideration of the social group that extends beyond the company, namely
the development of the entire town, is not expressed in any of the UCC student responses
and is only expressed in peacekeeper responses.
Discussion of Findings
In sum, responses to the saboteur problem presented in the vignette reveal that the
peacekeepers at KAIPTC are more prone to problem solving and out-group inclusion in
situations of conflict. The first hypothesis on use of a problem-solving approach involves
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a comparison between the peace professionals from KAIPTC and students without
background in peace studies from UCC. Although the choice to reveal names or not is
about the same between the two samples, the justification factors are quite different based
on content analysis of the open-ended responses. When choosing not to reveal the
saboteur names, the KAIPTC peace professionals are more likely to attempt to resolve
the sabotage within the in-group of protesters and are more likely to add the condition
that if their in-group attempt failed, they would reach out to out-groups for assistance.
The responsibility of leadership is also more prevalent in the peace professional group
than the student group. Although these responses do lend support to the hypothesis that
peace professionals are more focused on problem-solving, these results should be treated
with caution because the two samples are not directly comparable due to the age
difference. The focus on problem-solving could come with age, rather than with peace
and security background. Future research could help to resolve this dilemma; however, it
may be difficult to find comparable age groups between peacekeepers and nonpeacekeepers that are also comparable on all other demographics.
The second hypothesis that more experienced peacekeepers would be more likely
to involve out-groups in problem-solving was tested within the KAIPTC sample only.
Analysis shows that those with field experience on peacekeeping missions are three times
more likely to reveal the names of saboteurs than those with no field experience, thereby
involving out-groups in the problem resolution. Considerations of the company as a
whole and the development of the entire town are taken into account in the justification
factors in these cases, and there is openness to involving company management as well as
the police. In terms of Bennett’s model of intercultural sensitivity (discussed in Chapter
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8), peacekeeping experience moves a person further along the spectrum toward more
ethnorelative traits with the use of adaptive and integrative approaches.
Combining the results of both hypotheses reveals a general progression in
intercultural sensitivity as peacekeeping training and experience occurs. As responses are
compared across non-peacekeepers (students), peace professionals, and experienced
peacekeepers the results show a trend of problem avoidance, ethnocentric problemsolving, and ethnorelative problem solving respectively. At one end of the spectrum,
denial and defense are dominant among UCC students as respondents chose not to reveal
the saboteurs’ names simply due to a desire to maintain jobs and keep people out of
trouble. Toward the middle of the spectrum, minimization and adaptation occur, as more
experienced respondents attempt to solve the problem at hand within the in-group or
conditionally going outside of the in-group. Finally, the most experienced respondents
are at the far end of the spectrum where acceptance and integration enable their choice to
involve out-groups in the problem resolution.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion drawn from the analysis in this study is that cultural norms
and values do indeed impact the decision-making process in situations of conflict. A
quasi-experimental decision-making survey was administered to undergraduate students
in two countries that differ significantly in measures of individualism and collectivism:
the U.S. and Ghana. A comparison between the responses of the two sample groups
shows an impact of culture from each of the three approaches: individual, societal, and
situated. At an individual level, evidence indicates that those who are more collectivist in
their traits tend to be more dependent in their decision-making. At a societal level,
comparison between countries reveals that Ghanaian students are more likely to protect
the interests of their inner social identity groups, and American students are more likely
to make decisions based on perceived merit. At a situated level, data supports the
hypothesis that a feeling of familiarity with the setting of the situation tends to produce
more cooperative decisions with a focus on peace.
The quasi-experimental survey was carried over into a third sample of peace
professionals in Ghana. Ghanaian peace professionals are generally more focused on
problem-solving in their approaches to the vignette in the survey, possibly due to
professional experience in peace operations or due to the general professional experience
(age) of the individual. This area could be further explored in future research with sample
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populations that are more comparable in age, life, and professional experiences to see if
peace experience particularly correlates to problem-solving focus. What is clear from this
analysis is that the more field experience peacekeepers have, the more likely they are to
go outside of the inner social group in search of solutions to the problem. Ghanaian
peacekeepers are further along on the spectrum of intercultural sensitivity than Ghanian
university students, and they show more ethnorelative responses as a result (Bennett,
1993). The ethnorelative responses are more likely to be successful in the operational
tasks of peacekeeping, because those tasks require functioning in a multi-cultural and
multi-ethnic environment where all problem-solving alternatives should be fully
considered without the constraints of the peacekeeper’s own cultural background.
Some of the common limitations of cross-cultural studies such as cultural
attribution fallacy and lack of equivalence were overcome in this study through the use of
vignettes and the careful comparison of sample demographics. Some limitations to the
validity of this study do, however, remain. The lack of randomness in the sampling
method limits the ability to generalize results to a large population. Generalizability is
also limited due to the use of university students as participants, because they do not
represent the general public. However, it is common to use university students in crosscultural studies, because they provide reasonably comparable samples across countries
with few demographic differences outside of culture (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). Also,
there is value in considering the responses of university students, because they represent
the future elite and are more likely to be in decision-making positions later in life.
The strong support for many of the hypotheses in this study has broad
implications for the fields of decision theory and peacekeeping. In this conclusion
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section, I will discuss the theoretical, practical, and methodological implications of this
research. First, I discuss the enhancements to decision theory that can be made with a
focus on improving the poliheuristic model with cultural relevance. Then, I discuss the
practical implications by applying results to the fields of international negotiations and
peacekeeping. Finally, I discuss methodological implications of the vignette approach
used in this study and how it can be expanded in future research.
A Culturally-Constrained Decision Model
The cross-cultural differences in responses of participants at the individual,
societal, and situated levels of culture lend strong support to the impact of cultural
constraints on the decision-making process as shown in the framework in Figure 4.2. The
culturally varied responses of participants do not however mean that there is an absence
of logical thought during the decision-making process. The poliheuristic model provides
a foundation for combining cultural constraints with rational thought through the twostage process model. In the first stage of the poliheuristic model, cultural norms and
values constrain decisions by setting priorities to be used in the second stage and in some
cases by eliminating certain choices completely. In the second stage, a logical process is
used to sort through any remaining alternatives based on the priorities that have been set.
For example, an American student may believe that each individual should look out for
himself or herself and that merit is the ultimate priority in making choices, and therefore,
he or she looks at the mining protest situation from a merit based point of view and
logically decides that the protesters have shown the most initiative and have earned the
benefits offered in the deal. A Ghanaian student may believe that loyalty to the social ingroup is the ultimate priority, so betraying the broader mining population is eliminated as
131

an option. From there the logical choice, in fact the only choice, is to decline the deal. A
Ghanaian peacekeeper may value in-group loyalty but ultimately prioritizes peaceful
problem resolution, so the logical decision is to attempt to resolve the problem within the
social in-group but be willing to go outside that in-group if necessary to bring peace.
Clearly not all people in each category respond in exactly the same way, for each
person experiences culture uniquely. This study organized the aspects of cultural norms
and values into three distinct areas: (1) individual traits, (2) societal influence, and (3)
situated context. Empirical results from the U.S./Ghana comparison reveal distinct effects
in each of these three categories leading to a cultural configuration for the first stage of
the poliheuristic decision model. This enhanced two-stage model provided a framework
for exploring, measuring, and comparing the different cultural constraints across the
cultures of the U.S. and Ghana and can provide a framework for exploring additional
countries and cultures in the future.
The cultural differences in the process of decision-making discovered in this
study support the need to reassess approaches that assume universal applicability such as
conflict resolution techniques steeped in Western tradition, the rational choice model for
decision-making, and elements of behavioral decision theory that presume universal
behaviors. Although the poliheuristic model makes room for non-universal factors in the
first-stage of cognitive processing where various heuristics may be applied, culture is not
directly called out in the model. My study creates a culturally specific expansion of the
poliheuristic model by explicitly adding in the constraints of culture in the cognitive
processing stage. In this model culture is represented in a way that expands on Hofstede’s
values based approach, which is only at the societal level. By adding in the individual
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level and the situated level, culture is more representative of the uniqueness of
individuals and the situations in which they find themselves.
Implications for Cross-Cultural Negotiations
The cultural constraints on decision-making discovered in this study have broad
implications for the understanding of how culture influences the interactions of people
particularly in the context of international negotiations. First, the finding on dependent
decision-making styles for collectivists is important for those who work in cross-cultural
negotiations and mediation. When bringing parties together to form an agreement, one
has to consider the cultural characteristics of the individuals at the table. Based on the
results of this study, mediators should not anticipate that collectivists will make
significant decisions without the involvement of others in their group. In such cases, it
will be important to consider group priorities and avoid pinning down collectivist
participants for independent decisions. Collectivists have a dependent decision-making
style, which means they will naturally seek the advice of others in their in-group and will
be heavily influenced by them. However, involving a large group in support of the
collectivist decision-maker is not likely to yield the optimal decision, because the effect
of groupthink may ensue. The theory of groupthink states that in-group cohesion and
loyalties will influence people to make decisions in order to prioritize consensus within
the identity group leading to low quality or incorrect decisions (Esser, 1998; Schafer &
Crichlow, 2010). What is a negotiator or mediator to do when faced with a strong
collectivist at the table? The best path would be to recognize the dependent style of the
participant and find ways to address that participant’s group concerns without actually
bringing in a large group. This could be done by emphasizing precedent of previous
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decisions made by other group members or providing a mechanism for the participant to
seek advice from a limited number of people in their group.
Secondly, the nature of the society one lives in informs the decision making
process with a strong sense of loyalty to the in-group emerging from those from a
collectivist society and a focus on individual merit arising in an individualist society. This
result suggests that collectivist societies are less prone to accepting external intervention
and are not motivated by individual achievement or reward. The humanitarian mission to
Somalia in the 1990s is a prime example of this tendency and how it can cause
significantly disruptive outcomes. The U.S soldiers on Somalia mission had a very
different experience than the soldiers who went on the hurricane relief mission to Florida.
The individualist society in Florida in the U.S. had no problem accepting assistance and
welcomed the soldiers warmly. However, members of the collectivist society in Somalia
resented the outside intervention, particularly from a society so far removed from their
own. The Somali people did not welcome the U.S. soldiers but instead refused their aid
and often lashed out against them.
For mediators, it becomes crucial that they not be seen as outsiders when working
in collectivist societies. When possible, mediators should have some connection with all
parties at the table, particularly when any are from collectivist societies. Ideally the
connection will not favor any individual party but will be part of a “super-identity”, an
identity group that all parties feel a part of. It is always possible to find some superidentity, as shown in the concentric circles of overlapping identity in Figure 4.1.
However, if the only common ground is too far out in the circle diagram, such as at the
“humanity” level, then the potency of the identity group affiliation may be too weak to
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make any difference. Intervention in Somalia, for example, may require a lead mediator
that identifies as Somali equally with other parties and factions without showing any
loyalty to a particular faction. Intervention in the civil war in Syria, another collectivist
society (Hofstede, 1980), may also require a collectivist-sensitive approach. As an
example, compare the efforts of leading diplomat and peacemaker Kofi Annan in Syria
versus his efforts in the Bakassi peninsula territory dispute between Nigeria and
Cameroon. Mr. Annan was highly successful in the Nigeria/Cameroon case where he, a
Ghanaian, and the leaders of both Nigeria and Cameroon all lived in regional proximity
in the western part of Africa. On the other hand, Mr. Annan had no strong identity
connection with the conflicting parties in the case of Syria, and his attempts at conflict
resolution there were frustrated and unsuccessful. Although there were many factors at
play in each of these conflict resolution cases, the identity of the lead mediator as an
insider or outsider likely played a significant part in the decision-making of local parties.
Thirdly, my analysis indicates that the familiarity of the cultural setting can
influence decision-making processes with more familiarity leading to a tendency to
cooperate. Applying this result to the field of negotiations implies that mediators and
negotiators should attempt to create an aura of cultural familiarity for parties in order to
elicit the most cooperative responses from them. This notion may contradict the
traditional idea of the “home field advantage” in negotiations. Just as any sports team
prefers to play at home in comfortable and familiar surroundings with support from local
fans, many negotiators prefer to negotiate at home. Being in familiar surroundings has the
advantage of avoiding discomforts of foreign territory and the distractions that
accompany them. Traditionally, the last place negotiators want to negotiate is on the
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other party’s home field. Yet, if one is negotiating with people from collectivist societies,
the findings of this study indicate that the best place to negotiate is actually on the home
field of the collectivist party in order to induce more cooperative behavior from them.
Implications for Peacekeeping Operations
Results supported that peacekeepers with more field experience are more likely to
go outside of the in-group for aid in problem-solving, showing a higher level of
intercultural sensitivity that allowed them to break through some of the cultural
constraints of decision-making. This is an indicator of the overall effectiveness of the
culturally sensitive approach to peacekeeping. While Ghanaian students demonstrate a
more ethnocentric response and a reluctance to go outside of their social in-group for
help, Ghanaian peacekeepers in this sample demonstrate a more ethnorelative response
with the ability to break through this limitation and consider problem solutions that
would involve out-group members. The peacekeepers’ ability to break from cultural
constraints on decision-making may be due in part to the awareness training they have
received including exposure to the UN peacekeeper’s code of conduct as a mechanism of
informal control. This code of conduct is part of the training at KAIPTC, and all
uniformed peacekeepers who have gone on UN missions have gone through that training
and received the pocket card of ten rules of conduct.
Future research may explore in more detail the effect of informal control
mechanisms on different cultures. Do tangible methods of informal control, such as
written guidelines or cue cards, break through the cultural constraints on decisionmaking? More importantly, do different types of informal control work better in different
cultural environments? For example, based on the research done here, the group-focused
136

nature of collectivist cultures would more likely be influenced by mechanisms built
around collective identity, such as the “blue helmet” identifier and the common code of
conduct adopted by that group. Are individualist cultures equally influenced by such
mechanisms? Individualist cultures are probably more influenced by a self-focused
approach such as regular self-evaluation of defined measures of superior conduct along
with individual recognition for good performance.
In addition to the training aspects of peacekeeping, the results in this study have
implications for the formation of peacekeeping teams. The finding that familiarity of
setting induces more cooperation implies that it is best to deploy peacekeepers from
collectivist societies to conflict settings in collectivist societies because their familiarity
will aid their effectiveness. Likewise, individualists are best deployed to conflict setting
in individualist societies. The MINUGUA peacekeeping mission to Guatemala showed
the value of aligning cultural traits by populating much of their staff with national
indigenous people. The indigenous staff was able to take testimony from local people
who felt comfortable to freely express themselves with those who spoke their native
language and understood their culture particularly in rural settings (Jonas, 2000). While
many Guatemalans welcomed the presence of the MINUGUA team, there were resisters
within the Guatemalan government who openly criticized the MINUGUA efforts and
continuously tried to restrict the mission’s mandate. The mission was at times viewed as
clearly tied to the UN in New York and an unwanted outside intervention (Jonas, 2000).
The mission was ultimately successful in implementing peace accords despite these
occasional setbacks with resisters, which could possibly have been avoided with a
different team composition.
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Methodological Implications
The field of international conflict theory has recognized the value of considering
cultural variation in applications of conflict management such as cross-cultural
negotiations and interactive conflict resolution, yet little research has been done to date to
understand the implications of cultural variation on individual decision making processes.
The results of this research lead to the conclusion that there are cultural constraints that
have an effect on the decision making process. The research in this study can be
expanded in future work along two main paths: varying the sample populations and
building on the vignette methodology. I will discuss each of these two expansions
separately.
First, the survey instrument developed for this research can be used with other
sample populations from different locations and with different demographics. Further
research is warranted in other locations of the world, as this study was limited to just the
U.S. and Ghana in an initial cross-country comparison. Incorporating other countries that
have similarities and differences in key cultural dimensions would allow for further
comparisons and refinement of the conceptual model. In addition, conducting follow-up
research on non-student populations within the same country would allow for an
informative within-country comparison to highlight different cultural constraints between
populations aside from the country location factor. This study included a sample
population of peacekeepers in Ghana to compare with Ghanaian students. It would be
useful to conduct the same survey on peacekeepers at a U.S. peacekeeping training
facility for a comparison with U.S. students to determine if a similar increase in
intercultural sensitivity occurs. It would then also be possible to compare the U.S.
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peacekeeper sample with the Ghanaian peacekeeper sample to determine if the
differences seen between U.S. and Ghanaian students are evident in the peacekeeper. It
would also be essential to compare the training approaches used in the U.S. and Ghana to
see how different the approaches may be and how those differences impact the decisionmaking process.
Second, the vignette-based approach used in this study provided an effective tool
for quantitatively capturing decisions and qualitatively exploring the cognitive process
behind those decisions. Vignettes are a useful tool for overcoming the issue of culturallyvaried interpretation of survey questions and are particularly useful in the study of values,
norms, and culture. The vignette used in this research was unique in the way that it
captured the layers of social identity groups within the story line and made them salient
with the decision choices presented. As a consequence, the responses to the open-ended
questions were rich in information to describe and understand the cognitive decision
processing of the comparative groups. The responses were almost exclusively written in
the first person and indicated how clearly the participants were able to identify with the
character and the situation. In fact, the responses appeared to be so internalized that the
independent coders were initially confused as to whether the respondents were speaking
of their own real-life situation or the fictional story. The power of this particular vignette
came from its realism so that the participants could relate to it, its brevity so that they did
not tire of reading it, and its built-in dilemmas that intrigued and impassioned them.
The success of the vignette model in the study of cultural constraints can be
expanded further into the realm of games. A vignette is essentially a simulation of a real
world event that puts the participants in a situation to comment on how the event affects
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them. In essence, the participant is playing a role that is given to them. The role-playing
nature of the vignette requires a certain “suspension of disbelief” in order for the
participant to immerse himself or herself into the scenario and reveal information about
the experience (Perla & McGrady, 2011). The vignette approach, which is one of simple
interaction between the participant and the story, can be expanded to add the element of
interaction between participants in order to enhance the experience and reveal further
information about groups, societies, and culture. By adding the element of human
interaction to the role-playing vignette technique, the methodology becomes one of game
play.
The term “game” brings various ideas to mind ranging from the child’s board
game of Candyland, to card games such as poker, to the wildly popular world of video
games. At the heart of any game is the notion of “play” which was defined by Huizinga
in 1938 with the notion of the magic circle (Huizinga, 1950). The magic circle is a
socially constructed barrier around games. Within the circle, certain norms and rules are
voluntarily accepted as absolute and set the game play apart from every-day life. For
example, within a boxing ring, it is acceptable to knock another person unconscious
whereas in every-day life this could get a person arrested. In a less physical game such as
chess, a boss and an employee can play as equals without one having to take direction
from the other. The magic circle provides a forum for socialization and learning but also
a safe place for trying out new behaviors (Sutton-Smith, 1998). The magic circle of game
play also provides a mechanism for observing human interaction and has great potential
for revealing new knowledge on culture and decision-making.
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Game play can be used as a data collection tool much like the vignette method
allowing for collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. By observing the game
play and the moves made by players, the researcher can gather information on actual
decisions made. Qualitative data can be collected through surveys, interviews, or focus
groups conducted with participants to understand their thought processes throughout the
game. The additional element that game play brings over vignettes is the human
interaction. Rather than just interacting with the story in a vignette, the participant
interacts with other players, and more social aspects of the process are likely to be
revealed. In order to investigate the cultural constraints on decision-making in future
research, the game scenario and roles would be similar to the vignette scenario and roles
with the introduction of rules for conducting negotiations, announcing decisions (moves),
and allowing subsequent decisions (countermoves). The game could be played with
participants of a single culture and also with cross-cultural participants to observe
differences.
The data collected from such game-play sessions can be used to further enhance
the socially contextualized framework of culture and decision-making developed in this
study. Computer-based modeling programs then become useful tools for representing the
interactions between players and the constraints of culture on the movement (i.e.
decisions) of the players based on a significant volume of data collected during the
games. In order to obtain a large N from group game play, a large number of group game
sessions would have to be run which does become costly and time-consuming. However,
the use of custom on-line role-play games provides a nice alternative where players can
still interact and decisions can be easily tracked by the computer. The face-to-face
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interaction may be lost, but interaction still exists and it is easier to collect larger
quantities of data for analysis.
In sum, there are significant opportunities to build on the vignette-based approach
in this study by taking the existing instrument to other countries and sample populations
and to expand the vignette instrument into a game-based instrument to introduce
interaction between participants and deepen our understanding of culture as a social
phenomenon. Within the field of conflict management, future research should investigate
decision theory specifically in the context of conflict resolution practices, peacekeeping
strategy development, and pre-deployment troop training to assess the extent to which
individuals with different demographic, professional or identity backgrounds make
decisions on whether to fight or to cooperate. Central to any such analysis is the need to
gain a thorough understanding of the deeper effects of culture on cognitive processing
and decision-making. Only through such studies will we be able to help in heeding Erick
Barronodo’s call to the youth of Guatemala, and understand why some youth choose to
pick up guns and knives and others do not. Only through a culturally-informed model of
decision theory will we be able to address the challenges raised by peacekeeping troops
such as those in Guatemala, Somalia, and elsewhere as they pursue peace in highly multicultural environments.
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APPENDIX A
FOUR VERSIONS OF THE CONFLICT VIGNETTE

1.

Individualist setting in the U.S.

This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision. Please read the
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions.

You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people. You don’t know many of your
neighbors and you don’t have any family nearby, but you enjoy living in this quiet rural town
where people keep mostly to themselves. Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary
employer in the town for years, and you along with many of the townspeople work as miners for
the company. Life as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks,
but it is the only option you have for making a living around here.
Mr. Jones is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man
in town. Mr. Jones and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay. You have watched as Mr. Jones has
grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area. While
you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand why
you have seen no benefits personally. You struggle to provide for your basic needs just as much
as you did when you first started working here at the mines.
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You and about 50 other miners have formed a protest group dedicated to gaining better pay and
benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company. You call yourselves the BFA (Benefits for
All), and you are the leader of the group. The BFA’s primary objectives are to gain better pay,
better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to gain promotions.
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to
capture any attention from Mr. Jones and the management team. The protesting miners are
frustrated and angry. Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear
to be some form of sabotage. At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down. Then the
blower stopped working. And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose,
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the
mine at odd hours. When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working. These two
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter. You have spoken to them
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen.
Mr. Jones is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather than
pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes that
a deal will end the sabotage.
Offer
Mr. Jones says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”,
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions. Along with the title
come a pay increase and a better benefits package. The other miners, however, will receive no
increase in pay or benefits. Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions.
Questions
1. Would you tell Mr. Jones who is sabotaging the mine?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
2. Why?
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Jones’ offer?
[ ] Take the offer
[ ] Decline the offer
4. Why did you make this decision?
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2.

Collectivist setting in the U.S.

This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision. Please read the
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions.

You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people where you have lived your
entire life. You like living in this rural town where the people are friendly and everyone knows
everyone else. Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary employer in the town for years, and
you along with most of your family, friends, and neighbors work as miners for the company. Life
as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks, but it is the only
option you have for supporting your family.
Mr. Jones is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man
in town. Mr. Jones and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay. You have watched as Mr. Jones has
grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area. While
you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand why
you and your family and friends have seen no benefits personally. You all struggle to provide for
the basic needs of your families just as much as you did when you first started working here at
the mines.
You and about 50 of your miner friends and family have formed a protest group dedicated to
gaining better pay and benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company. You call
yourselves the BFA (Benefits for All), and you are the leader of the group. The BFA’s primary
objectives are to gain better pay, better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to
gain promotions.
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to
capture any attention from Mr. Jones and the management team. The protesting miners are
frustrated and angry. Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear
to be some form of sabotage. At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down. Then the
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blower stopped working. And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose,
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the
mine at odd hours. When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working. These two
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter. You have spoken to them
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen.
Mr. Jones is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather than
pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes that
a deal will end the sabotage.
Offer
Mr. Jones says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”,
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions. Along with the title
come a pay increase and a better benefits package. The other miners, however, will receive no
increase in pay or benefits. Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions.
Questions
1. Would you tell Mr. Jones who is sabotaging the mine?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
2. Why?
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Jones’ offer?
[ ] Take the offer
[ ] Decline the offer
4. Why did you make this decision?
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3.

Individualist setting in Ghana

This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision. Please read the
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions.

You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people. You don’t know many of your
neighbors and you don’t have any family nearby, but you enjoy living in this quiet rural town
where people keep mostly to themselves. Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary
employer in the town for years, and you along with many of the townspeople work as miners for
the company. Life as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks,
but it is the only option you have for making a living around here.
Mr. Owusu is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man
in town. Mr. Owusu and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay. You have watched as Mr. Owusu
has grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area.
While you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand
why you have seen no benefits personally. You struggle to provide for your basic needs just as
much as you did when you first started working here at the mines.
You and about 50 other miners have formed a protest group dedicated to gaining better pay and
benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company. You call yourselves the BFA (Benefits for
All), and you are the leader of the group. The BFA’s primary objectives are to gain better pay,
better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to gain promotions.
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to
capture any attention from Mr. Owusu and the management team. The protesting miners are
frustrated and angry. Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear
to be some form of sabotage. At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down. Then the
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blower stopped working. And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose,
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the
mine at odd hours. When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working. These two
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter. You have spoken to them
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen.
Mr. Owusu is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather
than pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes
that a deal will end the sabotage.
Offer
Mr. Owusu says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”,
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions. Along with the title
come a pay increase and a better benefits package. The other miners, however, will receive no
increase in pay or benefits. Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions.
Questions
1. Would you tell Mr. Owusu who is sabotaging the mine?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
2. Why?
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Owusu’s offer?
[ ] Take the offer
[ ] Decline the offer
4. Why did you make this decision?
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4.

Collectivist setting in Ghana

This section gives you a fictional scenario with a character that faces a decision. Please read the
story and the offer that has been made to the character, then answer the four questions.

You are a miner who lives in a small town of about 4,000 people where you have lived your
entire life. You like living in this rural town where the people are friendly and everyone knows
everyone else. Polymetal Mining, Inc. has been the primary employer in the town for years, and
you along with most of your family, friends, and neighbors work as miners for the company. Life
as a miner is hard, with long hours, very low pay, and numerous health risks, but it is the only
option you have for supporting your family.
Mr. Owusu is the local president of Polymetal Mining, Inc., and is by far the most influential man
in town. Mr. Owusu and the mine engineers are the local elite, living in large mansions and
reaping in all the material benefits of their position and pay. You have watched as Mr. Owusu
has grown the company to triple its size, providing a sound base for employment in the area.
While you appreciate the value the company’s success brings to the town, you don’t understand
why you and your family and friends have seen no benefits personally. You all struggle to
provide for the basic needs of your families just as much as you did when you first started
working here at the mines.
You and about 50 of your miner friends and family have formed a protest group dedicated to
gaining better pay and benefits for all 1000 miners who work at the company. You call
yourselves the BFA (Benefits for All), and you are the leader of the group. The BFA’s primary
objectives are to gain better pay, better working conditions, and job opportunities for miners to
gain promotions.
Peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and attempts at negotiating by the BFA have all failed to
capture any attention from Mr. Owusu and the management team. The protesting miners are
frustrated and angry. Recently, a series of “accidents” have occurred in the mine, which appear
to be some form of sabotage. At first, one of the mine shaft elevators broke down. Then the
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blower stopped working. And now it has been determined that the support beams on the third
level are insecure making that level inaccessible for safety reasons.
Although nobody has been able to prove that these break-downs are being caused on purpose,
you know that they are, because you have seen a couple of the BFA members going into the
mine at odd hours. When you confronted these two people, they admitted that they have been
sabotaging the mine, because the other efforts of the BFA have not been working. These two
miners are in a more desperate situation than most, because one is in debt due to his sick
mother and the other has huge medical bills to pay for his daughter. You have spoken to them
privately at length trying to convince them to stop the sabotage because they could end up
endangering the lives of the other miners, but they refuse to listen.
Mr. Owusu is concerned about the series of break-downs and suspects sabotage, but rather
than pursue an investigation, he has decided to negotiate with the BFA through you in the hopes
that a deal will end the sabotage.
Offer
Mr. Owusu says that he will create a new company position with the title “Shift Team Leader”,
and that all 50 members of the BFA will be promoted into these positions. Along with the title
come a pay increase and a better benefits package. The other miners, however, will receive no
increase in pay or benefits. Also, the Shift Team Leaders must disband the BFA and are no
longer allowed to participate in any protest groups as part of their management positions.
Questions
1. Would you tell Mr. Owusu who is sabotaging the mine?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
2. Why?
3. How do you choose to respond to Mr. Owusu’s offer?
[ ] Take the offer
[ ] Decline the offer
4. Why did you make this decision?
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APPENDIX B
REDUCED AUCKLAND INDIVIDUALISM COLLECTIVISM SCALE (AICS)

The following questionnaire is used to measure individualist and collectivist traits. Items
are indicated with I or C to indicate they are part of the individualist or collectivist index
respectively. Each question is implemented on a scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree,
strongly disagree, or don’t know.
1.

I define myself as a competitive person. (I)

2.

Before I make a major decision I seek advice from people close to me. (C)

3.

I believe that competition is part of human nature. (I)

4.

I consider my friends’ opinions before taking important actions. (C)

5.

I like to be accurate when I communicate. (I)

6.

It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a
decision. (C)

7.

I ask the advice of my friends before making career related decisions. (C)

8.

I sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. (C)

9.

I prefer using indirect language rather than upset my friends. (C)

10.

I take responsibility for my own actions. (I)

11.

My personal identity independent of others is very important to me. (I)

12.

Winning is very important to me. (I)

13.

I see myself as “my own person.” (I)

14.

I consult my family before making an important decision. (C)
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APPENDIX C
REDUCED GENERAL DECISION MAKING STYLE (GDMS)
The following questionnaire is used to measure general decision making styles. Items
are indicated with an R, I, D, A, or S to indicate they are part of the rational, intuitive,
dependent, avoidant, or spontaneous index respectively. Each question is implemented
on a scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or don’t know.
1.

When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. (I)

2.

I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. (D)

3.

When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right
than to have a rational explanation for it. (I)

4.

I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before
making decisions. (R)

5.

I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. (R)

6.

When making decisions I do what feels natural at the moment. (S)

7.

I like to have someone steer me in the right direction when I am faced with
important decisions. (D)

8.

My decision making requires careful thought. (R)

9.

When making a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. (I)

10.

When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specified goal.
(R)

11.

I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. (A)

12.

I often make impulsive decisions. (S)

13.

I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. (D)

14.

I often put off making important decisions. (A)

15.

If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. (D)

16.

I generally make important decisions at the last minute. (A)

17.

I make quick decisions. (S)
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APPENDIX D
CODEBOOKS
Table D.1
Codebook for Decision-Making Survey
Indicator
Location

Value
Location of the respondent
0=UCC (University of Cape Coast, Ghana)
1=KSU (Kennesaw State University, GA, US)
2=KAIPTC (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Center, Accra, Ghana)

All scaled questions

Raw data for scaled questions have values as follows:
1 = Strongly agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Strongly disagree
5 = Don't know
Data is transformed in a binary fashion such that strongly
agree and agree are changed to a 1, and strongly disagree
and disagree are changed to 0. Don't know is changed to
missing data.

IND

Individualism. Uses a reduced version of the Auckland
Individualism Collectivism (AICS) questionnaire to score 7
IND items as 0/1. If a majority of the items are 1, then the
overall IND score is set to 1, otherwise 0.

HIGHIND

High-Individualism. Uses a reduced version of the
Auckland Individualism Collectivism (AICS) questionnaire
to score 7 IND items as 0/1. If ALL of the items are 1, then
the overall IND score is set to 1, otherwise 0.

COL

Collectivism. Uses a reduced version of the Auckland
Individualism Collectivism (AICS) questionnaire to score 7
COL items as 0/1. If a majority of the items are 1, then the
overall COL score is set to 1, otherwise 0.
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Table D.1 (cont’d)
Indicator

Value

RAT1

Rational on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The
score is a 1 if a majority of the rational items are 1,
otherwise 0.

INTUIT1

Intuitive on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The
score is a 1 if a majority of the intuitive items are 1,
otherwise 0.

DEP1

Dependent on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The
score is a 1 if a majority of the dependent items are 1,
otherwise 0.

AVOID1

Avoidant on the GDMS scale before reading scenario. The
score is a 1 if a majority of the avoidant items are 1,
otherwise 0.

SPONT1

Spontaneous on the GDMS scale before reading scenario.
The score is a 1 if a majority of the spontaneous items are 1,
otherwise 0.

Version

Setting of the scenario:
1 = IND (individualist setting)
0 = COL (collectivist setting)

Tattle

First decision made for the scenario:
1 = Yes, tell who is the saboteur
0 = No, do not tell (was 2 in raw data)

Why1

Open-ended response to first decision

Cooperate

Second decision made for the scenario:
1 = Cooperate (take offer)
0 = Resist (decline offer, was 2 in raw data)

Why2

Open-ended response to second decision

RAT2

Rational on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario. The
score is a 1 if a majority of the rational items are 1,
otherwise 0.
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Table D.1 (cont’d)
Indicator

Value

INTUIT2

Intuitive on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario. The
score is a 1 if a majority of the intuitive items are 1,
otherwise 0.

DEP2

Dependent on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario.
The score is a 1 if a majority of the dependent items are 1,
otherwise 0.

AVOID2

Avoidant on the GDMS scale, after reading the scenario.
The score is a 1 if a majority of the avoidant items are 1,
otherwise 0.

DINTUIT

Difference in intuitive score before and after reading
scenario

DDEP

Difference in dependent score before and after reading
scenario

DAVOID

Difference in avoidance score before and after reading
scenario

DSPONT

Difference in spontaneous score before and after reading
scenario

Realistic

Was scenario realistic?
1= yes (strongly agree or agree)
0 = no (strongly disagree, or disagree)

SimLoc

Was the scenario location similar to where I live?
1= yes (strongly agree or agree)
0 = no (strongly disagree, or disagree)

Identify

Could I identify with the character that needed to make a
decision?
1= yes (strongly agree or agree)
0 = no (strongly disagree, or disagree)

Familiarity

1=COL setting (Version=0) AND Ghana (Location=0)
0=COL setting (Version=0) AND US (Location=1)
0=IND setting (Version=1) AND Ghana (Location=0)
1=IND setting (Version=1) AND US (Location=1)
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Table D.2
Codebook for Demographics at KSU
Indicator

Value

Age

Age in years

Gender

1=Male; 0=Female (was 2 in Raw Data)

CollegeLevel

1=Freshman; 2=Sophomore; 3=Junior; 4=Senior
5=Graduate

Major

1=Arts; 2=Business; 3=Education; 4=Health
5=Social Sciences; 6-Science and Math; 7=Undeclared

BornUSA

1=Born in U.S.; 0 = Born in other country (includes Ghana)

EthnicityUSA

1=Asian/Pacific Islander; 2=Black/African American
3=Hispanic; 4=Native American; 5=White/Caucasian
0=Other

ReligionUSA

1=Buddhist; 2=Christian; 3=Hindu; 4=Jewish; 5=Muslim
7=None (was 6 in raw data, changed to match UCC)
0=Other
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Table D.3
Codebook for Demographics at UCC
Indicator

Value

Age

Age in years

Gender

1=Male; 0=Female (was 2 in Raw Data)

CollegeLevel

1=Freshman (100); 2=Sophomore (200); 3=Junior (300)
4=Senior (400); 5=Graduate

Major

1=Arts; 2=Business; 3=Education; 4=Health
5=Social Sciences; 6-Science and Math; 7=Undeclared

BornGhana

1=Born in Ghana; 0 = Born in other country (includes US)

EthnicityGhana

1=Akan; 2=Ewe; 3=Mole-Dagbane; 4=Ga; 0=other

ReligionGhana

1=Buddhist; 2=Christian; 3=Hindu; 4=Jewish
5=Muslim; 6=Traditional; 7=None; 0=Other

RegionGhana

1=Ashanti; 2=Brong-Ahafo; 3=Central; 4=Eastern
5=Greater Accra; 6=Northern; 7=Upper East
8=Upper West; 9=Volta; 10=Western; 11=None of these
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Table D.4
Codebook for Demographics at KAIPTC
Indicator

Value

Age

Age in years

Gender

1=Male; 0=Female (was 2 in Raw Data)

BornGhana

1=Born in Ghana; 0 = Born in other country (includes US)

RegionGhana

1=Ashanti; 2=Brong-Ahafo; 3=Central; 4=Eastern
5=Greater Accra; 6=Northern; 7=Upper East
8=Upper West; 9=Volta; 10=Western; 11=None of these

EthnicityGhana

1=Akan; 2=Ewe; 3=Mole-Dagbane; 4=Ga; 0=other

ReligionGhana

1=Buddhist; 2=Christian; 3=Hindu; 4=Jewish
5=Muslim; 6=Traditional; 7=None; 0=Other

Education

1=High school; 2=Bachelors; 3=Masters
4=Doctorate; 5=Other

Mlitary

Any military experience?
1 = yes; 0 = no (was 2 in raw data)

Police

Any police experience?
1 = yes; 0 = no (was 2 in raw data)

PKO

Number of peacekeeping missions they've been on (+1 in
raw data). Capped at 4, i.e. "4" means 4 or more missions.
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APPENDIX E
CROSSTAB RESULTS FOR COMPLETE MATRIX OF HYPOTHESES

This Appendix lists out the results of crosstab comparisons for each of the dependent and
independent variables in each of the operationalized forms for all nine cells of the grid
shown in Table 5.2.

Table E.1
Cell 1: Decision-Making Style by Collectivism Trait
Decision-Making
Style
Rational
Dependent

Not Collectivist
(N=69)
88%

Collectivist
(N=400)
95%

26%

73%

X2

(p-value)
3.7
(0.056)*
59.0
(0.001)***

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.2
Cell 1: Decision-Making Style by Individualism Trait
Decision-Making
Style
Rational
Dependent

Not Highly
Individualist
(N=212)
50%

Highly
Individualist
(N=257)
94%

62%

70%

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)
6.4
(0.092)*
3.5
(0.06)*

Table E.3
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Individualism Trait
Factor

Not Highly
Individualist
(N=198)
22%

Highly
Individualist
(N=236)
19%

Saboteurs May
Lose Jobs
Moral Reasons

21%

16%

12%

9%

Sabotage Was
Justified
President
Responsible
Not My Business

10%

8%

10%

12%

5%

4%

Solve In Group

7%

6%

Betrays Group

8%

11%

For Company
Benefit
Protect Self

5%

8%

5%

3%

Miner Safety

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)
0.7
(0.418)
1.9
(0.171)
0.6
(0.435)
0.5
(0.464)
0.3
(0.560)
0.2
(0.687)
0.1
(0.766)
1.2
(0.279)
1.6
(0.212)
1.2
(0.265)

Table E.4
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Individualism Trait
Factor

Not Highly
Individualist
(N=195)
13%

Highly
Individualist
(N=235)
11%

Protest Group
Benefit
Miner Benefit

15%

11%

54%

54%

Company Benefit
Achieve Peace

0.5%
7%

1.3%
8%

Follow Principles

5%

3%

View of President

4%

4%

Keep Protest Rights

1%

1%

Self Benefit

X2

(p-value)
0.3
(0.575)
2.2
(0.142)
0.002
(0.968)
N/R
0.04
(0.850)
0.8
(0.374)
0.12
(0.724)
0.1
(0.809)
N/R

Avoid Confusion
0%
1%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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Table E.5
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Collectivism Trait
Factor

Not Collectivist
(N=62)
24%

Collectivist
(N=372)
20%

Saboteurs May
Lose Jobs
Moral Reasons

13%

19%

10%

11%

Sabotage Was
Justified
President
Responsible
Not My Business
Solve In Group
Betrays Group

10%

8%

11%

11%

2%
7%
2%

5%
7%
11%

Miner Safety

X2

(p-value)
0.6
(0.437)
1.5
(0.225)
0.04
(0.847)
0.1
(0.726)
0.004
(0.950)
N/R
N/R
5.0
(0.025)**
N/R

For Company
8%
7%
Benefit
Protect Self
5%
4%
N/R
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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Table E.6
Cell 2: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Collectivism Trait
Factor
Self Benefit
Protest Group
Benefit
Miner Benefit

Not Collectivist
(N=69)
18%

Collectivist
(N=400)
11%

12%

13%

53%

54%

X2

(p-value)
2.6
(0.108)
0.1
(0.740)
0.1
(0.800)
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R

Company Benefit
0%
1%
Achieve Peace
7%
8%
Follow Principles
6%
4%
View of President
3%
4%
Keep Protest Rights
0%
1%
Avoid Confusion
0%
1%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell

Table E.7
Cell 3: Decision to Tell or Not by Individualism Trait
Decision

Tell

Not Highly
Individualist
(N=198)
42%

Highly
Individualist
(N=248)
39%

X2

(p-value)
0.6
(0.427)

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.8
Cell 3: Decision to Deal or Not by Individualism Trait
Decision

Take Deal

Not Highly
Individualist
(N=198)
35%

Highly
Individualist
(N=244)
32%

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)
0.4
(0.523)

Table E.9
Cell 3: Decision to Tell or Not by Collectivism Trait
Decision
Tell

Not Collectivist
(N=64)
50%

Collectivist
(N=382)
39%

X2

(p-value)
2.9
(0.089)*

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.10
Cell 3: Decision to Deal or Not by Collectivism Trait
Decision
Take Deal

Not Collectivist
(N=64)
38%

Collectivist
(N=378)
33%

X2

(p-value)
0.6
(0.436)

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.11
Cell 4: Decision-Making Style by Location
2

X
Decision-Making
Ghana
U.S.
(p-value)
Style
(N=179)
(N=255)
Rational
Dependent
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
Note: Even though significant p-values, the differences in likelihood are small.
Ghanaians are only 1.07 times as likely to be rational, and only 1.2 times as likely to be
dependent.
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Table E.12
Cell 5: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Location
Factor

Ghana
(N=179)
13%

U.S.
(N=255)
26%

Saboteurs May
Lose Jobs
Moral Reasons

18%

19%

7%

13%

Sabotage Was
Justified
President
Responsible
Not My Business

5%

11%

15%

9%

2%

7%

Solve In Group

6%

8%

Betrays Group

14%

6%

For Company
Benefit
Protect Self

8%

6%

3%

5%

Miner Safety

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)
11.0
(0.001)***
0.1
(0.802)
3.2
(0.075)*
4.8
(0.029)**
3.7
(0.054)*
6.0
(0.015)**
0.6
(0.444)
8.2
(0.004)***
0.6
(0.426)
1.0
(0.312)

Table E.13
Cell 5: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Location
Factor
Self Benefit

Ghana
(N=175)
9%

U.S.
(N=255)
14%

Protest Group
Benefit
Miner Benefit

9%

16%

51%

56%

Company Benefit
Achieve Peace

2%
8%

0%
7%

Follow Principles

4%

4%

View of President

5%

3%

X2

(p-value)
3.1
(0.081)*
4.7
(0.030)**
0.8
(0.384)
N/R
0.1
(0.715)
0.1
(0.873)
1.1
(0.294)
N/R
N/R

Keep Protest Rights
1%
2%
Avoid Confusion
1%
0%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell

Table E.14
Cell 6: Decision to Tell or Not by Location
Decision
Tell

Ghana
(N=191)
36%

U.S.
(N=255)
44%

X2

(p-value)
2.5
(0.115)

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.15
Cell 6: Decision to Deal or Not by Location
Decision
Take Deal

Ghana
(N=187)
31%

U.S.
(N=255)
35%

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)
1.1
(0.289)

Table E.16
Cell 7: Decision-Making Style by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting
Decision-Making
Style

Rational
Dependent

Unfamiliar Setting
(Collectivist setting in
U.S. or Individualist
setting in Ghana)
(N=241)
95%

Familiar Setting
(Individualist setting
in U.S. or Collectivist
setting in Ghana)
(N=228)
92%

64%

69%

X2

(p-value)

1.7
(0.197)
1.3
(0.256)

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.17
Cell 7: Decision-Making Style by Self-Reported Familiarity
Decision-Making
Style
Rational
Dependent

Not familiar
(N=365)
94%
65%

Familiar
(N=70)
97%
77%

X2

(p-value)
N/R
3.8
(0.051)*

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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Table E.18
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting
Factor

Unfamiliar Setting
(Collectivist setting in
U.S. or Individualist
setting in Ghana)
(N=225)
22%

Familiar Setting
(Individualist setting in
U.S. or Collectivist
setting in Ghana)
(N=209)
19%

Saboteurs May
Lose Jobs
Moral Reasons

20%

16%

11%

10%

Sabotage Was
Justified
President
Responsible
Not My Business

11%

6%

13%

9%

4%

5%

Solve In Group

6%

7%

Betrays Group

8%

11%

For Company
Benefit
Protect Self

5%

8%

4%

4%

Miner Safety

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)

0.8
(0.358)
1.3
(0.262)
0.3
(0.599)
4.0
(0.045)**
1.6
(0.207)
0.4
(0.531)
0.2
(0.691)
1.5
(0.215)
1.4
(0.243)
0.01
(0.926)

Table E.19
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting
Factor

Unfamiliar Setting
(Collectivist setting
in U.S. or
Individualist setting
in Ghana)
(N=224)
10%

Familiar Setting
(Individualist setting in
U.S. or Collectivist
setting in Ghana)
(N=206)

Protest Group
Benefit
Miner Benefit

10%

16%

54%

54%

Company Benefit
Achieve Peace

1.3%
6%

0.5%
9%

Follow Principles

5%

3%

View of President

3%

5%

Self Benefit

14%

X2

(p-value)

1.1
(0.287)
2.7
(0.102)
0.03
(0.868)
N/R
1.8
(0.177)
1.6
(0.206)
0.8
(0.358)
N/R
N/R

Keep Protest Rights
2%
0%
Avoid Confusion
0.4%
0.5%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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Table E.20
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Telling or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity
Factor

Not familiar
(N=356)
21%

Familiar
(N=68)
15%

Saboteurs May
Lose Jobs
Moral Reasons

21%

6%

11%

6%

Sabotage Was
Justified
President
Responsible
Not My Business
Solve In Group
Betrays Group

10%

4%

11%

12%

5%
7%
10%

3%
4%
6%

Miner Safety

X2

(p-value)
1.6
(0.212)
8.9
(0.003)***
1.8
(0.184)
1.9
(0.169)
0.1
(0.791)
N/R
N/R
1.1
(0.302)
N/R

For Company
5%
13%
Benefit
Protect Self
4%
4%
N/R
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell
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Table E.21
Cell 8: Justification Factors for Taking Deal or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity
Factor
Self Benefit
Protest Group
Benefit
Miner Benefit

Not familiar
(N=355)
11%

Familiar
(N=65)
15%

13%

12%

57%

65%

X2

(p-value)
1.0
(0.310)
0.04
(0.838)
15.3
(0.001)***
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R

Company Benefit
0.3%
3.1%
Achieve Peace
7%
6%
Follow Principles
5%
3%
View of President
3%
9%
Keep Protest Rights
1%
2%
Avoid Confusion
1%
0%
***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
N/R:Not reported because Chi-squared may be distorted due to less than 5 cases in a cell

Table E.22
Cell 9: Decision to Tell or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting
Decision

Tell

Unfamiliar Setting
(Collectivist setting in
U.S. or Individualist
setting in Ghana)
(N=232)
41%

Familiar Setting
(Individualist setting in
U.S. or Collectivist
setting in Ghana)
(N=214)
39%

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)

0.2
(0.647)

Table E.23
Cell 9: Decision to Deal or Not by Unfamiliar Vignette Setting
Decision

Take Deal

Unfamiliar Setting
(Collectivist setting in
U.S. or Individualist
setting in Ghana)
(N=231)
32%

Familiar Setting
(Individualist setting in
U.S. or Collectivist
setting in Ghana)
(N=211)
35%

X2

(p-value)

0.6
(0.439)

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.24
Cell 9: Decision to Tell or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity
Decision
Tell

Not familiar
(N=365)
38%

Familiar
(N=70)
53%

X2

(p-value)
5.5
(0.019)**

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1

Table E.25
Cell 9: Decision to Deal or Not by Self-Reported Familiarity
Decision
Take Deal

Not familiar
(N=364)
31%

Familiar
(N=68)
44%

***=significant at .01; **=significant at .05; *=significant at .1
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X2

(p-value)
4.4
(0.035)**

APPENDIX F
TEN RULES: CODE OF PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUE HELMETS

1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined,
caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest
integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not
abuse or misuse your authority.
2. Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs
and practices.
3. Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration.
You are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with
admiration. Neither solicit nor accept any material reward, honor or gift.
4. Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or
exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and
children.
5. Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak.
Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners,
detainees or people in your custody.
6. Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and
property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal
benefits.
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7. Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the
mission, including other United Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender,
rank or origin.
8. Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the
host country.
9. Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking
of drugs.
10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of
official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United
Nations.
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